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LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR CONTROLLING THE ASSETS 
OF ENEMY NATIONALS I N  TIME OF W A R *  
The r i g h t  of a country a t  war t o  safeguard i t s  i n t e r e s t s  by seiz- 
ing property of enemy nationals has never been open t o  question. Art ic le  
I of the Constitution of t he  United S ta t e s  provides fo r  the exercise of 
t h i s  r i gh t  by Congress. Section 8 of t h a t  a r t i c l e ,  l i s t i n g  the powers 
of Congress, includes a s  the  eleventh item the  power of Congress "To de- 
c la re  war, grant l e t t e r s  of marque and repr i sa l ,  and make ru les  concern- 
ing captures on land and water." 
In 1917, six months a f t e r  the  United S ta tes  had declared war upon 
Germany, Congress implemented t h i s  Consti tutional provision with the  
Trading with the  Enemy Act of October 6. While the  immediate purpose of 
the  a c t  was the prevention of any u t i l i z a t i o n  of German a s se t s  i n  the  
United S ta t e s  which might fur ther  the  German war aims o r  obstruct  our 
own, it was, a s  amended, "always regarded as an a c t  of permanent legis-  
l a t i o n  which could be applied i n  the  event t h a t  t he  United S ta tes  was 
again involved in war."1  The  a c t  authorized the  President and the  
Alien Property Custodian t o  seize  and control  any property i n  the  United 
States  which was owned by, or  f o r  t he  benef i t  of, a person i n  an enemy 
country o r  a person within the United S ta tes  who was proclaimed by the  
President t o  be an enemy. 2 Section 2(c)  of the  a c t  authorized the 
President t o  include, by means of a proclamation, among "enemies" any 
resident a l iens ,  thus  implying t h a t  without spec ia l  president ia l  procla- 
mation  al iens of enemy na t iona l i t y  a r e  not enemies within the meaning of 
the Trading with the  Enemy Act. Various S t a t e  courts and the Supreme 
Court of the  United S ta tes  have taken the posit ion t h a t  i n  the absence 
of a p res ident ia l  proclamation t o  the  contrary,  legally res ident  a l i ens  
of enemy na t iona l i ty  a r e  not t o  be considered enemies. 3 
On April 10, 1940, because of the  Nazi invasion of Norway and 
Denmark, the  President by authori ty  granted by section 5(b) of the  
Trading with the  Enemy Act (dealing with the suspension of economic re- 
l a t ions  with a l l i e s  of the  enemy) issued Executive Order No. 8389, ini-  
t i a t i n g  "freezing" control. This order "prohibited transactions involv- 
ing Norwegian and Danish property within the United S ta tes  except a s  
authorized by the Secretary of the  Treasury. A s  other countries were 
invaded o r  dominated by t h e  Axis, the  Control was successively extended 
during the summer and f a l l  of 1940 t o  the  a s se t s  of the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France and the Balt ic  and Balkan States.  In June 1941 the 
Control was extended t o  Germany and I t a l y  and t o  the  r e s t  of continental  
Europe. On July 26, 1941, when Japan overran Indo-China, the Control 
was invoked against  Japan. A t  the same time, freezing control  was ex- 
tended t o  China a t  the  spec i f ic  request of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 
i n  order t o  a s s i s t  China i n  the  control  of i t s  economy and i n  order t o  
prevent Japan from using the occupied areas i n  China as  a loophole l o r  
evading the freezing control. 4 
*Prepared by Ruth E. McKee, WRA Historian. 
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The F i r s t  War Powers Act, of December 18, 1941-just 1 0  days 
a f t e r  t h e  United S ta tes  declared war upon Japan.--amended Section 5 (b) of 
t h e  Trading with t he  Enemy Act, granting the  President "broader au thor i ty  
over a l l  foreign-owned property, including t he  power t o  ves t  such p r o p  
e r ty ,  " 4-a and authorizing him t o  operate through any agency he might 
designate. On February 12, 1942, the  President addressed t o  t h e  Secretary  
of t he  Treasury a memorandum which t ransferred t o  t h e  l a t t e r  t he  powers 
which Sect ions  3 ( a )  and 3 (b) of the  Trading with the  Enemy Act had 
conferred upon t h e  President.  On March 11, 1942, the  President signed 
Executive Order 9095, which created the  Office of AlienProperty  Custodian 
and delegated t o  him t h e  powers conferred upon t he  President by Sections 
3 ( a )  and 5 (b) of t h e  Trading with t h e  Enemy Act, a s  amended. Executive 
Order No. 9193, signed July  6, 1942, amended Executive Order No. 9095, 
spe l l ing  out  spec i f i c  po l i c i e s  i n  regard t o  t he  handling of property of 
persons within countr ies  a t  war with the  United S ta tes  and property of 
persons wi thin  countr ies  occupied by t he  enemy. According t o  one 
author i ty ,  i n  h i s  article,"Law and Contemporary Problems": 
"The powers of supervision, control  and vest ing of these  two 
types of foreign-owned property a r e  divided between t h e  Alien 
Property Custodian and t he  Secretary of t he  Treasury. While 
defining i n  d e t a i l  t he  spec i f ic  powers and du t i e s  delegated 
t o  each agency the  order provides t h a t  no person may challenge 
t h e  v a l i d i t y  of any a c t  of e i t h e r  t he  Alien Property Custodian 
o r  Secretary of the  Treasury on the  grounds tha t  t he  au thor i ty  
f o r  such a c t  was spec i f i c a l l y  delegated t o  t he  Alien Property 
Custodian o r  the  Secretary  of the  Treasury o r  v ice  versa. "5 
The Alien Property Custodian, i n  an Annual Report, said:  
"In contras t  with t he  method of handling enemy property t h a t  
was followed during t h e  l a s t  war, a d i s t i nc t i on  has been drawn 
t h i s  time between two broad c lasses  of property. Cash, and 
investment s e c u r i t i e s  not involving control  over spec i f i c  
productive asse t s ,  have been placed within t h e  ju r i sd ic t ion  
of t he  Treasury Department. Other types of property, par t ic-  
u l a r l y  productive asse t s ,  which must not only  be kept from the  
enemy but which a l s o  must be pos i t ive ly  controlled i f  they  a r e  
t o  continue a s  pa r t s  of our economic system, have been placed 
under ju r i sd ic t ion  of the  Office of Alien Property Custodian. 
"Property with which the  Office dea l s  f a l l s  i n t o  f i v e  
main groups: 
1. Business enterpr ises .  
2. Patents,  trade-marks, and copyrights. 
3. Real and Personal Property. 
4. Ships. 
5. Property i n  process of j ud i c i a l  administration. "6 
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The first obl igat ion of t h e  Alien Property Custodian, t he  
iden t i f i ca t ion  of fore ign property i n t e r e s t s  within the  United S t a t e s ,  
was considerably simplif ied by t he  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Treasury Department 
had taken a census of foreign-owned proper ty  a s  a defense measure p r io r  
t o  the  opening of h o s t i l i t i e s  with t he  Axis powers.5-a 
"In terms of ownership, t he  manufacturing enterpr ises ,  patents,  
and miscellaneous proper t ies  were predominantly German, the  
t rad ing  companies, banks, and insurance companiesmos t ly  
Japanese . "6-a 
PROPERTY PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE EVACUATION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 
The foregoing has described the  provisions of t he  United S ta tes  
Government f o r  w a g i n g  economic warfare and protecting t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of 
the  United S t a t e s  i n  wartime. Before t he  war was long underway another 
property problem demanded Federal a t t en t i on  and l a i d  obl igat ions  upon 
the  government t o  p ro tec t  the  property i n t e r e s t s  of  a spec ia l  c l a s s  of 
i t s  o w n  c i t i z e n s  and t h e i r  a l i en  parents,  whom no p re s iden t i a l  proclama- 
t ion  a t  any time throughout the  war designatsd a s  enemies within t he  
meaning of the  Trading with t h e  Enemy Act. These c i t i z ens  were t he  
Americans of Japanese ancestry,  who were excluded by mi l i t a ry  order from 
t h e i r  homes and sources of l ivelihood on t he  Pac i f ic  Coast. 
For roughly two and one-half years, more than 100,000 people were 
exiled from t h e i r  homes. After January 2, 1945, the  major i ty  of them 
were permitted t o  r e tu rn  t o  t he  West Coast and pick up the  raveled ends 
of the l i f e  they knew before the  forced evacuation. December of 1945 
found the  l a s t  of t he  War Relocation Authority 's  Relocation Centers 
closed and the  population of Tule Lake, t he  segregation center,  r ap id ly  
dwindling. A t  t h e  c lose  of t h e  year it was estimated t h a t  ha l f  of the  
evacuees had returned t o  t he  West Coast. The remainder have been scat- 
tered throughout t he  country o r ,  i n  t he  case of t he  thousands i n  t he  
Armed Forces of the  United Sta tes ,  a r e  serving with the  Army of Occupa- 
t i o n  i n  Europe o r  Asia. It i s  too e a r l y  yet  f o r  any s o r t  of f i n a l  
estimate t o  be made of a c tua l  f i nanc i a l  and property losses  sustained by 
the  Japanese Americans because of the  enforced evacuation, but  it i s  
recognized t h a t  t h e i r  l o s se s  have been heavy. Some l o s t  everything they 
had; many l o s t  most of what they  had. 
It i s  des i rab le  t o  consider t he  f ac to r s  which combined t o  make a 
considerable l o s s  inevi table .  
F i r s t  of a l l ,  under s t r e s s  of wartime f e a r s  and hatred,  the  pre- 
vai l ing sentiment of the  West Coast population was opposed t o  any recogni- 
t i o n  of the  r i g h t s  and pr ivi leges  of t h i s  l i t t l e  known and hab i tua l ly  
misrepresented minority t h a t  was r a c i a l l y  associated with the  enemy across  
t he  Pacific.  
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Second, with the  evacuation a foregone conclusion, the  Federal  
Government was slow t o  s e t  up machinery f o r  safeguarding the property of 
t h e  people who were t o  be evacuated, thus  allowing an i n t e r v a l  of golden 
opportunity t o  swindlers and t r i c k s t e r s  who had a t e r r i f i e d  group of 
people a t  t h e i r  mercy. 
Third, when Federal provisions were made f o r  a s s i s t i ng  evacuees 
with unsolved property problems, they  were inadequate t o  prevent i n i t i a l  
l o s s  o r  s t e a d i l y  mounting l o s s  t o  the  absentee owners during the  period 
when t h e  Exclusion Orders remained i n  force. 
Fourth, r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  safeguarding evacuee property bounced 
from agency t o  agency, f i n a l l y  coming t o  r e s t  i n  the War Relocation 
Authority a f t e r  evacuation was an accomplished f ac t ,  wel l  a f t e r  the  
period when s t rong  measures might have prevented much hardship. I n  
August of 1942, a f t e r  the  evacuation had been accomplished, t h e  War 
Relocation Authority had t rans fe r red  t o  it not only the  r e spons ib i l i t y  
f o r  evacuee property protection but a l s o  a l l  t he  problems which had 
developed i n  t h e  period when t w o  o ther  agencies had shared t h e  responsi- 
b i l i t y .  WRA was handicapped a t  t he  s t a r t  by t he  necess i ty  t o  f i n i s h  work 
begun by other  agencies operating under d i f f e r en t  policies.  
F i f th ,  most of t h e  l o c a l  and s t a t e  law enforcement au tho r i t i e s  of 
t h e  West Coast, throughout the  years of the  exclusion and t o  a g rea t  ex- 
t e n t  f o r  some time a f t e r  the  Exclusion Order was rescinded, have shown a 
considerable indif ference t o  vandalisn and even t o  arson committed upon 
evacuee property and have put up e f f ec t i ve  passive res i s tance  t o  requests  
t o  conduct invest igat ions  which might lead to a r r e s t  and prosecution  of 
offenders. 
Sixth,  the  Western Defense Command, a f t e r  ordering and c o n d u c t i n g  
t he  evacuation, took no d i r e c t  respons ib i l i ty  fo r  safeguarding physical ly  
t h e  property which t he  evacuees were obliged t o  leave behind them, al-  
though t h a t  r e spons ib i l i t y  was very c l e a r l y  assigned t o  t h e  Western De- 
fense Command i n  a memorandum of February 20, 1942, addressed by Assistant  
Secretary  of War McCloy t o  L t ,  General DeWitt. 
These f ac to r s  have contributed heavily t o  t he  f a i l u r e  of t h e  
Government's attempts t o  protect  the  property of the  evacuated Japanese 
Americans and have made the  wartime handling of evacuee property a so r ry  
pa r t  of t he  war record, Whether it i s  possible f o r  t he  Federal govern- 
ment t o  prevent heavy property l o s s  t o  any group of persons excluded 
with emotion and i n  time of war from the  region which contains t h e i r  p r o p  
e r t y  i s  highly problematical. Whether t he  evacuees w i l l  receive remunera- 
t i o n  f o r  l o s se s  depends upon the  w i l l  of Congress t o  acknowledge Federal 
r e spons ib i l i t y  fo r  losses  sustained .  
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PRELIMINARIES TO THE MASS EVACUATION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 
In  s p i t e  of r a the r  conspicuous wr i t ing  on t h e  wall ,  t h e  f a c t  of 
war with Japan came a s  a shock t o  the  g rea te r  par t  of t he  American public. 
For months a f t e r  t h e  outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s  people on t h e  West Coast 
l ived i n  momentary expectation of a t t a c k  by t he  air and sea forces  of 
Japan. Wild rumors of what had happened i n  Hawaii on December 7 f lour-  
ished and were accepted so whole-heartedly a s  f a c t  on t h e  West Coast t ha t ,  
when they  were o f f i c i a l l y  denied, some months a f t e r  the  a t t a c k  on Pea r l  
Harbor, l i t t l e  pub l i c i t y  and l e s s  a t t en t i on  were given t o  t he  o f f i c i a l  
denials, and t he  majori ty of t he  people continued t o  cherish fantasy a s  
fact .  
During the  e n t i r e  period between t h e  7th  of December 1941 and the  
o f f i c i a l  announcement of the  Western Defense Command t h a t  a l l  people of 
Japanese ancest ry  would be excluded from the  coas t a l  area--March 2, 1942- 
t he  Japanese American population was suffer ing the  e f f ec t s  of a severe 
war of nerves. Rumors were r i f e ,  crowding rad io  programs and the  news 
sheets, f ly ing  from person t o  person. The West Coast was zealous t o  get  
r i d  of everyone with a drop of Japanese blood i n  h i s  veins, and t o  do it 
i n  a hu.-ry, but  such p rac t i c a l  d e t a i l s  a s  what should be done with more 
than 100,000 displaced people and t he  r e spons ib i l i t y  of a non-fascist 
government t o  a dispossessed segment of i t s  population were not being very 
r e a l i s t i c a l l y  considered i n  t he  e a r l y  part of 1942. 
The a t t a ck  on Pear l  Harbor having occurred on a Sunday, and t he  
Government having frozen bank accounts of a l l  enemy nat ionals  a t  once, the  
heads of t he  res iden t  Japanese famil ies  were stranded with whatever cash 
they had i n  t h e i r  pockets o r  homes over t h a t  week end. Business estab- 
lishments of t h e  Issei-and t he  vas t  majori ty of t h e  Nisei  were too young 
t o  have business establishments--were closed on government order and put 
under armed guard. Many I s s e i  and Nisei  workers i n  Caucasian homes or  
businesses were promptly discharged by panicky employers. Many people of 
good w i l l  and ordinary sense were s o  confused by the  suddenness of war 
and so unaware of the  meaning and ju r i sd ic t ion  of t h e  Trading with t h e  
Enemy Act t h a t  they were a f r a id  t o  buy a bunch of c a r ro t s  from a Nisei 
vegetable man f o r  f e a r  of making themselves l i a b l e  t o  prosecution. 
Many a l i e n  f a the r s  of famil ies  were picked up by t he  FBI and taken 
away, some of them t o  be detained f o r  months pending hearings, some t o  be 
interned f o r  an i nde f in i t e  period, leaving t h e i r  famil ies  i n  want. With 
t he  press and rad io  commentators and p o l i t i c i a n s  clamoring f o r  t h e  removal 
of a l l  Japanese, with some o f f i c i a l s  of the  Federal Government promising 
t a c i t l y  t h a t  t he  removal  would be accomplished and others  promising t h a t  
it would not, and with Nisei so ld i e r s  being discharged without explanation 
by many commanding o f f i ce r s ,  the re  was every condition favoring mass 
panic on t h e  pa r t  of t h e  Japanese Americans. The u t t e r  insecur i ty  of 
t h e i r  posit ion,  t h e i r  bewilderment, t h e i r  frequent l ack  of money t o  buy 
food, a l l  conspired t o  make them the  victims of bargain hunters. 
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On .January 29, 1942 the  Attorney General, act ing upon recommenda- 
t i ons  made by General DeWitt, began designating prohibited zones, small 
a reas  which surrounded e l e c t r i c a l  plants,  dams, o r  other v i t a l  ins ta l la -  
t ions.  These areas  were known a s  "spots." I n  the  course of a few days, 
99 such spots were designated a s  prohibited zones f o r  a l iens  of enemy 
nat ional i ty .  The l a rges t  of the  spots were along the water f ron ts  of 
San Francisco, San Diego and Wilmington. The l a s t  named included 
Terminal Island, t he  Japanese f ishing vi l lage.  During the f i r s t  few days 
of February the FBI gave spec ia l  a t ten t ion  t o  Terminal Island, removing 
th ree  hundred o r  more of the  a l i e n  fishermen i n  dawn raids .  When t h e  
prohibited spots were posted, the deadline f o r  evacuation by a l i ens  was 
given a s  February 15 except f o r  a few of the  la rger  and l a s t  d e s i g n a t e d  
areas, conspicuously a 40 - square - mile area which embraced a goodly portion 
of Los Angeles Ci ty  and County. These exceptions were t o  be cleared by 
February 24. 
A t  t h a t  time it was considered suf f ic ien t  i f  the a l i ens  simply 
l e f t  the  prohibited spots. T h o s e  who had fr iends or  r e l a t i ves  over the  
l i n e  moved i n  with them, but many were without any place t o  go and were 
by t h i s  time des t i tu te .  A study of any West Coast c i t y  newspaper for  the 
month of February 1942 reveals  the general confusion tha t  prevailed a t  t h a t  
period, t he  conflicting ideas and recommendations t ha t  were geysering 
from various c iv ic  and o f f i c i a l  groups, and how l i t t l e  action of a con- 
s t ruc t ive  o r  p rac t ica l  kind was being taken t o  remedy a bad s i tua t ion .  
Desti tution among Japanese American families had been increasing 
s t e a d i l y  with the, frequent FBI r a id s  and removal of a l i e n  family heads 
With the  announcement of clearance of prohibited spots, second-hand 
dealers  and t h r i f t y  housewives began t o  work on a t e r r i f i e d  segment of 
the  population t o  s e l l  anything of value f o r  f a r  l e s s  than it was worth. 
Verbal assurances of the  Government's intention t o  help the d e s t i t u t e  
were made through the  press, but substant ia l  losses  had been sustained 
before ac tua l  machinery f o r  giving assistance was s e t  up, and extra- 
ordinary hardships were experienced by the Japanese Americans because of 
t he  f a i l u r e  of the Government t o  make spec i f ic  arrangements f o r  she l t e r  
and care  f o r  the  dispossessed who could not finance t h e i r  own removal and 
subsequently because of the  f a i l u re  of the  Government t o  publicize 
adequately such provisions a s  were made. 
A consideration of the items which appeared i n  the  Los Angeles 
Times during February 1942 on the subject of res ident  Japanese and t h e i r  
c i t i z e n  children conveys some idea of the  confusion surrounding the issue 
and of the  complete sense of insecur i ty  such confusion inevi tably in f l i c t ed  
upon t h e  Japanese Americans. 
What comfort the  Japanese American population might have drawn 
from Attorney General Biddle's  nation wide broadcast over C B S  on the eve 
of t he  a l i en  reg is t ra t ion  carried on i n  the  f i r s t  week of February must 
have been wiped out by an e d i t o r i a l  appearing in  the same issue of the  
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Times t h a t  reported the  Attorney General's message. The Attorney 
General warned the nation against  persecution of a l iens ,  promising that. 
the Department of Jus t ice  would "continue t o  be on the a l e r t  i n  protect- 
ing the i n t e rna l  secur i ty  of our country," concluding:"I want t o  point 
out t ha t  the  persecution of aliens--economic o r  social--can be a two- 
edged sword. such persecution can eas i ly  drive people, now l o y a l  t o  us, 
in to  f i f t h  column ac t iv i t i e s . "  8-c The ed i to r i a l ,  t i t l e d  "The Question 
of Japanese-Americans," by W. H. Anderson, warned i n  a d i f fe ren t  vein: 
"A v iper  i s  nonetheless a viper  wherever the egg i s  hatched. 
A leopard's spots a r e  the same and i t s  disposi t ion i s  
t h e  same wherever it i s  whelped. 
"So a Japanese-American, born of Japanese parents, 
nurtured upon Japanese t rad i t ions ,  l i v i n g  i n  a trans- 
planted Japanese atmosphere and thoroughly inoculated 
with Japanese thoughts, Japanese ideas and Japanese 
ideals ,  notwithstanding h i s  nominal brand of acciden- 
t a l  c i t izenship,  almost inevi tably and with the r a r e s t  
of exceptions grows up t o  be a Japanese, not an 
American, i n  h i s  thoughts, i n  h i s  ideas and i n  h i s  
ideals ,  and himself i s  a po ten t ia l  and menacing, i f  
not an actual ,  danger t o  our country unless properly 
supervised, controlled ,and, a s  it were, hamstrung. 8-d 
The next day's  i ssue of the  Times was v i r t u a l l y  an all-Japanese 
number, with the  f ron t  page reporting i n  d e t a i l  the  f irst  of a new 
se r i e s  of FBI dawn r a i d s  upon Terminal Island and also the f ac t  t h a t  the  
Los Angeles County Defense Council was urging internment of "all dual 
ci t izens"* and recommending t h a t  interned Japanese should be put i n  
temporary camps i n  Antelope valley. 8-g 
The Washington correspondent of the  paper reported t h a t  the West, 
Coast Congressmen were pressuring f o r  mass evacuation. The California 
State  Attorney General, Ea r l  Warren was forwarding t o  Washington the 
request of California law enforcement o f f i ce r s  f o r  immediate removal of 
a l l  a l i en  Japanese within 200 miles of the Pac i f ic  Coast f o r  the  dura- 
t ion  of the  war, and he was launching a campaign t o  seize  the land pur- 
chased by Japanese a l i ens  f o r  t h e i r  c i t i zen  children, by escheat 
The Defense Council was doubtless unaware t h a t  internment of " a l l  
dual c i t i zensn  would have p re t ty  wel l  depopulated the  coas ta l  s ta tes .  
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proceedings.8-i* Side by s ide  with the  repor t  on t h e  S ta te  attorney- 
general 's  conference with d i s t r i c t  at torneys and sher i f f s ,  was a report  
of another meeting from which the  Governor of California emerged t o  s t a t e  
t h a t  he and h i s  conferees hoped t o  "avoid the extreme act ion of removing 
a l l  adul t  Japanese t o  and concentrating them i n  the i n t e r io r  of t he  
United S ta t e s  f o r  the  duration of t he  war. " 8 - j  
From day t o  day the papers carr ied confl ic t ing reports  and rumors 
and proposals f o r  dealing with the Japanese Americans. Some o f f i c i a l s  
were promising t h a t  there  would be no mass evacuation; others were prom- 
i s i n g  t h a t  a mass evacuation was imminent. Senator Downey of California 
delivered a nation-wide broadcast defending the policy of the  Department 
of Jus t ice  i n  regard t o  t he  Japanese problem on the Pacif ic  Coast; 
Representative Costello of Hollywood took issue with the  Senator's con- 
tentions.  The f anc i fu l  and garbled conclusions of the  Dies Committee's 
then unpublished " Yellow Paper" were released t o  the  press and presented 
sensat ional ly  t o  a public t h a t  was already inclined t o  see a Black Dragon 
behind every grass  blade. 
In the  'Twenties California had known an epidemic of s u i t s  brought 
against  Japanese farmers a t  the  ins t iga t ion  of Attorney General U. S. 
Webb, author and sponsor of the  r e s t r i c t i v e  s ta tutes .  Many Japanese who 
had purchased land f o r  t h e i r  c i t i zen  ch i ld ren ,  vesting t i t l e  i n  these 
children, l o s t  t h e i r  farms by escheat proceedings. However, i n  1928 the 
Superior Court of Sonoma County ruled in the Fuj i ta  case: "Children 
born i n  California of Japanese parentage a re  c i t i zens  of the  United S ta tes  
and of California,  and a r e  en t i t l ed  t o  the same r igh t s  of property, r e a l  
and personal, a s  other c i t i zens ,  i r respect ive of t h e i r  r a c i a l  descent; a 
Japanese fa ther  though incompetent himself t o  acquire r e a l  property may 
furnish money i n  good f a i t h  f o r  the  purchase of r e a l  property f o r  h i s  
minor children, who a r e  c i t i zens  of the  United Sta tes ;  minor children 
have the same r igh t  t o  acquire r e a l  property a s  adults,  and i f  a g i f t  of 
r e a l  property i s  made  by deed t o  minors, del ivery and acceptance w i l l  be 
presumed; Japanese a l i ens  a r e  en t i t l ed  t o  the  possession of r e a l  property 
f o r  r e s i d e n t i a l  and commercial purposes under Art ic le  1 of the Treaty of 
1911 between the  United S ta t e s  and Japan; a Japanese a l i e n  parent other- 
wise competent i s  en t i t l ed  t o  be appointed guardian of the person and 
e s t a t e  of h i s  c i t i zen  chi ld  and the c i t i zen  chi ld  has the r i g h t  t o  have 
h i s  a l i e n  Japanese parent appointed a s  such guardian." The enthusiasm 
of the  S t a t e  attorney general f o r  escheat proceedings was dampened by 
t h i s  decision and other supporting ones, and u n t i l  war with Japan oc- 
curred, l i t t l e  more was heard about fraudulent ownership of farm lands 
by J a p a n e s e .  9 
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The Times of February 7 headlined General DeWitt's sabotage a l e r t  
order. 
"* * * Army spokesmen sa id  t he  sabotage a l e r t  was State- 
wide, but would not e laborate  on reasons f o r  t he  warning. 
They said ,  however, it did not concern an a i r - ra id  
poss ib i l i ty .  
"The a l e r t  came a f t e r  Tom C. Clark, a l i e n  control  admin- 
i s t r a t o r  i n  San Francisco, announced t h a t  between 200 and 
300 c i t i z e n s  of Japan, Germany and I t a l y  w i l l  receive 
wr i t t en  not ices  by next Monday t o  leave prohibited areas. 
"He said  o ther  groups t o t a l i n g  10,000 in Cali fornia  and 
including 1,800 i n  t he  Los Angeles a rea  must obey the  
Federal ouster  order by February 24. Clark said t h a t  while 
it was not intended t o  impose add i t iona l  evacuations from 
ag r i cu l t u r a l  areas  a f t e r  February 24, the  Army is resur- 
veying c i t y  t e r r i t o r y ,  indicat ing possible fu r the r  movement 
from those zones. 
"The no t ices  t h e  a l i e n s  w i l l  receive through t h e  m a i l  w i l l  
i n s t r u c t  them t o  go t o  the  Socia l  Secur i ty  Board o f f i c e s  i n  
t h e i r  communities, They w i l l  be given information and ac- 
cess  t o  a t torneys  t o  l e a rn  t h e i r  c i v i l  r i gh t s ,  i f  they  
des i re ,  and w i l l  receive funds i f  they cannot finance t h e i r  
enforced moves, 
"Efforts  w i l l  be made t o  ge t  them jobs i n  t h e  in ter ior-  
perhaps i n  Utah, Clark said.  
"Possibilities of deta ining a l i e n  and other dangerous 
Japanese i n  t h e  County's s t r i ng  of mountain road camps and 
t h e  ja i l  honor farm a t  Castaic were explored yesterda by 
Supervisor Roger Jessup and Sher i f f  Biscailus. " 8-w [The 
idea  of using the  j a i l  honor f a r m ,  it was explained, could 
not be developed unless t h e  Army would accept a l l  t he  current  
honor system pr isoners  f o r  service,  thus vacating t h e  honor 
farm.]
A continuation of the  f ron t  page s tory ,  found on an inner page i s  
the  f i r s t  s ign of public awareness of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  the  Japanese 
res idents  were being victimized: 
"Determined t o  h a l t  asser ted racketeering by junkmen and 
secondhand fu rn i t u r e  dealers  upon t h e  confused and panicky 
fami l ies  of a l i e n  Japanese seized by t he  Federal Bureau of 
Investigation a t  Fish Harbor, Captain Basi l  Starkey of the  
San Pedro police d iv i s ion  assigned a d e t a i l  of f i v e  men t o  
t he  Terminal Island area. 
( 9 )  
"Starkey quoted K. Nigashi, president of t he  Japanese- 
American Cit izens '  League, a s  complaining junkmen,  and used 
fu rn i t u r e  dea le r s  were t e l l i n g  wives of a r res ted  a l i ens  t h a t  
t h e  Federal government intended t o  se ize  t h e i r  household 
belongings. 
"Through t h i s  technique they were buying r e f r i ge r a to r s , ,  
radios ,  s toves and other fu rn i t u r e  costing from $50 t o  $200 
f o r  from $4 t o  $5, loading t h e i r  purchases on t h e i r  t rucks   
and dr iv ing  away, Higashi complained. 
"The police were ins t ructed t o  aid  Higashi i n  warning h i s  
people not  t o  s a c r i f i c e  t h e i r  belongings, 
"Higashi was a iding Y. Sakamoto, head of t he  Southern 
Cal i fornia  Japanese Fishermen's Association, t o  r e g i s t e r  
a l i ens  a t  the  l o c a l  postoffices.  They a l s o  were attempting 
t o  prevent hunger or de s t i t u t i on  among famil ies  of a l i ens  
now i n  custody, 
"Sakamoto said he was obtaining power of a t torney from 
a l i e n  owners of j igboats t o  permit t h e i r  s a l e  t o  provide 
funds t o  support t he  fishermen's famil ies  pending rece ip t  of 
Federal aid.  About 45 of t he  small f i sh ing  boats a r e  
involved." 8-w 
The Terminal Islanders a s  a group were perhaps more thoroughly 
victimized than was any other group of Japanese Americans. Terminal 
Island began t o  develop a s  a f i sh ing  v i l l age  i n  1901. After 1907 i t 's  
population was enlarged only by parents,  wives, and chi ldren of t he  
fishermen. These immediate family members of res iden t  fishermen were 
allowed passports  t o  the  United S t a t e s  under t he  provisions of t he  
Gentleman's Agreenent.By  1917 Terminal Island had reached i ts  maxim 
development. By 1942 t he  a l i ens  of t he  colony had been i n  t he  United 
S t a t e s  fo r  a long time.13 Suddenly, with t he  outbreak of war, they and 
t h e i r  only  means of l ivel ihood were suspect. Hundreds of the  immigrant 
generation men were snatched from t h e i r  famil ies  and taken away by the  
FBI. The a l i e n s  l e f t  behind were not permitted t o  operate t h e i r  boats, 
and s ince  most of the  boats were operated by the  cooperative labor  of 
f a the r s  and sons, with t he  fa thers '  presence and superior s k i l l  e s sen t i a l ,  
t he  c i t i z e n  sons were unable t o  continue f i sh ing  and a l l  means of l i v e l i -  
hood ceased. Unable t o  p ly  the  only  c r a f t  they  knew,  these  people read 
o r  heard one half-fledged plan a f t e r  another f o r  the  disposal  of the  
Japanese population. It became increas ingly  ce r t a in  t h a t  they were 
going t o  have t o  leave t h e i r  homes, but where they were t o  go remained 
an unsolved problem f o r  l a rge  numbers of them. There was every reason 
f o r  them t o  be bewildered. 
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On Tuesday, February 10, 1942, posters  were put up on Terminal 
Island by Department of Ju s t i c e  order, warning a l l  a l i e n s  t h a t  t he  dead- 
l i n e  f o r  t h e i r  departure from t h e  is land was the  following Monday, 
February 16. However, on February 11, without warning, a p r e s i d e n t i a l  
order t rans fe r red  Terminal Island t o  t h e  ju r i sd ic t ion  of the  Navy, and 
Secretary Knox ins t ruc ted  Rear Admiral R. S. Holmes, Commandant of t he  
11th Naval D i s t r i c t  i n  San Diego t o  no t i fy  a l l  r es iden ts  of Terminal Is- 
land t h a t  t h e i r  dwellings would be condemned and t h a t  they  would be 
evicted wi thin  30 days. 8-Y This arrangement cancelled the  order of t h e  
Department of Jus t i ce ,  and on t he  face  of t he  matter it seemed t o  con- 
s t i t u t e  a reprieve of ev ic t ion  sentence. Before a week had passed, t h e  
res idents  of Terminal Island were ordered t o  be out within 48 hours of 
not i f ica t ion.  
The Terminal Islanders suffered spec i a l  confusion and handicap 
because of the  changes i n  ju r i sd ic t ion ,  changes i n  ins t ruc t ions ,  and t he  
omission of individual. m a i l  no t ices  of evic t ion which a l i en s  l i v i n g  with- 
i n  the  a reas  designated by Just ice  a s  prohibited spots  received. These 
individual  not ices  ins t ruc ted  the  rec ip ien t  t o  go t o  h i s  l o c a l  Soc ia l  
Secur i ty  Board-and gave him t h e  address of the  office-where he might 
ava i l  himself of f u r the r  ins t ruc t ions  and such ass i s tance  as he needed 
and could be provided by t h e  Government. 
The Federal Government, using Tom Clark a s  coordinator, had ar- 
ranged with t h e  Soc ia l  Secur i ty  Board t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  would loan t o  t he  
Department of Jus t i ce ,  personnel from t h e  Bureau of Public Assistance t o  
r eg i s t e r  and a s s i s t  a l i ens  affected by t he  designation of spots  prohibited 
t o  a l i ens  of enemy na t iona l i ty .  These people functioned i n  t h e  USES of- 
f i c e s  wi thin  each country, t heo re t i c a l l y  a t  t he  same time t h a t  t h e  De- 
partment of Ju s t i c e  was conducting a l i e n  r eg i s t r a t i on  a t  the  post  o f f ices ,  
from February 2 t o  9. The Los Angeles o f f ice ,  however, did not open 
u n t i l  February 9. 
By au tho r i t y  of t h e  Alien Regis t ra t ion Act of 1940, all a l i e n s  14 
years of age o r  over, whatever t h e i r  country of o r ig in ,  had been regis tered 
i n  t h a t  year. The 1942 r eg i s t r a t i on  was confined t o  a l i ens  of enemy 
nat ional i ty ,  and it was conducted under au thor i ty  conferred by Presiden- 
t i a l  Proclamation No. 2537 issued January 14 1942. Each enemy a l i e n  who 
was 14 years of age o r  older was again required t o  f i l l  out a question- 
nai re ,  t o  provide photographs, and t o  be f ingerprinted.  
Aliens required by Department of Ju s t i c e  orders t o  move out of a 
prohibited spot were t o l d  t h a t  they could ge t  ass i s tance  from the  Soc ia l  
Secur i ty  Board, but no pressure was put upon them t o  go t o  these  o f f i c e s  
s e t  up wi thin  USES of f ices .  When  an a l i e n  went t o  h i s  l o c a l  Socia l  
Secur i ty  Board, he was asked t o  show h i s  r eg i s t r a t i on  card, and i f  he 
could not produce one, he  was sen t  a t  once t o  the  post o f f i c e  and to ld  t o  
re tu rn  with h i s  card. The Soc ia l  Secur i ty  Boards regis tered a l l  a l i ens  
 
                                           ( 11 )   
who cal led with a view t o  determining who needed assistance and what kind 
of assistance.  These boards were provided with a special  fund and with 
au thor i ty  t o  provide vans for  moving possessions, t o  make small cash 
grants  and t o  provide grocery orders on request. According t o  reports  of 
those who worked on t h i s  program, comparatively few requests f o r  ass i s t -  
ance were made by Japanese a l iens .  In  the  majority of cases, during t h i s  
phase of exclusion movements, o n l y  t h e  a l i e n  members of a family l e f t  the 
prohibited zone. In many instances the fa ther  of a family was a l i e n  and 
the  mother a c i t izen,  i n  which case only the f a the r  moved across the  l ine .  
I n  other instances, both parents might be a l ien ,  but i f  one of the  c i t i -  
zen children was old enough t o  take over the home and business, the chil- 
dren would s t a y  and the parents would move out. In general, only i n  
cases where both parents were a l i en  and the children too young t o  be l e f t  
alone did the e n t i r e  family move. The Social  Securi ty  off ices  functioned 
f o r  the  benef i t  of Japanese, German and I t a l i a n  a l i ens  up t o  February 19, 
when Executive Order No. 9066 was approved. After t ha t  they confined 
t h e i r  a t ten t ions  t o  the  Japanese; no more Germans o r  I ta l ians  were moved 
out. With General DeWitt's Proclamation No. 1, of March 2, 1942, Depart- 
ment of Jus t ice  orders were cancelled i n  favor of arrangements devised by 
the  Commanding General of the  Western Defense Command. During the period 
of March 2 t o  March 29, Japanese a l i ens  who had been evicted under De- 
partment of Just ice  orders were l ega l ly  i n  a posit ion t o  re turn t o  t he i r  
homes, i f  they had chosen t o  do so-until the  mi l i t a ry  moved a l l  persons 
of Japanese ancestry  i n t o  assembly centers some weeks l a t e r .  
To re turn  t o  the  pl ight  of the  Terminal Islanders,  on 48 hours' 
not ice  and without any d i r e c t  information on where they m i g h t  turn for  
help from the  Government, the  Japanese residents,  c i t i z e n  a s  well a s  
a l ien ,  aged and infant ,  had t o  leave. Certain church groups, the  
American Friends Service Committee, and a group known a s  Friends of the 
American Way-organized i n  Pasadena t o  oppose persecution of the  
Japanese Americans-went t o  work t o  help the uprooted people. 
A l a rge  building a t  506 North Evergreen S t r ee t  i n  the  Boyle Heights 
d i s t r i c t  of Los Angeles was converted i n t o  a temporary hostel .  Previ- 
ously t he  building had housed a language school and had served a s  a com- 
munity center f o r  the  Japanese res idents  of the  neighborhood. In 
emergency it could she l te r  600 people. A s  need arose with t he  clearance 
of "spots," churches and other language schools were converted t o  use a s  
hostels-at Compton, Saratoga, Norwalk, Blue H i l l s  and E l  Monte. However, 
t he  castouts  from Terminal Island found haven, f o r  the most par t ,  i n  the 
Forsyth Hostel i n  Boyle Heights. The f r iendly  groups worked a t  high 
speed, begging, borrowing and renting del ivery and farm trucks t o  carry 
famil ies  and such of t h e i r  possessions a s  had not f a l l en  in to  t he  hands 
of junk dealers  t o  the  hos te l  or  t o  r e l a t i ves  or  f r iends with room t o  
accommodate the  homeless outside the  prohibited area. Time was short, 
and i n  s p i t e  of the  e f f o r t s  and good w i l l  of the  helpers, much property 
had t o  be abandoned because there  was not time t o  load it onto the  trucks 
and get  it off the island within t h a t  48-hour period allowed. 
(12) 
ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTING EVACUEE PROPERTY 
Formal procedures f o r  protecting evacuee property and the  r i g h t s  
of t he  owners were slow i n  being established.  General DeWitt in h i s  
recommendations of February 14 t o  t h e  Secretary  of War included a s  a 
f i n a l  item: 
"Pending fu r the r  and de ta i l ed  study of t he  problem, it i s  
fu r the r  recommended : (1) That the  Commanding General, 
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, coordinate with 
t h e  l o c a l  and S t a t e  au thor i t i es ,  i n  order t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
t h e  temporary physical  protect ion by them of t he  property 
of evacuees not taken with them; (2) That t h e  Commanding 
General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, deter- 
mine t he  quant i ty  and character  of propertyt which the  
adu l t  males * * *  may be permitted t o  take with them; and 
(3) That t he  Treasury Department or  o ther  proper Federal 
agency be responsible f o r  t he  conservation, l iquidat ion,  
and proper d i spos i t ion  of the  property of evacuees if it 
cannot be cared f o r  through t he  usual  and normal channels." 7 
On February19, 1942, ac t ing  on t he  recommendations of the  West 
Coast Delegation and h i s  Cabinet members, the  President of the  United 
Sta tes ,  invoking the  extraordinary powers granted  the  Chief Executive i n  
time of war, signed Executive Order No. 9066, authorizing the  Secretary 
of War t o  prescribe mi l i t a ry  areas. The first two paragraphs of t h e  
order s e t  f o r t h  i t s  j u s t i f i c a t i on  and pa r t i cu l a r  purpose: 
"WHEREAS, The successful  prosecution of t he  war requires  
every possible protection against  espionage and against 
sabotage t o  national-defense material ,  national-defense 
premises and national-defense  Utilites* * *   
"NOW THEREFORE, By v i r t u e  of the  au thor i ty  vested i n  me as  
President of t he  United S ta tes ,  and C o m m a n d e r  i n  Chief  of 
t h e  Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and d i r e c t  t h e  Secre- 
t a r y  of War, and t he  Mil i tary  Commanders whom he may from 
time t o  t i m e  designate, whenever he o r  any designatedCom- 
mnder deems such ac t ion  necessary o r  des i rable ,  t o  prescribe 
mi l i t a ry  areas  i n  such places and of such extent  as he or 
the  appropriate Mil i tary  Commander may determine, from 
which any o r  a l l  persons may be excluded, and with respect  
t o  which, the  r i g h t  of any person t o  enter ,  remain i n ,  o r  
leave s h a l l  he subject  t o  whatever r e s t r i c t i o n  the  Secre- 
t a r y  of War or  t he  appropriate Mi l i t a ry  Commander may im- 
pose i n  h i s  d iscre t ion.  The Secretary of War i s  hereby au- 
thorized t o  provide f o r  res iden ts  of any such area  who a r e  
excluded therefrom, such t ranspor ta t ion,  food, she l t e r ,  
and other accommodations a s  may be necessary i n  the  judgment 
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of t h e  Secretary of War, or t he  sa id  Military  Commander, 
and until other arrangements a r e  made, t o  accomplish t h e  
purpose of t h i s  order. The designation of m i l i t a ry  a reas  
in any region o r  l o c a l i t y  s h a l l  supersede designations of 
prohibited and r e s t r i c t ed  areas  by the  Attorney General 
under t he  Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and s h a l l  
supersede t he  r e spons ib i l i t y  and au thor i ty  of t he  Attorney 
General under t he  sa id  Proclamations i n  respect  of such 
prohibited and r e s t r i c t e d  areas." 
I n  authorizing the  Mil i tary  t o  exclude "any o r  a l l  persons whom 
the Mi l i t a ry  might  see f i t  t o  designate from home and source of l i v e l i -  
hood, t h e  Chief Executive was giving the mi l i t a ry  power over c i v i l i a n  
l i f e  t h a t  was unprecedented i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  except under conditions 
of mar t i a l  law; a l s o  he was incurring an obligation on the  par t  of the  
Federal Government t o  p ro tec t  the  property r i g h t s  of such persons a s  
should be excluded by mi l i t a ry  order. 
Assistant Secretary  of War McCloy under whose supervision Execu- 
t i v e  Order No. 9066 had been draf ted immediately upon h i s  re tu rn  t o  
Washington from West Coast, conferences with the  Commanding General of 
t he  Western Defense Command, d id  not include i n  t h a t  document any in- 
s t r uc t i on  a s  regards the  protection of evacuee property. However, i n  a 
memorandum which the  Assistant Secretary  forwarded t o  Lt. General  DeWitt 
on, February 20, 1942, a memorandum containing r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  based on 
t h e  Assistant  Secretary 's  survey of t he  West Coast s i tua t ion ,  Mr. McCloy 
s t ressed  t h e  necessity of safeguarding the  property of evacuated persons: 
"It w i l l ,  of course, be necessary t h a t  your plans include 
provision f o r  protection of the property, pa r t i cu l a r l y  t he  
physical  property, of evacuees. A l l  reasonable measures 
should be taken through publ ic i ty  and other means, t o  en- 
courage evacuees t o  take s teps  t o  protect  t h e i r  own property. 
When evacuees a r e  unable t o  do t h i s  p r i o r  t o  t he  time when 
it i s  necessary f o r  them t o  comply w i t h  the  exclusion or- 
ders ,  there  is  always danger t h a t  unscrupulous  persons 
w i l l  take undue advantage or  t h a t  physical property un- 
avoidably l e f t  behind w i l l  be pil laged by lawless elements. 
The protection of physical property f rom  t h e f t  o r  other 
harm i s  primarily t he  responsibility  of s t a t e  and l oca l  law- 
enforcement agencies, and you w i l l  doubtless c a l l  upon them 
fo r  the  maximum ass is tance i n  t h i s  connection. Where they 
a r e  unable t o  protect  physical p rope r ty  l e f t  behind i n  mili- 
areas,  t h e  respons ib i l i ty  will be yours, t o  provide 
reasonable protect ion,  e i t he r  through the use of troops or  
through  other appropriate measures.* The appointment by you 
* I t a l i c s  not in or ig ina l .  
(14 )  
of a property custodian and the  c rea t ion  by him of an organi- 
za t ion t o  dea l  with such property i n  mi l i t a ry  areas  may 
become necessary. The provisions of t he  Executive Order and 
t h e  necess i ty  in each given ins tance a r e  such t h a t  you have 
au tho r i t y  t o  take such action,  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  through 
another f ede ra l  agency. In t he  development of your program, 
it i s  desired t h a t  you accomplish it w i t h  t h e  minimum of 
individual  hardship and d i s loca t ion  of business and i ndus t r i e s  
consis tent  with safety,  7-a 
It was ce r ta in ,  a f t e r  February 19, 1942, t h a t  a mass evacuation 
of t h e  people of Japanese ancest ry  from the  West Coast would take place. 
On March 2, General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1, i n  which he 
designated Mi l i t a ry  Area No. 1, consis t ing of the  western halves of t h e  
Pac i f i c  Coast S t a t e s  and t he  southern port ion of Arizona, and Mi l i t a ry  
Area No. 2, consis t ing of the  remaining pa r t  of those Sta tes .  He fol-  
lowed the  proclamation with a press r e l ea se  i n  which he s ta ted t h a t  t h e  
Japanese na t iona l s  and a l l  persons of Japanese descent would be t he  
f i r s t  t o  go and i n  which he advised a l l  persons of Japanese ancestry t o  
go voluntar i ly .  It was a l s o  announced a t  t h i s  time t h a t  clearance of  
Military  Area No, 2 was not ant ic ipated.  The delay i n  s e t t i n g  up any 
procedures f o r  safeguarding the  property of t h e  excluded people i s  
emphasized by t h e  following passage contained i n  General DeWitt's f i n a l -  
repor t  : 
"Between March 2 and March 10, 1942, t h e  discussions a s  
t o  evacuation procedures were general  i n  nature  and 
spec i f i c  planning had not emerged. The voluntary movement 
did  not gain momentum because means had not been provided 
on t he  ground f o r  aiding evacuees i n  the  solution of per- 
sonal  problems incident  t o  t h e i r  voluntary exodus. 
" P r i o r  t o  March 10 the  General S t a f f  of t he  Western  
Defense Command and Fourth Army had not engaged i n  any 
extensive planning o r  preparation f o r  t h e  program. The 
t a c t i c a l  du t i e s  imposed upon it were such t h a t  it was 
unable t o  do so  and a t  t h e  same time meet the  responsi- 
b i l i t i e s  imposed on t he  Headquarters by t he  e s sen t i a l l y  
m i l i t a r y  aspects of i t s  mission. Accordingly, on March 10, 
by General Order No. 34, the  Commanding General es tabl ished 
t h e  C iv i l  Affai rs  Division a s  an addi t ion t o  h i s  general  
s t a f f .  On the  day following, by G e n e r a l  Order No. 35, he 
created t h e  Wartime C iv i l  Control Administration, an operating 
agency of h i s  Command t o  ca r ry  out assigned missions involving 
c i v i l  control." 7-b 
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A l i t t l e  fur ther  along the report  s ta tes :  
" A s  an i n i t i a l  s tep  i n  the f a c i l i t a t i o n  of voluntary 
emigration, 48 Wartime Civil  Control Administration 
of f ices  were established, one i n  each important center of 
Japanese population i n  the affected area. These off ices  
were s taffed by representatives of the cooperating Federal 
agencies which had agreed t o  undertake certain specif ic  
respons ib i l i t ies  i n  the program. The Federal Reserve Bank 
and the Farm Security Administration had undertaken t o  
provide property protection, under the direction of the 
Wartime Civil  Control Administration--the former, primarily 
a s  t o  business and personal property; the l a t t e r  primarily 
respecting agricul tural  property. The Federal Security 
Agency, through i t s  various associated agencies, had agreed 
t o  provide necessary soc ia l  services. The 48 Wartime Civi l  
Control Administration of f ices  (which became known a s  'War -  
time Civil  Control Administration Service Centers')* were 
s ta f fed  by a team with one or  more representatives from 
each of these agencies. 7-c 
Responsible c i t izens  and some o f f i c i a l s  had been concerned about 
the lack  of provisions for  safeguarding property of the people selected 
f o r  evacuation. The Fourth Interim R e p o r t  of the Tolan Committee on i t s  
Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others 
from Prohibited M i l i t a r y  Zones, May 1942, was emphatic i n  i t s  cr i t ic i sm 
of t h i s  lack. 
"Witness a f t e r  witness, appearing before the committee, 
deplored the f ac t  t ha t  no provision was being made fo r  pro- 
tec t ing  the property of the persons who had already been, o r  
were about t o  be evacuated. Evidence tha t  there were numerous 
instances of sa les  of personal property a t  great sacr i f ice  
appear throughout the record. In  addition t o  the unanimous 
demand f o r  appointment of some agency with authority t o  take 
custody of property, both personal and agricul tural ,  sugges- 
t ions  were made tha t  other minor but important de ta i l s ,  such 
a s  t a x  deferments and mortgage moratoriums should be given 
serious consideration. " 14 
The report r e fe r s  t o  and quotes from  the testimony of ministers, 
lawyers, the regional director  of the Social Security Board, t he  
regional d i rec tor  of the Farm Security Administration, S ta te  at torney 
generals, welfare workers, educators, and representatives of benevolent 
* The average busy person referred t o  them more simply a s  "Control 
Stations,  " (16) 
societ ies ,  pointing t o  specif ic  instances of widespread preying upon a 
frightened segment of the population. It quotes a t  length from the 
testimony of Carey McWilliams, then chief of the division of immigration 
and housing, California Department of Industr ia l  Relations, given in  
Los Angeles i n  ear ly  March-the hearings took place from February 21 
through March 12, a t  San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland and Seattle.  
"There  i s  ample evidence tha t  soc ia l  and economic vultures 
a r e  already preying upon the unfortunate a l iens  who expect 
t o  be evacuated. They a r e  to ld  t o  dispose of t h e i r  property 
and are  frequently offered ridiculous sums which i n  panic 
and desperation the evacuees are  inclined t o  accept. Stor ies  
a r e  a l so  being circulated which indicate t h a t  unless great  
care i s  exercised, and tha t  immediately, we sha l l  have a 
repe t i t ion  here of what transpired i n  Germany and i n  other 
countries a s  the r e su l t  of large-scale evacuation. People 
have been threatened tha t  unless they dispose of t h e i r  
property t o  those who are  eager for  it, they w i l l  be reported 
t o  the Federal Bureau of Investigation and t h e i r  property 
w i l l  be confiscated. In the absence of a statement from 
high Government au thor i t ies  t o  the contrary, the a l iens  who 
a re  a t  the mercy of rumors and rumor mongers have no choice 
but t o  accept what they a re  told a t  the moment. The immediate 
creation of an Alien Property Conservator or a bureau for  
i t s  conservation, with an immediate announcement tha t  trans- 
act ions under duress w i l l  not be recognized and tha t  the 
i n t e r e s t s  and property of a l iens  w i l l  be protected i n  every 
way, would not only give the unfortunate victims  a sense of 
needed r e l i e f ,  but make them feel t h a t  they are  l iv ing  i n  a 
country where human digni ty and human values a re  more than 
mere phrases mouthed by pol i t ic ians.  It is absolutely 
e s sen t i a l  t ha t  the problem of a l i en  property conservation 
be handled a s  an in t eg ra l  par t  of the en t i r e  program. In 
other words, a l i en  property conservation should const i tute  
a function of the authori ty  proposed, and should not be 
handled i n  an unrelated and uncoordinated manner. 
" A l s o  a moment's re f lec t ion  w i l l  suff ice t o  indicate  t h a t  
there a re  l i t e r a l l y  hundreds of minor but important problems 
involved, such a s  the  possible necessity fo r  working out 
ways and means t o  defer  payment of taxes and contractual 
obligations. A l l  of these problems should be centralized 
i n  the Authority, because of the i r  intimate connection with 
the problem of welfare, maintenance, property conservation, 
preservation of morale, etc. 
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"The foregoing program w i l l ,  no doubt, require modification 
from time t o  time a s  the s i tua t ion  develops. But i f  put 
i n t o  execution promptly with scrut iniz ing a t ten t ion  t o  the  
select ion of personnel and the elimination of the usual in te r -  
departmental d i f f i c u l t i e s  and jur i sd ic t iona l  conf l ic t s  it 
would, I am confident, meet a l l  the  requirements s e t  f o r  it. 
It would above a l l  demonstrate t h a t  democracy can work 
e f f ic ien t ly ,  effect ively,  and with t h a t  consideration f o r  
the  welfare of the people who brought it i n t o  being, which 
d i f f e r en t i a t e s  it from autocracy and makes it worthy of any 
sacr i f ice .  14-a 
The committee a t  the  c lose of the first hearings-in San 
Francisco--had sent  a telegram t o  Speaker Rayburn, the President, the  
Secretary of the  Treasury, the  Attorney General, and the Secretary of 
War. 
" W e  urge the  immediate establishment of a regional al ien- 
property custodian o f f i ce  f o r  the  Paci f ic  coast area. We
have learned of numerous sac r i f i ce  sales  by aliens;  t h i s  
o f f i ce  should have existed before the evacuation of 
February 15. It must be functioning before addit ional,  
prohibited areas  a r e  evacuated. Many witnesses before t h i s  
committee have urged t h i s  action. 
" C i t i z e n s  who may be evacuated will require s imilar  pro- 
t ec t ion  f o r  t h e i r  property, and l eg i s l a t i on  may be needed 
t o  s e t  up such custodianship. 
"It i s  our impression t h a t  the  need f o r  an a l i en  property 
custodian on the  coast i s  but one example of a general need 
f o r  advance planning f o r  the  c iv i l i an  problems which a re  
accompanying the evacuation of a l iens  and w i l l  accompany 
any fu ture  evacuations. The Army, a f t e r  designating 
s t r a t eg i c  areas,  needs the planned assistance of the 
c i v i l i a n  agencies of the  Federal Government i n  handling 
the  ac tua l  evacuation and i n  r e s e t t l i n g  the evacuees. The 
need for  advance planning and coordination of a l l  c i v i l i a n  
agencies concerned with evacuation problems ex i s t s  now. 14-b 
The telegram was despatched on February 23. On February 26, the  
committee received a rep ly  from the  Secretary of the Treasury: 
Your telegram of February 23 has been careful ly  studied 
by t h i s  Department. We a r e  i n  agreement t h a t  there  i s  a 
general need for  carefu l  planning with respect t o  t h e  
resett lement of persons, both a l iens  and c i t i zens ,  
evacuated from s t r a t eg i c  areas and tha t  the problem is  
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one i n  which t h e  Federal  Government should assume a 
major r e spons ib i l i ty .  W h i l e  t h e  Treasury Department 
s tands  ready t o  handle any problems wi th in  i t s  proper 
sphere of operat ion,  I am sure  t h a t  you w i l l  agree  t h a t  
t h e  problems involved i n  na t iona l  defense migrat ion a r e  
p r imar i ly  s o c i a l  problems envisaging the  uprooting of 
a l a r g e  segment of populations from an a r e a  and t h e  
t r ansp lan t ing  of t h i s  group t o  a new l o c a l i t y .  The 
problem i s  v e r y  similar t o  t h a t  of t h e  Dust Bowl migration 
o r  i n  t h e  r e se t t l ement  of f ami l i e s  moved from submarginal 
land. As we see  it, t h e  same problem would be ra i sed  i f  
t h e  Army decided t o  c l e a r  a s u b s t a n t i a l  a r e a  of  all of 
i t s  inhab i t an t s  i n  order  t o  use t h e  ground f o r  maneuvers, 
minit ions dump, o r  a f i r i n g  range. I n  any such case t h e  
i n h a b i t a n t s  of t h e  a r e a  on s h o r t  n o t i c e  would have t o  be 
r e s e t t l e d  i n  new areas ,  f i n d  new employment, and l i q u i -  
d a t e  a t  forced s a l e  t h e i r  immovable property. A s  we see  
it, ves t ing  t i t l e  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  Government of t h e  
proper ty  of t h e  groups being r e s e t t l e d  would only f u r t h e r  
complicate an a l r eady  aggravated s o c i a l  problem. More- 
over, a s  you pointed out  i n  your telegram, t h e  problems 
a r e  no t  confined t o  a l i e n s  but  undoubtedly  w i l l  involve 
United S t a t e s  c i t i z e n s  a s  well .  It i s  the  view of t h e  
Treasury Department  t h a t  the  s o c i a l  problems involved i n  
any such rese t t lement  problem s h o u l d  be handled by one o r  
more departments of t h e  Federal  Government handling  s imi la r  
s o c i a l  problems o r  i f  need be, a new agency crea ted  f o r  t h e  
purpose of deal ing  with the  problems of na t iona l  defense 
migration."14-b
However, between February 26 and March 5  , t h e  Sec re ta ry  of t h e  
Treasury had a l t e r e d  h i s  views t o  the  point  of sending the  following 
telegram, bearing t h e  l a t t e r  da te ,  to the  Federal  Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco: 
"Suggested program f o r  t h e  Federal  Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco and other  p u b l i c  agencies t o  dea l  wi th  proper ty  
of  evacuees from P a c i f i c  Coast m i l i t a r y  a reas .  The suc- 
cess  of t h e  proposed program w i l l  depend upon placing 
complete r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  its execution i n  a respon- 
s i b l e  West Coast agency ac t ing  under the  genera l  direc-  
t i o n s  of the l o c a l  mil i t a ry  a u t h o r i t i e s .  
"I - Scope of  Problem: 
"The evacuation  on s h o r t  no t i ce  oftens  of thousands of 
persons from m i l i t a r y  a r e a s  on t h e  P a c i f i c  Coast r a i s e s  
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ser ious  problems i n  connection with t he  l iqu ida t ion  of 
t h e i r  property holdings and t he  protection of t he  p r o p -  
e r t y  of such persons against  fraud, forced sa les ,  and 
unscrupulous credi tors .  Obviously t he  emergency w i l l  
cause f i nanc i a l  l o s s  t o  t he  group involved. However, 
t h e  following program i s  intended t o  accord t o  t h i s  group 
reasonable protection of t h e i r  property i n t e r e s t s  con- 
s i s t e n t  with t he  war e f for t .  
"II - Legal Authority: 
"Since t he  program is one ba s i ca l l y  t o  a s s i s t  the  
evacuee i n  the  l iqu ida t ion  of h i s  property, it i s  expected 
t h a t  i n  most instances t h e  evacuee w i l l  vo lun ta r i ly  a v a i l  
himself of the  f a c i l i t i e s  afforded by t h i s  program. 
Government sanctions w i l l  be necessary t o  deal  with cred- 
i t o r s  and others who seek unfa i r  advantages  of the evac- 
uees. There i s  ample l e g a l  au thor i ty  now vested in t h e  
m i l i t a r y  au tho r i t i e s  and i n  t h e  Treasury D e p a r t m e n t  which 
can be delegated t o  such West Coast agency t o  d e a l  with 
t h i s  problem without necess i ty  of obtaining  flrrther 
l e g i s l a t i o n  or  new executive orders. 
"III - Administration of  Program : 
"The nature and urgency of t h e  s i tua t ion ,  coupled with 
t h e  l a rge  volume of t ransact ions  t h a t  w i l l  require  prompt 
handling, necess i t a tes  t he  program's being administered 
by an agency on the  West Coast cloaked with f u l l  au tho r i t y  
t o  a c t  without reference t o  Washington. The over-all con- 
t r o l  of a l l  aspects  of t he  evacuation must obviously r e s t  
in the  mi l i t a ry  au thor i t i es .  Subject t o  t h i s  over-all 
con t ro l  by the  Army, t h e  d i r e c t  respons ib i l i ty  f o r  t h e  
execution of t he  property aspects of the  program should 
be placed i n  the  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
which has branch of f ices  in Los Angeles, Sea t t l e ,  and 
Portland. The Federal Reserve Bank w i l l  be i n  a pos i t ion  
t o  obtain t h e  cooperation of o ther  Government agencies 
and of well-known and experienced individuals and i n s t i t u -  
t i ons  i n  t h e  various communities thronghout the  West Coast 
area. This cooperation, together with t he  established 
i n t e g r i t y  and a b i l i t y  of  the  Federal Reserve Bank, w i l l  
e n l i s t  the  confidence of all of t he  affected groups and 
discourage gouging  by c r ed i t o r s  or other self-seeklng 
i n t e r e s t s .  The Federal Reserve Bank w i l l  a l s o  work in 
close  l i a i s o n  with the  Federal Secur i ty  Agency, the  United 
S ta tes  Department of Agriculture, and other Federal, S t a t e  
and l o c a l  public agencies t h a t  can be of ass is tance i n  
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dealing with the property during the course of i t s  
l iquidation. These agencies w i l l  undoubtedly be called 
upon by the  mil i tary authori t ies  t o  handle other aspects 
of the evacuation problem, such a s  the transportation 
and resettlement of the evacuees, and t h e i r  re-employment 
i n  new areas. 
"The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which i s  the 
F isca l  Agent of the Treasury Department, w i l l  be clothed 
with ample authority t o  execute the  program. The 
Treasury Department w i l l  l a y  down the broad principles 
and objectives of such programs a s  well a s  the general 
procedure t o  be followed. The Department will  a l so  
furnish the  San Francisco Bank by airplane with the 
requis i te  number of trained experts t o  a s s i s t  i n  work- 
ing out the de ta i l s  of the program i n  the f i e l d  and t o  
par t ic ipa te  i n  i t s  execution. I f  need be the Depart- 
ment i s  i n  a posit ion t o  provide the San Francisco 
Federal a t  once with 100 or  more men f o r  t h i s  purpose. 
The keynote of t h i s  program is speed. It i s  believed 
t h a t  it can be put i n  operation by Monday, March 9, 1942. 
" I V  - Outline of Program: 
"A. Properly s taffed of f ices  under the direc- 
t i on  of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank 
w i l l  be opened a t  once in the loca l  communities 
from which evacuees w i l l  be moved. 
"B. Announcement w i l l  be made throughout the 
area by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
t h a t  i t s  representatives i n  these off ices  a re  
prepared t o  a s s i s t  evacuees with the problem 
of l iquidating the i r  property and protecting them 
against those seeking t o  take unfair  advantage 
of t h e i r  plight. 
"C. These representatives w i l l  a s s i s t  i n  put- 
t i ng  the evacuees i n  a position t o  obtain buyers, 
lessees,  and other users of the i r  property on 
f a i r  terms. In  cases where the evacuee i s  unable 
t o  select  h i s  own agent t o  dispose of h i s  p r o p -  
erty,  the Federal w i l l  be prepared t o  ac t  a s  
agent f o r  the evacuee under a power of attorney 
or similar arrangement and take s teps t o  l iqui- 
date the property on f a i r  terms. 
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"D. Evacuees threatened by c red i to rs  w i l l  be 
encouraged t o  come t o  the  representatives of 
t he  Federal f o r  advice and guidance. The 
Federal representa t ives  w i l l  a l s o  discuss  the  
matter with t he  credi tor  with t h e  view t o  
working out a f a i r  settlement and limiting t he  
remedies t h a t  maybe pursued by t h e  c red i to r  
who threatens  unfa i r  action. By and la rge  t he  
mere existence of t h i s  program  of helping 
evacuees w i l l  e l iminate o r  f o r e s t a l l  most of 
t h e  sharp prac t ices  t h a t  a r e  now feared. 
"E. In some cases the  property of the  evacuee 
may be such t h a t  i t s  r e a l  value can only be 
rea l ized  a t  a f u tu r e  time, e.g,, Japanese 
novelt ies.  In such cases t h e  bank's representa- 
t i v e  w i l l  a s s i s t  t he  evacuee i n  arranging f o r  
t he  storage of such property i f  t h a t  i s  the  
wish of t he  evacuee. 
"F. On ag r i cu l t u r a l  proper t ies  the  bank's 
representa t ive ,  with t h e  ass is tance of represent- 
a t i ve s  of the  United S t a t e s  Department of 
Agriculture, w i l l  attempt t o  arrange fo r  the  
l eas ing  o r  s a l e  of such property o r  i f  need be
f o r  t he  growing of t he  crops, with a view t o  
preventing t h e i r  l o s s  through inat tent ion.  
"G. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
and i ts  representa t ives  w i l l  be cloaked with 
adequate au thor i ty  t o  cope w i t h  the  problems 
a r i s i ng  on the  basis  of ex i s t ing  circumstances. 
The program w i l l  be f l ex ib l e  and a t  a l l  times 
the  bank w i l l  attempt t o  keep matters on a 
voluntary basis ,  s a t i s f ac to ry  t o  the  evacuee. 
Where these  e f f o r t s  f a i l  it may be necessary 
f o r  t h e  bank's representa t ives  t o  s t ep  i n  and 
take t h e  property over f o r  the purpose of ob- 
t a in ing  a f a i r  and reasonable l iquidation.  
"It i s  expected t h a t  the  s e t t i n g  up of t h i s  
program and the  accordance t o  t h e  evacuee of 
f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  the  l iqu ida t ion  of t h e i r  property 
should g r ea t l y  expedite the  departure on a 
voluntary bas i s  of the  evacuees from t h e  m i l i -  
t a r y  area." 13 
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On March 9, t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of t he  Treasury  addressed the Tolan 
Committee i n  a te legram which dup l i ca t ed  t h e  one which he had s e n t  t o  
the Reserve Bank of San Franc isco  on March 5, and which contained t h e s e  
two a d d i t i o n a l  paragraphs: 
"This  program i s  be ing  p u t  i n t o  ef fec t  a t  t h e  r eques t  of  
t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of  War and w i l l  be c a r r i e d  ou t  under  t h e  
g e n e r a l  d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  l o c a l  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  
F u l l  au tho r i ty  ha s  been de lega ted  t o  t h e  Federa l  Reserve 
Bank o f  San Francisco t o  c a r r y  out  such a program. 
"I am asking John W. Pehle,  a s s i s t a n t  t o  t h e  Sec re t a ry ,  
who i s  i n  San Francisco f o r  t h e  purpose  o f  he lp ing  t h e  
Fede ra l  Reserva Bank t o  pu t  t h i s  program i n t o  e f f e c t ,  
t o  communicate w i th  you and keep you advised a s  t o  t h e  
p rog res s  of t h e  program. 1 4 - c  
On March 11, 1942, t h e  President  signed Execut ive Order  No, 9095, 
c rea t ing  t h e  O f f i c e  of Al ien  Prope r ty  Custodian w i t h i n  t h e  Of f i ce  for 
Emergency Management.  On the  day  fol lowing t h e  newly appoin ted  Al ien  
Proper ty  Custodian, by means o f  a statement  which he i ssued  a t  a p re s s  
c o n f e r e n c e  h e l d  j o i n t l y  wi th  t h e  S e c r e t a r y of the  Treasury, 
* * *   delagated  t o  the Secretary of t h e  Treasury  a l l  
power a n d  a u t h o r i t y  under sections 3 (a )  and 5 (b) of 
the  T r a d i n g  wi th  t h e  Enemy act, as amended,  confer red  
upon me  by t h e  President  * * * pending t h e  s t a f f i n g  and 
organization of theO f f i c e  of the Alien Property 
Custodian * * *" 14-c
On March 12, 1942, General DeWitt addressed t h e  Fede ra l  Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco  i n  a l e t te r  which contained t h e  authorizat ion  and 
d i r e c t i o n s  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s :  
"* * *  I am f a m i l i a r  w i th  t h e  contemplated program  d e a l i n g  
wi th  t h e  prob lem  of evacuees and I find t h a t t h e  prompt 
execut ion  o f  such a program i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  succes s fu l  
p rosecu t ion  of t h e  war and t h e  pe r fo rmance  of myduty 
under Execut ive Order No. 9066. Accordingly, I hereby 
author ize  and d i r e c t  you t o  t a k e  a l l  s t e p s  which i n  your 
judgment a r e  necessary  o r  d e s i r a b l e  in o r d e r  t o  c a r r y  ou t  
t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  program. 
"You a r e  au tho r i zed  and requested to employ suchpersonnel  
and s e t  up such officies w i t h i n  t h e  Western Defense Com- 
mand as you may consider  advisable ,  necessary  o r  expedi- 
e n t  f o r  t h e  purpose of c a r r y i n g  out  ' the program o f  dea l ing  
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with the  property in t e res t s  of said evacuees. You are 
fur ther  authorized t o  employ such personnel and appoint 
such sub-agents a s  you may see f i t  i n  connection there- 
with. 
"You w i l l  be reimbursed f o r  a l l  necessary and proper 
expenses incurred i n  connection with the carrying out 
of t h i s  program. Furthermore, you are  directed t o  
perform any and a l l  a c t s  incident t o  the accomplish- 
ment or  furtherance of t h i s  program and a s  such you 
are, of course, en t i t l ed  t o  be reimbursed fo r  a l l  
necessary and proper expenses and obligations a r i s ing  
out of such agency, fo r  which  under law such an agent 
would be ent i t led  t o  reimbursement. 
"It is  understood tha t  i n  executing the foregoing no 
warranty of my authori ty  i s  included nor i s  any per- 
sonal l i a b i l i t y  imposed upon or assumed by the under- 
signed . " 13-a 
The Secretary of the Treasury had by telegram on March 7 dele- 
gated t o  the  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco "Full authori ty  t o  
exercise any and a l l  powers delegated t o  the Secretary of the  Treasury 
under Section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, a s  amended by 
T i t l e  III of the  F i r s t  War Powers Act, 1941, together with a l l  other 
powers vested in me, f o r  the purpose of carrying out t h i s  general 
program." 13-b 
Thus authorized, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
established the Evacuee Property Department under the  general super- 
vision of a vice president a t  the head office,  and under the  d i r ec t  
supervision of an ass i s tan t  cashier, The San Francisco of f ice  opened 
on M a r c h  9, a second principal  of f ice  opened i n  Sea t t le  on March 12, 
and the th i rd  and fourth pr incipal  off ices  opened on March 13 in Los 
Angeles and Portland. 13-c Field  offices  were established a s  needed a t  
various points i n  the three coastal  States  and one i n  Phoenix t o  pro- 
vide services t o  the  Japanese forced t o  evacuated f rom the  southern 
th i rd  of the S ta te  of Arizona, A t  the peak of operations, i n  May 1942, 
184 persons were employed i n  the Evacuee Property Department. In addi- 
t i o n  t o  i t s  own of f ices  and f i e l d  offices,  the Evacuee Property Depart- 
ment maintained personnel i n  each of the WCCA control s t a t ions  tha t  
operated during evacuation movements. 
March 18, 1942, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco issued Special Regulation No. 1, which provided the 
authori ty  t o  "freeze" evacuee property and made provision fo r  a licens- 
ing system t o  e f f ec t  transactions involvirg blocked property.13-dThe 
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president of the  bank on the previous day had given a release t o  the 
press f o r  publication on the  18th t o  publicize the freezing power of the 
bank. 
"In order t o  protect Japanese and other evacuees, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco a s  Fiscal Agent 
of the United States,  today issued regulations designed 
t o  bring about equitable settlements between creditors 
and West Coast evacuees. 
"The new regulations a re  intended t o  f o r e s t a l l  unfair  
action by unscrupulous credi tors  which would be detr i -  
mental t o  the in te res ts  of the  evacuee and t o  minimize 
h i s  losses i n  connection with the disposit ion of h i s  
property. 
"It is  anticipated tha t  t h i s  w i l l  be accomplished t o  a 
large extent by d i rec t  appeal t o  the  credi tors '  sense 
of f a i r  play and the obvious necessity f o r  complete 
cooperation in the administration of the evacuation 
program. 
"'We want any Japanese or  other evacuee who finds tha t  
he has d i f f i c u l t y  i n  reaching  an equitable settlement 
with h i s  credi tors  t o  come t o  the nearest off ice of the 
Evacuee Property Department of the Federal Reserve Bank. 
A t  the  bank w e  can discuss h i s  case and take the  necessary 
s teps t o  protect the evacuee from unjust losses, '  William 
A. Day, President of the Federal Reserve Bank, stated. 
"Bank o f f i c i a l s  warned tha t  the i n i t i a t i v e  under the new 
regulations w i l l  r e s t  with the evacuee. After the evacuee 
has attempted t o  make an equitable settlement with h i s  
credi tors  and has fai led,  he should go t o  the nearest 
off ice of the  Evacuee Property Department of t h e  Federal 
Reserve Bank and l ay  a l l  the f ac t s  before one of i t s  
representatives.* 
"The bank  will c a l l  i n  the creditor and hear h i s  side 
of the case and make every ef for t  t o  bring about an ami- 
cable set t lenent  of the matter. If the creditor i s  
unreasonable and i n s i s t s  on taking unfair  advantage of 
the  evacuee, the Federal Reserve Bank m a y  freeze the 
evacuee property by designating it a s  Special Blocked 
Property, 
* I t a l i c s  not i n  original.  The press emphasized the points indicated. 
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"Following t h i s  s t ep  t h e  bank w i l l  e i t h e r  post a no t ice  on 
o r  near t h e  property of t he  evacuee s t a t i n g  t h a t  the  property 
described i n  t he  not ice  i s  Specia l  Blocked Property, o r  w i l l  
n o t i f y  t he  person holding o r  having possession of t h e  prop- 
e r t y ,  o r  persons having an i n t e r e s t  i n  it, t h a t  such property 
i s  Specia l  Blocked Property. Federal Reserve Bank o f f i c i a l s  
s t a t ed  t h a t  persons dealing w i t h evacuees may assume t h a t  
t h e i r  property i s  not Specia l  Blocked Property unless they 
a r e  a f f i rmat ive ly  on no t ice  t o  t h e  contrary. 
"After t he  property has been declared Special  Blocked Property, 
any acquis i t ion,  d isposi t ion,  o r  t r ans f e r  of t h a t  property is 
subject  t o  a l i c ense  issued by t h e  Federal Reserve Bank. 
Applications f o r  such l i c ense s  may be f i l e d  with t h e  neares t  
o f f i c e  of  t he  bank. 
"Because t h e  bank wishes t o  p ro tec t  t he  evacuee not only  i n  
t ransactions  involving r e a l  property but a l s o  i n  those 
involving a l l  kinds of personal  property ,  t he  regulat ions  
make it possible  f o r  any kind of property t o  be designated 
a s  Special  Blocked Property. 
"By these  broad provisions t h e  regulat ions  enable t h e  bank 
t o  p ro tec t  t he  evacuee i n  such t y p i c a l  t ransact ions  a s  condi- 
t i o n a l  s a l e s , instalment purchases, or any other type of 
dealing i n  any kind of property, i f  the  evacuee w i l l  first 
undertake t h e  simple s t e p  of pe t i t ion ing  t he  bank t o  dec la re  
h i s  property Specia l  Blocked Property. 
"The bank made c l e a r  t h a t  it w i l l  be on guard f o r  any a t t emp t  
on t he  p a r t  of  evacuees t o  avoid t h e  payment of reasonable 
c r ed i t o r s  ' claims through today's regulations.  " 13-e 
The repor t  of t h e  Federal Reserve Bank on t h e  preforrnance of i t s  
Evacuee Property Department contains t h e  comment: 
"Special Regulation No. 1 provided a fo rcefu l  weapon f o r  
discouraging inequi table  ac t ion  on t h e  pa r t  of c r ed i t o r s  
and others  deal ing with the property of evacuees. Poten- 
t i a l i t i e s  of t h i s  regula t ion were recognized by c r ed i t o r s  
and t h a t  recognit ion was an important f a c t o ri n  t he  
sett lement of numerous problems which otherwise would have  
been subject  t o  long dispute. Although t h e  regulation was 
of immense value t he r e  was no occasion t o  make d i r e c t  use 
of i t s  power." 13-e 
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The head o f f i c e  of the  bank cautioned i t s  f i e l d  representa t ives  
i n  Ins t ruc t ion  Le t t e r  No. 2, dated March 19, 1942, t h a t  t he  power was 
not ex-tended t o  the  f i e l d  o f f i c e s ,  and f i e l d  representa t ives  could only 
make recommendations t o  the  head office.13-f Ins t ruc t ion  Le t t e r  No. 6, 
dated March 28, warned fur ther :  
"The only  casesi n which t he  power of f reezing control  
covered by Specia l  Regulation No. 1 w i l l  be exercised a r e  
those i n  which it c l ea r ly  appears e i t h e r  t h a t  t h e  evacua- 
t i o n  program w i l l  be delayed unless t he  power i s  exercised 
o r  the  evacuee i s  being taken advantage of by reason of t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  he i s  o r  may sho r t l y  be under orders  t o  leave the  
community. 
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"Generally speaking, t he  only c a s e s  i n  which the  f reezing 
control ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a s i t ua t i on  which might be s e t t l e d  
by l i t i g a t i o n ,  would be j u s t i f i ed  a r e  those i n  which t he  
r i g h t s  of t h e  evacuee a r e  c l ea r  and, by reason of indigence 
o r  the  necess i ty  f o r  immediate  depar tu re  from t h e  community, 
t h e  evacuee is  not able  t o  have h i s  r i g h t s  determined i n  
our cour ts  of law." 13-8 
The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco had one more delegation 
of au thor i ty  before t h e  end of March. Milton S. Eisenhower, Director of 
the  newly created War Relocation Authority, addressed t he  Secretary  of 
the Treasury i n  a l e t t e r  which included the  following: 
"I * * *  a s  Director of t h e  War Relocation  Authority and t o  
t h e  extent  of my au tho r i t y  t o  do so, delegate t o  t h e  
Treasury Department and i t s  agencies, including t h e  Federal .  
Reserve B a n k  of San Francisco, t he  au thor i ty  vested i n  me 
under Executive Order No. 9102 of March 18, 1942, t o  assist 
persons removed under such Executive Order No.  9102 o r  under 
Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, i n  t he  manage- 
ment and d i sposa l  of t h e i r  property." 13-h 
Business o r  commercial  property and movable property-with the  
exception of farm machinery which became the  r e spons ib i l i t y  of the  Farm 
Secur i ty  Administration--were the  proper concern of  t h e  Federal Reserve 
Bank. However, " A l l  property problems were handled on a purely voluntary 
bas i s  and t he  evacuees were encouraged a t  a l l  times t o  make such arrange- 
ments a s  they  might d e s i r e  with respect  t o  t h e i r  proper t ies ."13-i The 
pr inc ipa l  r e s u l t  of t h i s  po l icy  was t h e  extreme reluctance of t h e  
evacuees t o  seek ass i s tance  of t h e  Federal bank. The g r ea t  majori ty of 
those who did  ask he lp  were people who had been unable t o  make any sort 
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of arrangement before r eg i s t r a t i on  a t  t he  con t ro l  s t a t i o n  f o r  entrain- 
ment. A t  t h e  con t ro l  s t a t ion ,  i n  t he  course of processing, he was 
asked pointedly, "Have you disposed of your property?" I f  t he  answer 
were, "NO," t h e  representa t ive  of t he  appropriate agency exerted himself 
t o  a s s i s t  t he  evacuee. The contents of Ins t ruct ion Le t t e r  No. 19, dated 
Apr i l  10 ,  1942, addressed t o  f i e l d  representa t ives  and signed by t h e  
v i c e  pres ident  of t h e  bank a t  San Francisco a r e  s ign i f ican t :  
"We have every reason t o  bel ieve t h a t  evacuation i n  remaining 
a reas  w i l l  be carr ied forward i n  a comparatively shor t  time. 
Experience ind ica tes  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  evacuation i s  g rea t l y  
f a c i l i t a t e d  when property problems have been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  
adjusted p r io r  t o  not ice  of evacuation. We therefore  urge 
t h a t  every e f f o r t  be made t o  contact  po ten t ia l  evacuees in 
your a rea  t o  the  end t h a t  a solut ion be found t o  any property 
problems they may have. 
"We wish t o  r e i t e r a t e  t h a t  it i s  our r espons ib i l i ty  t o  see 
t h a t  such sett lements a r e  ca r r ied  through on an equi table  
bas i s ,  It i s  not su f f i c i en t  merely t o  advise the  evacuee t o  
s e t t l e  h i s  a f f a i r s  o r  consult h i s  credi tors .  You should, i n  
each instance, go su f f i c i en t l y  i n to  t he  d e t a i l s  of t h e  problem 
t o  s a t i s f y  yourself a s  t o  t h e  character  of t h e  problem and 
then follow through u n t i l  you have de f in i t e  knowledge t h a t  it 
has reached a s a t i s f ac to ry  conclusion. 
We fu r the r  request  t h a t  you review your interview f i l e s  and, 
i n  ins tances  i n  which advice was given but you do not know 
t h e  f i n a l  d isposi t ion,  t h a t  you endeavor t o  contact t he  
evacuee and l e a r n  from him t h e  r e s u l t s  of h i s  e f fo r t s .  This 
w i l l  then enable you t o  complete your f i l e .  
"Your r epo r t s  and records should f u l l y  s e t  fo r th  a complete 
h i s t o ry  of t h e  case so  t h a t  i n  future  the  f i l e  w i l l  r e f l e c t  
f u l l y  t he  problem presented and t h e  solution a r r ived  a t .  
Remember, undoubtedly cases w i l l  be found i n  t h e  fu ture  i n  
which we s h a l l  be cal led upon t o  defend our actions.  
"That we have not had referred t o  us more c r i t i c a l  cases 
r a i s e s  a question i n  our minds a s  t o  whether f i e l d  represent- 
a t i v e s  a r e  ge t t ing  c lose  enough t o  the  problems presented, and 
being thorough enough i n  t h e i r  invest igat ions ,  We of course 
do not welcome the  use of the  freezing power; nevertheless, 
such power i s  avai lable  and, a s  previously ins t ructed,  you 
should promptly contact t he  o f f i c e  of t h e  Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco i n  your zone i f  i t s  use seems des i rab le ."13- j  
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During the  period when "vo lun t a ry"  evacuation was encouraged, the  
Federal Reserve Bank did not consider it necessary t o  provide f a c i l i t i e s  
for  storage  of movable property o r  f o r  the  d i spos i t ion  of evacuee owned 
motor vehicles.  However, a f t e r  controlled evacuation emerged, a t  the  
end of March, the  bank was ins t ructed by the mil i tary  au thor i t i es  "to 
provide warehouse f a c i l i t i e s  i n  a manner which would not exhaust o r  bur- 
den f a c i l i t i e s  of t h a t  character  a l ready i n  exis tence  *  *  *  .  Every e f f o r t  
was made t o  keep the  number of warehouses a t  a minimum t o  limit guarding 
costs."  Evacuees l i v ing  i n  remote communities o r  r u r a l  areaswere ad- 
vised, i n  order t o  guard against  vandalism and pi l ferege,  t o  concentrate 
the i r  g o o d s  " i n  deposi tor ies  of t h e i r  own choice," a n d  "on a voluntary 
basis," I f  the  evacuees acted on t h i s  suggestion ,  which was a f t e r  a l l  
i n  l i n e  with what they had been doing a l l  along, and decided t o  s t o r e  
the i r  goods i n  a church or  a s to re ,  then t he  Federal Reserve Bank pro- 
vided drayage f a c i l i t i e s  "in connection with each controlled evacuation 
operation." 13-k A t  the  close of the  Federal Reserve Bank's program of 
evacuee property handling, i t  turned over t o  the  Relocation Authority 
Government warehouses with contents t o t a l i n g  "2,983 family, un i t s  of prop- 
erty, made up of 38,693 individual  parcels."* 13-1 
By l a t e  March, when controlled evacuation emerged, the  F e d e r a l  
Reserve Bank worked out with t h e  mi l i t a ry  authorities a plan for handl ing  
evacuee-owned automobiles and trucks.  "Under t h i s  plan, evacuees had 
three a l t e rne t ives :  they could s e l l ,  s t o r e  or  otherwise dispose of t h e i r  
automobiles pr ivate ly;  they could s t o r e  them  i n  the  custody of the  bank;  
or they could s e l l  them t o  t he  A r m y  through t he  bank's f a c i l i t i e s . "  1 3 - m  
As an evacuee reported a t  a control  center a f t e r  t h e  area  i n  which he 
lived had been posted f o r  exclusion, he was handed t h e  Western Defense 
Command  and WCCA Ins t ruct ions  t o  Evacuees Regarding Disposit ion of Motor 
Vehicles. To t h e  evacuee who had not yet disposed of h i s  c a r  o r  truck,  
e i the r  because he had been offered too l i t t l e  f o r  it o r  because he had 
hopes of being allowed t o  rees tab l i sh  himse l f  i n  t he  i n t e r i o r  where he 
would need h i s  motor vehicle,  these_ ins t ruc t ions  offered l i t t l e  hope o r  
reassurance. They began: 
"Evacuees w i l l  not he permitted t o  take t h e i r  motor vehicles 
t o  reception centers.  No assurance whatever can be given t h a t  
evacuees w i l l  be enabled a t  some fu ture  time t o  have the  motor 
vehic les  now owned by them returned f o r  t h e i r  individual  use, 
"The United S t a t e s  Army  i s  authorized, i n  i t s  d iscre t ion,  t o  
purchase motor vehic les  f r o m  evacuees. 
* A grand piano was counted a s  four parcels ,  i t s  body being one, and each 
of i t s  three  l egs  an a d d i t i o n a l  piece. 
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"Prior t o  evacuation, motor vehic les  may be stored, sold  or  
otherwise disposed of by t h e  owner pr ivate ly ,  without govern- 
mental in terference o r  assistance." 
As a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  storage o r  sa le ,  t h e  ins t ruc t ions  offered t o  
t he  evacuee: 
"Alternative I. To de l iver  h i s  motor vehicle t o  Federal 
Reserve Bank of San F r a n c i s c o ,  as  F i sca l  Agent of the  United 
Sta tes ,  f o r  storage a t  owner's r i sk ,  without  insurance; 
which storage w i l l ,  i n  most instances,  be i n  open a r e a s  ( a t  
Assembly Centers o r  other designated places) and must of 
necess i ty  be of a character  which w i l l  subject  motor vehicles 
t o  a more o r  l e s s  rapid deter iora t ion.  
"Alternative 11. To o f f e r  h i s  motor vehicle f o r  s a l e  t o  t he  
United S t a t e s  on the  following  basis:  
"The motor vehicle w i l l  be appraised by two d i s in te res ted  
appraisers  and, i n  i t s  d i sc re t ion  and a t  i t s  option, t h e  
Army may buy the  motor vehicle a t  t h e  appraised pr ice  which 
s h a l l  not, however, exceed the  Blue Book wholesale value i n  
t he  l o c a l i t y  where t he  purchase i s  c o n s u m a t e d . "  13-n 
The ru l ing  t h a t  evacuees could not take t h e i r  ca rs  t o  assembly
centers  was relaxed i n  t he  f i r s t  weeks of t he  evacuation movements, so 
t h a t  evacuees who had re ta ined t h e i r  c a r s  were permitted t o  dr ive  them- 
se lves  and t h e i r  famil ies  t o  such centers  a s  were then i n  existence, 
ch i e f l y  t o  Santa Anita and t o  Manzanar. On a r r i va l ,  these  ca r s  were 
placed i n  t he  custody of the  Federal Reserve Bank. The ca rs  were kept 
under guard i n  t h e  open a t  these  centers,  and the  r ap id i t y  of deteriora- 
t i o n  was e a s i l y  perceived by t he  evacuee owners. 
"It was apparent t h a t  storage of evacuee automobiles under 
t h e  conditions which exis ted would r e s u l t  i n  considerable 
economic waste, and hence i n  a l o s s  t o  t he  evacuee. In t he  
case of vehic les  tendered fo r  storage, therefore,  when t he  
appraised value of a given vehicle was determined ,  t h e  bank 
extended an o f f e r  of purchase t o  the  evacuee. The wr i t t en  
o f f e r  was followed by personal c o n t a c t  w i t h  each evacuee. 
* * *  O f  the  1,905 motor vehic les  received i n t o  the  custody 
of the  bank, 1,469 were sold t o  the  Army and 319 released 
i n  accordance with the  d i rec t ions  of the  evacuees. 
"Late i n  the  F a l l  of 1942, 117 ca r s  remined  i n  t h e  custody 
of the  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. A t  t h a t  t i m e
t he  mi l i t a ry  au tho r i t i e s ,  i n  consideration of t h e  nat ional  
i n t e r e s t  during wartime, and i n  t he  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  evacuees 
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themselves, decided t o  requ is i t ion  these  vehicles.  Pending 
completion of the  requis i t ioning procedure, voluntary s a l e s  
t o  t he  Army continued i n  accordance with t he  procedure out- 
l ined  above. " 13-0 
S t a t i s t i c s  furnished i n  regard t o  t he  handling of residence, 
business a n d  income property of evacuees i n  the  Report of the  Federal 
Reserve Bank seem t o  be inconplete. There i s  mention of 200 ho t e l s  i n  
the S e a t t l e  area,  t he  prevalence of ho te l ,  market and dry  cleaning 
establishment  problems i n  the  Portland  branch zone, dry  cleaning estab- 
lishment and nursery problems i n  the  head o f f i c e  zone, and residence 
property, hote l ,  apartment a n d  market problems i n  the Los Angeles zone. 
Figures f o r  the  number of cases handled a t  the  peak of operations f o r  
the head office  zone a r e  quoted, and t yp i ca l  o r  outstanding  cases a re  
described i n  the  appendix, but no over-all f igures  a r e  presented. 13-p 
The t o t a l  cost  of the  Federal Reserve Bank's pa r t i c ipa t ion  i n  t he  
evacuee property program t o  December 31, 1942, was $315,694.47. A t  t h i s  
time it was considered t h a t  the  Federal Reserve  Bank of San Francisco 
had "no f u r t he r  o f f i c i a l  r e spons ib i l i t y  i n  the  Japanese evacuation 
program. " 13-q 
The Federal Reserve Bank had been concerned with a l i e n  property 
from April  1940. A t  t h a t  time the  Foreign Funds Control had been es- 
tablished t o  administer t h e  powers of the  Secretary  of t he  Treasury a s  
conferred by Execut ive  Order No. 8389, which was issued under the  
T r a d i n g  with t he  E n e m y  Act a s  amended, and Foreign Funds Control oper- 
ated  through t h e  Federal Reserve Banks of t he  country. Immediately upon 
the o u t b e a k  of war, Foreign Funds Control froze banking and business 
asse t s  which involved foreign exchange. Thus, when the  question of 
evacuee property protection began t o  receive t he  serious a t t en t ion  of 
the general  who ordered the  evacuation, the re  was no confusion involved 
i n  the  delegation of au thor i ty  and placing of r e spons ib i l i t i e s  with t he  
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco a s  f i s c a l  agent of the  United 
States,  subject  t o  t h e  control  of t he  War Department. The same could not 
be said of t h e  way i n  which the  services  of t h e  Farm Secur i ty  Adnlinistra- 
t ion  were procured f o r  ass is tance with the  evacuee property program. 
In a l e t t e r  of March 15, 1942, Lieutenant General DeWitt addressed 
Lawrence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director of Farm Secur i ty  Administration 
in San Francisco: 
"By v i r t u e  of and pursuant t o  t h e  au thor i ty  vested i n  me a s  
Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, 
and i n  order t o  e f fec tua te  t he  removal of any enemy a l i ens  
and other  persons designated by me, engaged i n  farming 
operations  , who evacuate from r e s t r i c t e d  and prohibited areas  
lying within  my Command, you a r e  hereby ordered and authorized 
a s  fo l lows :
(31) 
1. To i n s t i t u t e  and administer a program which w i l l  in- 
sure continuation of t h e  proper use of ag r i cu l t u r a l  
lands  vo lun ta r i ly  vacated by enemy a l i ens  and other 
persons designated by me, and which will insure  f a i r  
and equitable arrangements between t he  evacuees and 
t h e  operators of t h e i r  property. 
"2. To incur  t h e  necessary administrat ive expenses, in- 
cluding t h e  payment of personnel and necessary travel-  
ing expenses, t o  ca r ry  out  the  purposes of t h i s  order, 
such expenses t o  b e  reimbursed by me upon presentation 
of reimbursement vouchers. 
"3. From funds made avai lable  o r  t o  be made avai lable  by 
me, t o  m a k e ,  service  and co l l ec t  loans, including t he  
provisions of necessary farm management advice and 
guidance. 
"4. To redelegate t o  such o f f i ce r s  and employees of t h e  
Farm Security Administration a s  you may designate, 
any par t  of t h e  au thor i ty  herein contained. " 11 
Actually General DeWitt was cu t t ing  corners i n  "ordering and 
authorizing" an o f f i c i a l  of another department of t he  Government t o  do 
any of these  things.  The F i r s t  War Powers Act, of December 18, 1941, 
had amended Section 5 ( b )   of the  Trading with t he  Enemy Act, granting the  
President broad and sweeping powers. The President i n  a memorandum of 
February 12, 1942, t rans fe r red  powers a f fec t ing  property-control t o  t h e  
Treasury Department. By Executive Order No. 9095, March 11, 1942, t h e  
President conferred s imilar  powers upon the  Alien Property Custodian. 
Thus t he  Secretary  of the  Treasury o r  the  Alien Property Custodian might 
with propr ie ty  h a v e  delegeted au thor i ty  t o  t h e  Secretary of Agriculture 
t o  delegate  t h a t  au thor i ty  i n  t u rn  t o  t h e  Federal Secur i ty  Administrat ion  
o r  t o  t h e  U.S .D.A. War Boards. General DeWitt was technical ly  i n  a posi- 
t i o n  t o  do no more than recommend such a course t o  the proper department 
of Government. A few formal i t i es  had been overlooked, and t he  Secretary  
of Agriculture, i n  whose ju r i sd ic t ion  the  Farm Secur i ty  Administration 
was, had not been consulted. FSA was l e f t  i n  an awkward s i t ua t i on  u n t i l  
i t s  delegation of au thor i ty  could be legalized--an achievement which re- 
quired several  weeks. 
Conferences were held i n  Washington, memoranda were exchanged; the  
S o l i c i t o r  of the  newly created War Relocation Authori ty  was ac t ive  i n  
Washington and made recommendations t o  WRADirector  Milton S. Eisenhower, 
who was i n  San Francisco learning what nature of problem h e  had t o  cope 
with. In a l e t t e r  t o  M r .  Eisenhower, dated April 1, 1942, t h e  S o l i c i t o r  
of WRA described a meeting which had been held two days e a r l i e r  i n  t he  
o f f i c e  of t h e  General Counsel of t he  Treasury Department; it had been 
attended by the  Special  Assistant t o  t h e  Secretary  of Agriculture, the  
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Assistant S o l i c i t o r  of Agriculture, the  S o l i c i t o r  of WRA, and represent- 
at ives from the  Farm Secur i ty  Administration and t h e  Agricul tura l  Ad- 
justment Administration; these  o f f i c i a l s  had met t o  discuss t he  problem 
of f reezing power and property management with regard t o  the  Farm 
Security Administration. 
It developed i n  the  course of t h i s  meeting t h a t  the  Secretary of 
the Treasury was prepared t o  delegate the  necessary power t o  t h e  Secre- 
t a ry  of Agriculture "provided t h a t  the Secretary  of Agriculture sub- 
mitted a wr i t t en  statement t h a t  such a delegation was necessary t o  enable 
the Secretary  of Agriculture t o  provide fo r  continuous ag r i cu l t u r a l  pro- 
duction on t h e  lands of the  evacuees. Foley's  [ t h e  General Counsel of 
the T r e a s u r y ]  point  was t h a t  the  exercise of t h i s  power i s  an important 
Government respons ib i l i ty ,  and, therefore ,  t h a t  the  Secretary  of the  
Treasury should have before him some document indicat ing t h a t  the  dele- 
gation of so important a power i s  necessary i n  t he  public i n t e r e s t . "  
The same l e t t e r  explained that, the  Secretary  of Agriculture was 
indisposed t o  request  t he  Secretary  of the  Treasury t o  e f f ec t  such dele- 
gation of au tho r i t y  and continued i n  t h a t  frame of mind f o r  a week, 
during which i n t e rva l  the  regional  d i r ec to r  of FSA i n  San Francisco re- 
mained i n  an anomalous position. 
Following the  advice of h i s  S o l i c i t o r ,  M r .  Eisenhower ca l led the  
Secretary of Agriculture--whose department M r .  Eisenhower l e f t  t o  become 
Director of WRA--by long dis tance and immediately addressed him i n  
writing: 
"This l e t t e r  contains no r e q u e s t  but a s e t  of f ac t s .  Apparent- 
l y  the  s i t ua t i on  here i n  California has been reported t o  you 
by so many persons i n  so  many ways t ha t  t h e  t r u e  s i t ua t i on  
must be elusive,  t o  say the  l e a s t .  
"You will r e c a l l  t h a t ,  a f t e r  a day and a hal f  of g r i l l i n g ,  I 
to ld  Harold Smith I would accept the  job a s  head of the  War 
Relocation Authority. The fo l l owing  morning Assistant  
Secretary McCloy cane i n  t o  see me, andamong o ther  things 
sa id  t h a t  General DeWittwished Agriculture t o  be repre- 
sented on h i s  Civi l ian  Committee on Evacuation. I,knowing 
t h a t  I would have t o  r e l y  heavily on FSA f o r  help i n  relo- 
cating t he  Japanese, suggested Larry Hewes. Naturally I 
should have consulted you, but i n  t h e  pressure I did not. 
A day l a t e r  I was on my way t o  California.  
"Apparently Secretary  McCloy wired General DeWitt t o  the  
e f f ec t  t h a t  Larry Hewes was o f f i c i a l l y  designated by the  
Department, therefore  General DeWitt placed Mr. Hewes on 
h i s  committee. 
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"General DeWitt placed two r e spons ib i l i t i e s  upon Hewes: 
To aid i n  r ec ru i t i ng  farmers t o  till over t h e  farms of 
evacuees and t o  a id  i n  maintaining production. The 
General made t h i s  assignment t o  Hewes a s  a representa t ive  
of the  Department a s  a whole. 
"When I returned t o  Washington, I learned * * * t h a t  
Hewes' designation had mixed up other plans, and I there- 
f o r e  offered t o  s t ra igh ten  t he  matters out  by having the  
General * * * designate someone e lse .  However, a f t e r  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  with Ed Dodd [in charge of t h e  Western 
Division of t h e  Agr i cu l t u r a l  Adjustment A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ]  
it seemed be t t e r  t o  send two telegrams t o  California-- 
one t o  Hewes emphasizing t h a t  he was serving a s  a 
Departmental representa t ive  and t h a t  he should cooperate 
with the War Board i n  meet ing  al l respons ib i l i t i e s ;  a 
second went t o  Dave Davidson, asking the  War Board t o  
he lp  get t h e  job done. 
"Ed Dodd and I then came t o  California and found th ings  i n  . 
a turmoil. A few evacuations had taken place, and these  
showed t h a t  the  Japanese would su f fe r  losses  and production 
would decl ine  unless the  e f f o r t s  already under way were 
backed up by some r e a l  authori ty.  
"The perishable nature of t ruck  crops almost i nv i t e s  a 
s t a l l i n g  on the  par t  of prospective purchasers who may 
hope t o  ge t  the  property on t h e  equity of the  Japanese a t  
a f rac t ion  of i t s  t r ue  value. There's no need t o  review 
a l l  the  pos s ib i l i t i e s .  The long and shor t  of it i s  t h a t  
t he  Japanese a r e  s e l l i ng  f o r  what they can get. Con- 
sequently, everyone agreed t h a t  t he  power t o  f reeze  p r o p -  
e r t y  and t o  o p e r a t e  the  farms u n t i l  f a i r  value could be 
received should be vested i n  t he  Department of Agriculture. 
"This power e x i s t s  now i n  t he  hands of t h e  Federal Reserve 
Bank, which i s  act ing a s  t he  agent of the Treasury. This 
means t h a t  the  agency which i s  rec ru i t ing  people t o  operate, 
buy, o r  l ease  farms must, i f  it runs i n to  any type of un- 
fa i rness ,  appeal t o  a representa t ive  of t he  Federal Reserve 
Bank who i s  not on the  ground and who knows l i t t l e  about 
farming and farm values. 
"It soon became evident t ha t  the  power t o  freeze property 
would not be delegated d i r e c t l y  t o  F.S.A. here i n  San 
Francisco, so Ed Dodd and I recommended t h a t  such power be 
delegated t o  you, and by you t o  the War Boards. Everyone 
here--General DeWitt, Federal Reserve, and a l l  others-- 
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approves t h e  purpose. In  my judgment it i s  a necessary 
s t e p  and one which i n  all jus t i ce  t o  many innocent people 
should be exercised by a responsible Federal agency, which 
i s  not only f a m i l i a r  with the  problem but has a de f in i t e  
r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  maintaining production. 
"Now, I ' m  sure you know t h a t  General DeWitt has no au thor i ty  
t o  delegate any au thor i ty  of the  type I ' m  discussing. The 
grea tes t  amount of au thor i ty  r e s t s  w i t h  the  Treasury * * * 
The President gave me au thor i ty  t o  a s s i s t  with t he  property 
problem under limited  circumstances and I do delegate t h i s  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  the  Treasury. This  w a s  a l l  done i n  the i n i t i a l  
be l i e f  t h a t  a s ing le  agency could best  handle the  s i tua t ion .  
I s t i l l  th ink  t h a t ' s  t rue .  But the  Treasury should use a 
competent ag r i cu l t u r a l  agency f o r  ag r i cu l t u r a l  property 
* * * a s  it i s  using a banking agency f o r  other property. 
"Most of t he  Japanese farmers have maintained t h e i r  farms 
i n  excel lent  condition. When they leave a t  t h e  rate of two 
t o  th ree  thousand a day, however, production i s  going t o  be 
a b i t  retarded.  Evacuees must leave t h e i r  household goods 
behind, with only  a storage rece ip t  which disclaims a l l  
r espons ib i l i ty ;  t h e i r  cars,  t rucks,  t r a c to r s ,  and other  
machinery  a r e  impounded. They move t o  assembly points and 
then on t o  reception centers  where, s t a r t i n g  with sand and 
cactus, they hope t o  make a l iv ing .  
"I f e e l  most deeply t h a t  when t h i s  War i s  over and we conslder 
calmly t h i s  unprecedented migration of 120,000 people, we 
a r e  a s  Americans going t o  r eg re t  the  avoidable injustices  
t h a t  may have occurred. 
"I hope very much t h a t  t h i s  explanation may d i spe l  any 
notion t h a t  you or  Carl[ Carl Hamilton, Special  Assistant  t o  
the  S e c r e t a r y ]  may have ( i f  you do) t h a t  GeneralDeWitt has 
attempted t o  determine ag r i cu l t u r a l  po l ic ies  o r  action.  Here 
on t he  ground things a r e  moving f a s t  and a re  g r ea t l y  confused. 
Consequently, our judgement may not always be sound."12 
On April 3, 1942 t he  Secretary of Agriculture  formally requested 
the Secretary of the  Treasury t o  delegate t he  proper au tho r i t y  t o  him. 
He received rep ly  on April 7 i n  t he  form of a l e t t e r  of t r ansmi t t a l  and 
a memorandum formally delegating authori ty.  The former read: 
"Reference i s  made t o  your l e t t e r  of April 3, 1942, request- 
ing t h a t  I authorize you, i n  accordance with t he  provisions 
of subdivision ( b )  of Section 5 of the  Trading with t he  
Enemy Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Sta t .  4 1 1 ) ,  a s  amended by 
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the  F i r s t  War Powers Act, 1941 (publ ic  Law 354, 77th 
congress), t o  freeze property and t ransact ions  there in  and 
t o  ves t ,  manage, operate and dispose of property when t he  
property or  any i n t e r e s t  the re in  i s  held by an evacuee 
engaged in farming operations who has been evacuated o r  i s  
about t o  evacuate a farm located i n  a mi l i t a ry  area  wi thin  
t h e  Western Defense Command. 
"Enclosed i s  a memorandum delegating the  au thor i ty  you re- 
quest f o r  the  purpose of enabling t he  Department of 
Agriculture t o  ca r ry  out  the  ag r i cu l t u r a l  aspects of t h e  
evacuation program fo r  the  West Coast m i l i t a ry  areas  i n  
designated zones i n  order, i n  appropriate cases, t o  protect  
an equi ty  of an evacuee from grasping c red i to rs  o r  i n  order 
t o  prevent t he  l o s s  of ag r i cu l t u r a l  production." 
The memorandum read: 
"For t he  purpose of enabling the  Department of Agriculture 
t o  ca r ry  out t he  agr icu l tu ra l  aspects of  the  evacuation 
program f o r  t he  West Coast m i l i t a ry  areas  and designated 
zones, the re  i s  hereby delegated t o  and conferred upon t he  
Secretary  of Agriculture f u l l  au thor i ty  t o  exercise any and 
a l l  powers delegated t o  the  Secretary  of t he  Treasury under 
sec t ion  5 (b) of the  Trading with the  Enemy Act as  amended 
by T i t l e  I I I of the  F i r s t  War Powers Act of 1941,with the  
power t o  redelegate these powers t o  such f i e l d  and other  
agencies i n  the  Department of Agriculture a s  the  Secretary 
of Agriculture may from time t o  time designate. This 
delegat ion s h a l l  not be construed a s  a l imi ta t ion  upon my 
au tho r i t y  t o  exercise such power and au thor i ty  a t  any time 
o r  a s  a l im i t a t i on  upon t h e  au thor i ty  of t he  Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco t o  exercise the  power and 
au thor i ty  conferred upon it a s  f i s c a l  agent of the  United 
Sta tes .  
On April 8, t he  S o l i c i t o r  of WRA was able t o  wire Director 
Eisenhower : "Secretary Wickard has delegated freezing and management 
powers d i r e c t  t o  Farm  Secur i ty  Administration r a the r  than t o  W a r Boards." 
By the  time t h i s  question of au thor i ty  and ju r i sd ic t ion  was an- 
swered t o  the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of a l l  agencies concerned, the exclusion orders 
were ra ining down upon a thoroughly bewildered people, and t r a i n s  and 
buses were carrying t he  evacuees--who were permitted t o  take with them 
only what t hey  could ca r ry  i n  t h e i r  two hands-to half-constructed camps 
a t  Santa Anita and a t  Manzanar. Throughout the  r e s t  of April and during 
May, 15  other  assembly centers were designated i n  former race t racks  o r  
f a i r  grounds i n  the  coas t a l  States and one i n  Arizona, t o  receive t he  
r e m a i n d e r  of the  Wes t  Coast Japanese American people. 
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The worst consequence of the Government's delay i n  creat ing 
machinery f o r  t h e  handling of evacuee property was t he  tendency of t h e  
evacuees t o  make any arrangements they  could, pr ivate ly ,  t o  s e l l ,  l ease  
or salvage something of what represented t h e i r  l i f e ' s  labor  and t h r i f t .  
Those who could make no arrangement a t  a l l  f o r  themselves, o r  the  few 
who had su f f i c i en t  hardihood t o  hold out against  outrageous pressures 
to  s e l l  o r  l e a se  f o r  a pi t t ance  l e s t  they lose  a l l ,  reported t o  the  WCCA 
control centers a f t e r  the notices of exclusion were posted and u t i l i z e d  
the avai lable  ass is tance of Farm Secur i ty  o r  the  Federal Reserve Bank, 
according t o  need. 
The paragraphs quoted below from the  FSA repor t  of May 1942 de- . 
scribe t h e  general manner i n  which FSA car r ied  out t he  ins t ruc t ion  of 
the Secretary  of t he  Treasury t o  "protect an equ i ty  of an evacuee from 
grasping c r ed i t o r s  o r  i n  order t o  prevent the  l o s s  of ag r i cu l t u r a l  pro- 
duction." The Secretary  of the  Treasury put f i r s t  t he  protection of 
the evacuee's equity; while General DeWitt reversed the order i n  h i s  
l e t t e r  of March 15, 1942 t o  M r .  Lawrence Hewes, he did include i n  h i s  
f i r s t  paragraph t h e  ins t ruc t ion  t o  protec t h e  evacuee's r igh t s .  
On June 5, 1942, Mr. Hewes, a s  regional  d i r e c t o r  of FSA charged 
with the  r e spons ib i l i t y  of t h i s  phase of t he  evacuation program sub- 
mitted a Final Report of t h e  Par t i c ipa t ion  of t he  Farm Secur i ty  Admini- 
s t ra t ion  in t h e  Evacuation Program of t he  Wartime C i v i l  Control admini- 
s t ra t ion,  C i v i l  Affai rs  Division, Western DefenseCommand Fourth 
Army, Covering t h e  Period March 15, 1942, through May 31, 1942. This 
report. was presented t o  Colonel K a r l  R. Bendetsen, General DeWitt's 
Assistant Chief of S t a f f ,  who headed the  WCCA. On May 31, t he  l a s t  
evacuees from M i l i t a r y  Area No. 1 were behind the  barbed wire of as- 
sembly centers, and except f o r  f inding operators f o r  a f e w  farms, F S A  
had accomplished i t s  work. It had reg i s te red  6,664 farms i n  M i l i t a r y  
Area No. 1, comprising wel l  over 200,000 acres. It had made some 
interes t ing discover ies  about t he  value and cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of Japanese 
farming. 
"The number of farms operated by Japanese i n  t h e  Pac i f i c  Coast 
region comprised only 2 percent of a l l  farms, and t h e i r  
acreage involved only .3 percent of the  t o t a l  farm acreage. 
These percentages, however, give an e n t i r e l y  misleading in- 
d icat ion of t he  importance of Japanese farming en te rpr i se  i n  
the  area. The average value per acre  of a l l  farms i n  1940 
was $37.94, whereas t h a t  of Japanese farms was $279.96. This 
difference i n  value i s  due pr imari ly  t o  the f a c t  t h a t  
Japanese agr icu l tu re  has been a highly in tensive  and productive 
enterprise.  Three out of every four acres of Japanese farm 
land were devoted t o  ac tua l  crop production, whereas only 
one out of every four acres  of a l l  farm land i n  t he  area 
was planted i n  crops. The average s i z e  of the  Japanese farms 
was 42 acres, and 85 percent of them contained l e s s  than 50 
acres. 
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"The estimated value of crops grown by Japanese farmers i n  
1940 i n  California was $32,317,700. The values f o r  c e r t a in  
spec i f i c  crops were: l e t t uce ,  $5,942,100; celery,  $4,667,250; 
tomatoes, $4,182,000; cantaloupes, $2,720,000; carrots ,  
$2,326,000; and strawberries,  $2,181,600. 
"An analysis  of Japanese farm en te rpr i ses  showed t h a t  the  
types of crops grown were l a rge ly  i n t e r - t i l l ed  truck, 
f r u i t ,  and spec ia l ty  c r o p s ,  and of ten each acre was planted 
and harvested several  times during the  same year. These 
crops were invar iably  of an in tensive  type such a s  straw- 
ber r ies ,  tomatoes, l e t t uce ,  onions, celery,  nursery stock, 
peas, beans, f r u i t ,  cranberries,  melons o r  sugar beets. A 
r epor t  of the  estimated percentage of t he  major vegetable 
crops produced i n  t he  Pac i f ic  Coast region by Japanese 
farmers c l ea r ly  shows the  importance of t h e i r  ag r i cu l t u r a l  
production. For example, i n  C a l i f o r n i aJapnese  operators 
grew 90 percent o f  the strawberries,  73 percent of the 
snap beans, 75 percent of t he  celery,  60 percent of the  
cau l i f lower ,  70 percent of the  l e t t u c e ,  60 percent of the  
spinach, and 50 percent of  t he  tomatoes. 
"The specia l izat ion Japanese f a r m i n g  i s  very s ign i f ican t  
and presented an important  problem t o  an agency which con- 
t e m p l a t e d  the removal of the J a p a n e s e  farm operators. 
Flor icul ture ,  greenhouse opera t ion ,  and oyster  farming a re  
other  examples of special ized operations i n  which many of 
the  Japanese a re  engaged. 
"In summary it may be f a i r l y  s t a t ed  t h a t  the  Japanese 
people were the  most important r a c i a l  minority group 
engaged i n  ac r icu l tu re  i n  t he  Pac i f ic  Coast region. Their 
systems of farming, types of crops, and land tenure con- 
ditions* were such t ha t  t h e i r  replacement by other  farmers 
would be extremely di f f icu l t .  Highly technical  personnel 
would be required t o  handle such a t r ans i t i on ,  a c r ed i t  
program would have t o  be adapted t o  the  peculiar  problems 
presented, and some s h i f t s  i n  t he  fu ture  use of land 
would undoubtedly be involved. 11-a 
Beginning on March 17, 1942, F S A  o f f i c e s  regis tered only those 
farms whose owners vo lun ta r i ly  approached the  FSA, but on order from 
Washington t o  conduct a s y s t e m t i c  survey and r eg i s t r a t i on  of a l l  
* Refers t o  ce r t a in  shadowy arrangements f o r  occupancy of land by 
Japanese r e su l t i ng  from t h e  terms of t he  Alien Land Laws. 
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evacuee operated farm proper ty- in  t he  week ending March 27, FSA under- 
took a l a rge  job, which was 80 p e r c e n t  complete by the  deadline and was 
continued throughout the period of evacuation movements i n to  assembly 
centers, by checkup a t  t he  control  s t a t i ons  which processed a l l  evacuees 
affected by t he  various exclusion orders. This matter attended t o ,  FSA 
set  about reg i s te r ing  prospective non-evacuee operators, but a t  f i r s t  
few materialized. Doubts of venturing i n t o  t h i s  special ized s o r t  of 
farming, a large-looming labor problem, and various other fac tors  made 
potential  operators hes i t a te .  FSA inaugurated a campaign of adver t is ing 
opportunities, going in to  l o c a l i t i e s  and put t ing pressure on possible 
operators and a t  the  same time publicizing t he  federa l  loan policy; 
eventually t h e  agency reg i s te red  about 5,000 pos s ib i l i t i e s .  
Because of t he  nature of Japanese farming, it was found most 
practicable i n  many instances t o  encourage the  formation of corpora- 
tions-often connected with growers' and shippers'  organizations--to 
operate a group of farms and t o  make loans of considerable s i z e  t o  such 
corporations. By June 1, 722 loans t o t a l i ng  $3,120,243 had been 
approved. 11-b 
FSA operations were financed i n  pa r t  by t he  War Department; i n  
part from t h e  Pres ident ' s  Emergency Fund: 
"On March 18, 1942, the  Army al located t o  the  Regional Director 
(of FSA) $1,000,000 f o r  use i n  making W F A  loans. * * *  By the 
middle of April,  t h i s  sum had been exhausted, ch ie f ly  by t he  
making of loans i n  excess of $900,000. In an t ic ipa t ion  of 
t h i s  s i t ua t i on  addi t ional  funds were requested on April 9, 1942. 
On Apri l  24, 1942, $5,000,000 of addi t ional  money was received 
from t h e  Pres ident ' s  Emergency Fund with which t o  continue 
operations. 
"By the  end of May, a t o t a l  of $3,584,025.42 had been expended 
e i t h e r  f o r  loans o r  administrat ive costs .  Of t h i s  sum, 
$3,434,008.08 was f o r  loans and $150,017.34 f o r  administrat ive 
costs. " 11-c 
In only one instance had FSA seen f i t  t o  use i t s  freezing power 
t o  protect the  equi ty  of a Japanese American owner. The f a c t  t ha t  t he  
agency had such power was presumed t o  have had a sa lu ta ry  e f f ec t  upon 
those Americanswho were over-zealous bargain-hunters.11-d A Farm 
Security Administration ins t ruc t ion ,  dated April  10, 1942, warned : "The
extraordinary character  of the  power  presupposes t h a t  it w i l l  be used 
with the g rea tes t  of reserve." 14-d  In a communication of t he  same date 
addressed t o  h i s  s t a f f ,  Regional Director Laurence I. Hewes, Jr. ,spelled 
out the warning i n  more d e t a i l :  
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" A s  pointed out  i n  Wartime Farm Adjustment I n s t r u c t i o n
952.1, t h e  f r eez ing  power imposes upon t h e  Farm Secur i ty  
Administrat ion  d u t i e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  with re ference  
t o  i t s  use,  which a r e  commensurate with the  ext raordinary  
charac ter  of  thesepowers. It i s  abso lu te ly  imperat ive 
t h a t  these  powers be used spar ingly  and w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  
of c a u t i o n  t o  insu re  agains t  any poss ib le  abuse.The 
Administrator of t h e  Farm Secur i ty  Administration has re- 
peatedly  impressed upon me t h e  need of  avoiding has ty  and 
i l l -considered ac t ion .  I bel ieve  it i s  unnecessary f o r  
me t o  advise  you t h a t  t h e  improper use of the  f reez ing 
power w i l l  not  only  occasion considerable embarrassment t o  
and i n v i t e  se r ious  c r i t i c i s m  of the  Farm Secur i ty  Adminis- 
t r a t i o n  but ,  of much g r e a t e r  importance, w i l l  de fea t  t h e  
ve ry  purpose which t h e  Farm Secur i ty  Administration seeks 
t o  accomplish--namely, t h e  cont inuat ion  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  
production. 
"The abuse of  t h e  power may r e s u l t  e i t h e r  from i t s  improper 
exe rc i se  o r  from c a r e l e s s  references  t o  the  exis tence  of 
t h e  power and t h e  a b i l i t y  t o   make use of it. I must, there-  
fo re ,  advise you t h a t  under no circumstances whatsoever may
any of  you i n d i c a t e  t o  an evacuee o r  t o  any person i n  t h e  
r e l a t i o n  of  landlord,  l i e n o r ,  o r  c r e d i t o r  of an evacuee, 
t h a t  any p a r t i c u l a r  a c t  o r  f a i l u r e  t o  a c t  on h i s  p a r t  w i l l  
r e s u l t  i n  t h e  exerc ise  of the  f reez ing power. In other  
words, you m a y  not  under any circumstances th rea ten  o r  imply 
, 
t h a t  t h e  f r eez ing  power w i l l  be exsrcised.  In any s i t u a t i o n  
i n  which it appears t o  you t h a t  the  f reez ing power should 
be exercised,  t h e  proper procedure t o  follow i s  t h a t  s e t  
f o r t h  i n  Wartime Farm Adjustment Ins t ruc t ion  952.1.* You 
a r e  expected t o  adhere s t r i c t l y  t o  t h a t  procedure and not  
dev ia te  theref rom.  I f e e l  very deeply the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
which i s  placed upon t h e  Farm Secur i ty  Administration and, 
the re fo re ,  wish t o  advise you t h a t  the  f a i l u r e  of  any
employee t o  exe rc i se  the  proper degree of r e s t r a i n t  and 
caut ion  i n  connection w i t h  t h e  use of the  f r eez ing  power 
w i l l  be t h e  sub jec t  of prompt and f u l l  inves t iga t ion"  14-d 
* By t h e  terms of  t h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n  t h e  evacuee owner had t o  t ake  t h e  
i n i t i a t i v e  i n  i n s t i g a t i n g  use of the  f r eez ing  power. The evacuee had t o  
f i l e  a formal p e t i t i o n  t o  have h i s  proper ty  designated a s  Specia l  
Blocked Property  and the  s i t u a t i o n  which had produced t h e  p e t i t i o n  had 
t o  be thoroughly inves t iga ted  by the  Government agents  before t h e  
f r eez ing  power could be invoked. 
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In t he  evacuation of Bainbridge Island-in Puget Sound--the f i r s t  
area t o  be evacuated under the  mi l i t a ry  power of exclusion, shortage of 
time made it necessary fo r  t h e  FSA f i e l d  agent t o  accept 13 powers of 
attorney, The Cal i fornia  Evacuated  Farms Association was a corporation 
formed within FSA t o  exercise supervisory and. managerial r i g h t s  a t  need; 
it took over t h e  Bainbridge I s l a n d .property.11-e 
FSA had addi t ional  respons ib i l i ty  t o  prevent unnecessary junking 
of evacuee-owned farm machinery and t o  keep it avai lable  f o r  use. The 
policy s ta tement  contained four major provisions: 
"1. To the  extent  necessary f o r  the  continued operation of 
evacuated farms, farm machinery was t o  be retained upon 
t he  land f o r  which it was normally used. A separate 
s a l e  of the  farm machinery  t o  persons other than t he  
subs t i t u t e  operator was t o  be discouraged unless t he  
subs t i t u t e  operator possessed t he  necessary machinery 
t o  con t inue  operations under a s a t i s f ac to ry  f a r m  
program. 
"2. Where machinery  was  t o  be sold off  of the  farm it was 
t o  be retained i n  the  community or  l oca l i t y .  
"3. The storage of farm machinery which would remove it 
from use during t h e  war period was t o  be discouraged  
in view of the  d i f f i c u l t y  experienced i n  obtaining 
f a r m i n g  i m p l e m e n t s  and equipment. 
"4. Farm machinery s t i l l  su i tab le  f o r  use or  capable o f  
being repaired was not t o  be sold t o  junk dea le rs  f o r  
u l t imate  r e s a l e  a s  scrap metal."11-f 
A r epor t  from a l l  FSA. f i e l d  agents, of May 8, 1942, showed t h a t  
only 13 farms i n  t h e  evacuated area  had any undisposed-of machinery. 
The approximate value of t h i s  machinery  was $11,655. 11-g . 
On August 1, 1942, t he  r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  d isposal  by s a l e  or  
lease of r e a l  property and fo r  storage or t r ans f e r  of movable property 
of evacuees became t h a t  of WRA. The Authority a t  t h a t  time s e t  up an 
Evacuee Property Division i n  what was then t h e  San Franc i s co  r e g i o n a l  
office,  w i t h  branches s ta f fed  by an ag r i cu l t u r a l  proper ty  o f f i c e r  and a 
conmercial property o f f i c e r  a t  S e a t t l e  and a t  Los Angeles .  The Farm 
Security Administrat ion  retained ju r i sd ic t ion  over i t s  WFA loans and 
col lect ions ,  but  otherwise stepped out of t he  picture ,  having referred 
t o  WRA 53 cases  requir ing action. The Federal Reserve Bank turned over 
businesses numbering 1,325 i n  California,  185 in the  Portland area, and 
1,277 i n  Washington. 
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The Director of t he  War Relocation Authority had wr i t t en  from San 
Francisco on March 30, 1942 - ont h eeve of enforced evacuation movements- 
t o  James Rowe, Assistant  t o  Attorney General Bidd le :  
"The hardest  b a t t l e s  so f a r  a r e  about the  property of 
evacuees. I am f e a r f u l  t h a t  t h e  voluntary system i s  going 
t o  bog down badly i n  spots. Colonel Bendetsen and I a r e  
t ry ing  to f i x  things up a s  bes t  we can and on the  whole, 
perhaps, j u s t i c e  w i l l  be done the  Japanese. But the re ' s  
no denying t h a t  the re  w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
"Colonel Bendetsen and I had hoped t h a t  Ennis o r  someone 
e l s e  keenly in te res ted  i n  t h i s  whole problem could come 
out here and observe impar t i a l ly  the  functioning of the 
property-handling system. It may prove t o  be t he  darkest  
pa r t  of a p r e t t y  dark picture." 
The May 1942 repor t  of the Tolan Committee indicated both under- 
standing and concern with regard t o  t he  handling of evacuee property. 
"With respect  t o  the  present program of protecting personal 
property r i gh t s ,  t he  committee herewith records severa l  
observations. It should be emphasized t h a t  property protec- 
t i on ,  pa r t i cu l a r l y  with regard t o  household goods and per- 
sonal  e f f e c t s  cannot be disassociated from any plan fo r  
resett lement.  * * *  It i s  obvious t ha t ,  with t he  rapid 
curtailment i n  the  manufacture of household goods and 
appliances, it w i l l  be impossible i n  many instances t o  
supply a r t i c l e s  of fu rn i tu re ,  and other household items, 
when resett lement projects  have assumed de f in i t e  shape. 
It i s  impract icable , therefore ,  t o  urge upon t he  evacuees 
t h e  hurried s a l e  of these ar t ic les ,  when they w i l l  undoubt- 
ed ly  be needed badly a t  a l a t e r  date. 
"It appears t o  the  committee t ha t ,  although momentarily 
l i k e l y  t o  involve addi t ional  d e t a i l  work, a plan f o r  the 
storage of a l l  general ly  recognized useful  household a r t i c l e s  
should be i n s t i t u t ed ,  r a the r  than the present system of 
making such storage optional  t o  the  evacuees. Storage 
should be insisted  upon. If t h i s  i s  not done, the  committee 
believes the  W a r  Relocation Authority w i l l  f ind i t s e l f  
severely handicapped i n  any resett lement e f f o r t ,  with 
evacuees arr iv ing a t  reception centers and resett lement 
s i t e s  without  even t he  bare necess i t i es  f o r  a new begin- 
ning. The following summary, submitted by t he  Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco on April 20, 1942, indicates  
how few evacuees weretakingadvantageoft h e  opportunity 
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t o  s t o r e  property. [The summary showed t h a t  of  2,506 heads 
of famil ies  processed through control  s t a t ions ,  only 679 had 
discussed movable property problems and only 498 had a t  t h e i r  
request  been provided with government storage i n  warehousesJ 
"The committee considers t he  present po l i c i e s  of t he  Federal 
Reserve Bank i n  handling property matters t o  be def ic ien t  i n  
t he  following par t i cu la r s :  Although t h e  bank, under t he  
au tho r i t y  of the  Secretary  of the  Treasury, apparently has 
ample au tho r i t y  f o r  a s s u m i n g  powers of a t to rney  and otherwise 
con t ro l l ing  the  d i spos i t ion  of property, it appears t o  have 
emphasized a pol icy of immediate l iquidat ion.  The conditions 
under which t he  bank w i l l  accept property f o r  storage have 
thus f a r  been cautious i n  the  extreme. The pr inciple  of 
owner's r i s k  l a i d  down a s  a condition of accepting property 
f o r  storage,  including automobiles, a l so  must be regarded a s  
a bad psychological factor .  
"The committee recognizes t h a t  t he r e  a r e  few, i f  any, prece- 
dents  f o r  dealing w i t h  the  endless number of problems ra ised by 
t he  enforced evacuation of a l i ens  and c i t i z ens  from s t r a t e g i c  
mi l i t a ry  areas  i n  t h i s  country. * * *  However, a fars ighted 
po l icy  of resett lement demands that; future negotiat ions point  
more i n  t he  d i rec t ion  of salvaging  use fu l  household items and 
o ther  property e f f e c t s  consis tent  with fu ture  a c t i v i t i e s  of 
t he  War Relocation Authority, r a the r  than toward undue en- 
couragement of  l iquidation.  
"The committee a l so  recommends t h a t  Congress consider whether 
some extension of war-damage insurance i s  f ea s ib l e  f o r  p r o p -  
e r t y  accepted f o r  storage. I n  t h i s  connection, t he  committee 
c a l l s  a t t en t i on  t o  language appearing a t  t he  bottom of t he  
personal  property inventory l i s t  supplied by t he  Federal 
Reserve Bank t o  evacuees which reads a s  follows: 
" ' I f  t he  property herein claimed t o  have been delivered, 
and which a c t u a l l y  was delivered, i s  l o s t ,  damaged, o r  
destroyed a s  the  r e s u l t  of negligence while it i s  i n  the  
possession o r  custody of t h e  United S ta tes ,  or  of any 
agency act ing f o r  it, the  Congress of the  United S t a t e s  
w i l l  be asked t o  take appropriate act ion f o r  t he  benef i t  
of owners.' 
"Having i n  mind t h a t  the  majori ty of t he  present evacuees a r e  
American c i t i zens ,  it i s  not inconceivable t h a t  law s u i t s  may 
be i n s t i t u t ed  a t  the  c lose  of the  war i n  t he  event negligence 
or  damage t o  property i s  suffered by individuals affected by 
the  evacuation. 
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"The re t icence t o  assune r e spons ib i l i t y  which has character- 
ized the  handling of personal property has a l s o  been present 
i n  the  d i spos i t ion  of automobiles * * * . The o f f i c i a l  in- 
s t r uc t i ons  t o  evacuees would ind ica te  t h a t  present arrange- 
ments do not take full s tock of the straightened economic 
circumstances i n  which t h i s  country now f inds  i t s e l f  * * *. 
"It i s  c l ea r  t ha t  before t h i s  war i s  concluded our Nation 
w i l l  have acute need f o r  every automobile, bat tery ,  and 
t i r e  it can secure. It is, therefore,  urged upon those 
responsible f o r  property protect ion t h a t  they  husband these  
asse t s ."  14-e 
On the  subject  of the  protect ion of evacuee-owned r u r a l  property 
and continuance of ag r i cu l t u r a l  production, r e spons ib i l i t i e s  of t h e  
Farm Security  Administration, t h e  committee commented: 
" * * *  As the committee pointed out i n  i t s  preliminary 
repor t  on evacuation problems, the Japanese have been 
responsible f o r  a considerable volume of c e r t a in  crops 
grown i n  Pac i f ic  Coast S ta tes ,  pa r t i cu l a r l y  i n  California. 
This fac tor ,  plus the  slender margin of time allowed fo r  
the  completion of property t rans fe rs ,  has a l ready l e d  t o  
severa l  unfortunate consequences f o r  the  evacuees  * * * 
"While supporting the  exhortat ion of the  Wartime Civi l  
Control Administration t o  the  evacuees t o  continue f a r m -  
ing operations up t o  t h e  time of evacuation a s  a demonstra- 
t i o n  of loya l ty ,  the  committee i s  nevertheless constrained 
t o  point  out t h a t  t h i s  pol icy has frequently worked t o  t h e  
economic disadvantage of the  evacuees o r  has proved beyond 
t h e i r  economic means t o  ca r ry  out. Ut i l i za t ion  of farm 
implements t o  the  l a s t  moment makes it d i f f i c u l t  t o  effec- 
t ua t e  equitable set t lements when the  order comes fo r  
evacuation. Moreover, * * * it may be wel l  f o r  the  War 
Relocation Authority** t o  weigh care fu l ly  possible 
a l t e rna t i ve s  t o  t h i s  course, such a s  storage of implements 
which a r e  growing scarcer  dai ly ,  u n t i l  resett lement projects  
assume more tangible out l ines .  In t r ans f e r s  of l ease  o r  
t i t l e ,  where the  implements a r e  considered an i n t e g r a l  pa r t  
of the  t ransact ion,  t h i s  a l t e rna t i ve  may not be feas ible .  
* Reference i s  t o  ins t ruc t ions  quoted on pp. 29-30 of t h i s  report .  
** The committee was an t ic ipa t ing  fu ture  events: it was not u n t i l  
August of 1942 t h a t  the  War Relocation Authority inher i ted t he  property 
problems which t he  mass evacuation had posed. 
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The committee must emphasize, however, t h a t  conservation 
i s  t o  be encouraged r a the r  than wholesale dispersion of 
machinery which may be d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  not impossible t o  
replace.  
"Again recognizing t h a t  urgency has operated a t  a l l  times 
a s  a qualifying circumstance against  a perfected evacuation 
plan, t h e  committee observes t h a t  the  de l ay  i n  delegating 
t o  t he  Farm Secur i ty  Administration t he  power t o  ' freeze '  
proper t ies  s imi l a r  t o  t h a t  held by t he  Federal Reserve Bank 
has represented a hindrance t o  Farm Secur i ty  Administration 
i n  i ts  work a s  overseer of a g r i c u l t u r a l  proper t ies  owned o r  
leased by Japanese  * * * 
"In t h e  i n t e r e s t  of formalizing procedures, the  committee 
recommends t h a t  the  Farm Secur i ty  Administration, through 
i t s  f i e l d  agents cur ren t ly  engaged i n  t he  t r ans f e r  of 
ag r i cu l t u r a l  propert ies,  be delegated t o  perform a con- 
t inu ing  check upon the  terms of a l l  l e a se s  and other 
arrangements entered i n to  by t he  evacuees. By t h i s  method, 
t he  Farm Secur i ty  Administration could a c t  a s  agent f o r  
r e tu rns  due evacuees f o r  crops planted and growing pr io r  
t o  t he  evacuation; it could a l so  receive and forward 
property payments t o  the  Japanese, s ince  t he  new operators 
may f ind  it d i f f i c u l t  t o  keep i n  touch with t he  various 
resett lement projects .  This must be done t o  assure the  
property r i g h t s  of the  evacuees. Orderly accounting 
procedures i n s t i t u t e d  now merely would r e f l e c t  sound 
business sense and serve t o  avoid endless l i t i g a t i o n  i n  
t h e  post-war period. 
"The committee fu r the r  recommends t h a t  the  Congress give 
immediate a t t en t i on  t o  such other  property items a s  con- 
servation of equ i t i e s  i n  mortgages, a s  wel l  a s  the possi- 
bi l i ty  of delinquencies i n  taxes on property vacated or 
abandoned by evacuees  * * * ." 14-f
THE EVACUEE PROPERTY PROGRAM OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY 
Gathering a small s t a f f  from the  ranks of the  Farm Secur i ty  Ad- 
minis t ra t ion and California Land Bank personnel, t he  War Relocation 
Authority s e t  up t he  Division of Evacuee Property within the San 
Francisco Regional Office of the  Authority i n  August of 1942, estab- 
l i sh ing  small branch o f f i ce s  i n  S e a t t l e  and Los Angeles, prepared t o  
o f f e r  e igh t  types of services  t o  any evacuee who requested such service:  
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1. To secure tenants  o r  operators f o r  both ag r i cu l t u r a l  
and commercial properties. 
2. To negotiate new leases  or  renewals of existing leases .
3. To obtain buyers f o r  r e a l  o r  personal property of a l l  
k i n d s .  
4. To e f f ec t  set t lement of claims f o r  o r  against  an evacuee. 
5. To adjust  d i f ferences  a r i s i ng  out of i n e q u i t a b l e ,  h a s t i l y  
made o r  indef in i te  agreements. 
6. To obtain an accounting f o r  amounts due, and t o  
f a c i l i t a t e  col lect ions .  
7. To ascer ta in  whether property was being s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  
maintained o r  whether damage or  waste was occurring. 
8. To check inventories of goods and equipment, and t o  
recommend u t i l i z a t i o n  of material  for the bes t  i n t e r e s t s  
of the  evacuee and the  nation. 
Ear ly  Problems Relating  t o  Moveable Property  
A t  t he  time when WRA assumed r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  evacuee property, 
the  Federal Reserve B a n k  of San Francisco assigned t o  W R Athe  l e a s e s  f o r  
t he  19 warehouses which the bank had taken f o r  storage of household goods 
and personal proper t ies  of evacuees u n t i l  such possessions could be 
t ransferred t o  re locat ion centers.  However, having been encouraged t o  
make arrangements f o r  pr ivate  storage wherever possible,  the evacuees had 
i n  general  u t i l i z e d  the  bank's services  only a s  a  l a s t  r e so r t ;  i n  a l l ,  
only  2,867families had stored t h e i r  possessions i n  t he  bank's ware- 
houses. 15 The others  had l e f t  t h e i r  possessions stored i n  vacant s to res ,  
churches, houses, garages or other outbuildings on t h e i r  own land; many 
had reserved a room i n  a house rented f o r  the  duration t o  a  tenant,  with 
only a verbal  agreement t h a t  the  reserved room i n  which possessions of 
t he  absent owner were stored shouldremain unmolested u n t i l  the  owner 
could recover h i s  property. 
The Federal Reserve Bank had agreed t o  ship, f r e e  of charge, t o  
re loca t ion  centers  such household and other p e r s o n a l goods as  had been 
stored i n  t h e  bank's warehouses. WlA assumed t h i s  obl igat ion  i n  August. 
Throughout t h e  summer and e a r l y  f a l l  the  evacuee population was being 
moved from WCCA assembly centers  i n t o  the  WRA re locat ion centers,  where 
t he  majori ty of the  people ant ic ipated l i v ing  f o r  the  durat icn of the  
war. I n  the  barrack s he l t e r  of the  re locat ion centers,  a l a rge  family 
occupied a s ing le  room 20' x 25' a  small one received a  room 16' x 20' .  
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Cots and blankets were issued t o  the  occupants, Heating stoves were  in- 
s t a l l e d  a s  soon a s  t ranspor ta t ion f a c i l i t i e s  permitted. Anything be- 
yond these  bas ic  e s s e n t i a l s  of l i v ing  equipment had t o  be contrived or  
provided by the  evacuees. Understandably they wanted such items of 
fu rn i t u r e  and equipment f ron  storage a s  could be u t i l i z e d  i n  the  l imi ted 
space of t h e i r  barrack  apartments. Those who had stored t h e i r  goods i n  
Government warehouses  could check inventories f o r  wanted items and re- 
ceive them a t  the  center  i n  a reasonable length of time, without  cost .  
Those who had l e f t  t h e i r  goods in an abandoned church or i n  a shed on a 
farm which might be untenanted, o r  i n  any pr iva te ly  arranged accommoda- 
t i ons  were not e l i g i b l e  f o r  f r e e  service.  Throughout t he  f i r s t  few 
months of W R A ' s  j u r i sd ic t ion  over evacuee property matters, regulations 
provided t h a t  WRA would t ranspor t  t o  t he  owner such goods as  the  evac- 
uees a t  t h e i r  own expense had t ransferred from pr iva te  storage t o  
Government warehouses. It soon became evident t h a t  the  majority of t h e  
evacuees had so depleted t h e i r  savings i n  the  course of the e v a c u a t i o n  
t h a t  they  had not means t o  pay fo r  ge t t i ng  t h e i r  possessions col lected 
and transported t o  a Government warehouse. It was becoming increas ingly  
apparent, too, a s  WRA representa t ives  made requested check-ups on 
evacuee personal property, t h a t  goods stored i n  vacant s to res ,  churches, 
and l e f t  w i t h  neighbors were not adequately safeguarded. Losses from 
f i r e ,  flood, t h e f t  and vandalism were mounting s teadi ly .  16 
In recognit ion of t h i s  s i tua t ion ,  t he  Authority established pro- 
cedures i n  January of 1943 which permitted the col lect ion of movable 
property and t he  t ranspor ta t ion of such evacuee property t o  Government 
warehouses a t  Government expense. This service was offered t o  any 
evacuee who wished t o  a v a i l  himself of it, and a s  requests streamed  i n  
from the  centers  for  t r ans f e r  of household goods and equipment t o  t h i s  
sa fe r  kind of storage, warehoases were leased a t  various points where 
the re  was a concentration of evacuee property. 
It i s  unfortunate t h a t  t he  evacuees wnre encouraged t o  arrange 
f o r  pr ivate  storage of t h e i r  goods a t  the  time of t h e i r  removal from t h e  
West Coast. Time and experience have denonstrated t h a t  padlocks and 
bo l t s  on i so la ted  farm buildings and deserted churches o r  s tores  afforded 
l i t t l e  protection t o  absentee owners against  t he  lawless. Prejudice 
against  the  evacuated people ran  high during the war years throughout 
t he  evacuated area ,  and t h i s  prejudice was re f lec ted  i n  the  indif ference 
of many l o c a l  law enforcement agencies toward the  depredation of evacuee 
property and i n  t h e i r  professed i n a b i l i t y  t o  f ind o r  i den t i fy  vandals, 
a r son is t s  and thieves.  
Problems Inheri ted by WRA from FSA 
Not long a f t e r  WRA had taken over t he - r e spons ib i l i t i e s  of the  
Farm Secur i ty  Administration with regard t o  evacuee property, a major 
problem emerged a s  an outgrowth of t he  FSA policy of col lect ions  on 
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Wartime Farm Adjustment loans made to operators who took over evacuee 
farms. A meno from Victor L. Furth of the  Evacuee Property Division t o  
the  regional  d i r ec to r  of WRA, San Francisco, dated November 9, 1942, 
summarized the  problem a s  it was recognized by WRA a t  t h a t  time: 
"The Evacuee Property Divison has been cal led on t o  a s s i s t  
i n  property problems involving loans made through t h e  War- 
time Farms Administration [Adjustment Program] which was 
supervised by the  Farm Secur i ty  Administration. As you 
know, FSA has turned over t o  the  War Relocation Authority 
a l l  of the  other evacuee ag r i cu l t u r a l  problems but  s t i l l  
has t he  r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  servicing and col lect ing WFA
loans. It i s  already apparent t h a t  a number of these loans 
are not likely  t o  be repaid  wi thin  the  period of twelve  
months f o r  which the  loans were made, so t h a t  it becomes 
e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  protection of evacuee i n t e r e s t s  t o  f ind 
out j u s t  what the  collection policy of F S A  w i l l  be wi th  
respect  t o  requests f o r  renewals or extensions of time. 
"In conversation. with M r .  L. I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director 
of t he  Farm Secur i ty  Administration i n  San Francisco, we have 
learned t h a t  h i s  agency expects t o  exer t  'a f i rm co l lec t ion  
policy'.  However, it was indicated t h a t  due consideration 
would be given t o  each case and t h a t  some concessions might 
be made i f  circumstances j u s t i f i ed  them. The policy as  
s ta ted  appears reasonable but a serious problem a r i s e s  from 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  many operators need assurence r i gh t  now a s  t o  
whether o r  not they can o b t a i n  an extension of time so t h a t  
they can plan t h e i r  operations f o r  next season's crops in  
ample time . 
"Mr. Hewes has expressed the  be l ie f  t h a t  the  Farm Secur i ty  
Administration took on t he  financing program fo r  the 1942 
season because no other  agency was  avai lable  but he f e e l s  
t h a t  it was more or  l e s s  of a temporary arrangement t o  
ca r ry  through the  crop season t h a t  was already under way, 
and he believes t h a t  the  loans should be l iquidated a s  
completely  as  possible and t h a t  operators needing addi- 
t i o n a l  financing should e i t h e r  obtain it from the  usual  
commerc i a l  channels or  t ha t  some othergovernment agency 
should provide the  necessary funds, 
"In t h e  Sea t t l e  area  we are already observing cases where 
operators of evacuee farms a r e  abandoning the  propert ies,  
knowing t h a t  they w i l l  not be able  to repay t h e i r  loans i n  
full. by t he  due date  and believing t h a t  they have no 
 
 
                                                       (48)  
opportunity of obtaining extensions of time o r  renewals of 
t h e i r  loans. It seems t o  us t h a t  i f  t he  Farm Secur i ty  
Administration i s  wi l l ing  t o  consider each case on i t s  
individual  merits, some indicat ion of t h i s  pol icy should 
be made known t o  t he  farm operators so t h a t  they w i l l  be 
encouraged t o  remain on the farms, s t a r t  t h e i r  operations 
f o r  next season, and keep the  places i n  production instead 
of d r i f t i n g  of f  t o  other  occupations. 
"We believe t h a t  if it were possible t o  do so t h i s  e n t i r e  
s i t u a t i o n  might be reviewed with representa t ives  of t h e  
Farm Secur i ty  Administration i n  Washington, We a r e  anxious 
t o  see  t h a t  the  evacuees receive a l l  of the  money due them 
from t h e  operation of t h e i r  farms and we a r e  l ikewise in- 
t e res ted  i n  providing f o r  t h e i r  continued operation. Both 
of these  object ives  a r e  adversely affected by the  uncer ta inty  
t h a t  e x i s t s  a t  the  present  time." 
A memo of November 26, 1942, from Lieutenant Colonel Claude B. 
Washburne, Civ i l  Affai rs  Division, Chief, Inspection and Fiscal  Division, 
t o  Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant  Chief of S t a f f ,  C iv i l  Affai rs  
Division, Wartime Civ i l  Control Administration, gives a mi l i t a ry  anal- 
y s i s  of t he  s i t ua t i on  i n  the  following numbered paragraphs: 
" 3 .  A conversbtion witMr. Hollingberry [Hol lenberg]  of Farm 
Secur i ty  Administration reveals t he  following per t inent  in- 
formation. Maturity date of crop loans and extensinns there- 
of do not i n  any case run beyond the  end of f i s c a l  year 1943. 
Extensions of loans a r e  not made unless Farm Secur i ty  Ad- 
minis t ra t ion f e e l s  confident t h a t  a g rea te r  port ion of the  
loan can be collected i f  an extension i s  granted. These 
cases a r e  few. The policy in general  i s  t h a t  these  loans 
were made t o  cover the  emergency need of evacuating Japanese 
and insuring harvesting of growing crops, t h a t  the  obliga- 
t i o n  of the  borrower i s  posi t ive  and t h a t  t he  loans w i l l  
be collected from any monies avai lable  from the  crop and 
equipment cha t t e l s  notwithstanding it may work a hardship 
on t he  borrower and possibly mean the  other c red i to rs ,  
including the  Japanese, may ge t  nothing. Under t h i s  pro- 
cedure t he  borrower must refinance  through normal c r ed i t  
channels. In many cases the  Japanese have agreements with 
t he  borrowers whereby the  Japanese a r e  t o  receive 50% of 
t h e  ne t  proceeds of the  s a l e  of crops. In t h e  event the  
Farm Secur i ty  Administration takes  a l l  proceeds under t h e i r  
f i r s t  l i en s ,  it means the  Japanese ge t s  nothing. The l i k e l i -  
hood of charges t h a t  the  evacuees have been robbed of t h e i r  
equipment and i n t e r e s t  i n  leases  becomes obvious. 
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"4. A s  a  r e s u l t  of the  s t r i c t  compliance of c r ed i t  terms, 
it has been necessary f o r  Farm Secur i ty  Administration t o  
s e l l  under t h e i r  supervision farm equipment of Japanese and 
borrower on which they held cha t te l s .  Considerable and 
b i t t e r  c r i t i c i sm  i s  directed a t  them a s  a r e s u l t  of t h e i r  
co l lec t ion  procedure. 
"5. The s t a t i s t i c i a n  a t  Farm Secur i ty  Administration e s t i -  
mates they w i l l  c o l l e c t  between 70% and 90% of the  t o t a l  
loans made. 
"6. Farm Secur i ty  Administration has pursued t h i s  policy 
fee l ing  t h a t  t he  matter of a f i s c a l  year 1944 loaning 
program t o  insure  production from these  lands and the  
protect ion of the  property i n t e r e s t s  and leases  i n  con- 
nection therewith of t h e  Japanese  a r e  now functions per- 
t a in ing  t o  t he  War Relocation Authority. They f e e l  t h a t  
t h e i r  job w i l l  becompleted  upon col lect ion of present 
loans unless cal led upon by the  proper branch of the  
Government t o  perform addi t ional  services.  
"7. They wish t h a t  above informition be i n  the  hands  of 
t h e  A s s i s t a n t  Chief of Sta f f ,  C iv i l  Affairs  D i v i s i o n ,  t o  
determine i f  t h e i r  policy i s  sa t i s fac tory .  
"8. I n  t h i s  connection it might be assumed tha t  the  crop 
problem i s  s e t t l ed  a s  follows:  
"a. War Relocation Authority being charged with duty  
of protect ing Japanese i n t e r e s t  in farm machin- 
e r y  and leases.  
"b. Farm Secur i ty  Administration cleaning up the  
emergency growing crop loans. 
"c. Future refinancing of borrowers and replant ing of 
lands being l e f t  t o  norma l  channels which a r e  
ava i lab le  t o  the general  public. 
"d. War Production Board and U. S. Department of 
Agriculture War Boards t o  take t he  matter up i n  
t h e  event t he  lands l i e  i d l e  t o  the  extent  it 
might become serious.  However, the re  the War 
Relocation Authority and t he  Farm Secur i ty  Ad- 
minis t ra t ion a r e  engaged i n  a controversy re- 
garding the  justness of Farm Secur i ty  Administration's  
co l lec t ion  a s  it concerns property r i g h t s  of evac- 
uees. It appears they and t h e i r  at torneys have 
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reached.an impasse. War Production Board and U. S. 
Department of Agriculture War Board are not  par t ic-  
u l a r l y  in te res ted  a t  the present moment. 
"9. The matter has been talked over with War Production 
Board, Farm Secutiry  Administration, and War Relocation 
Authority and it i s  the  recommendation of t he  Inspection 
and F i s ca l  Division t h a t  the  at tendant problems beyond 
t h a t  of t he  present crop loans be guided i n t o  normal and 
more permanent channels. This might be effected by a 
meeting i n  t h e  very near fu tu re  between M r .  Di l lon  Myer 
(now in San F r a n c i s c o ) ,  M r . Laurence Hewes and yourself 
o r  your reprepresentative."  
A copy of t h i s  memo was sen t  t o  Mr. Fryer, W R A regional  d i rec tor ,  
who responded i n  a b r i e f  memo addressed t o  Colonel Bendetsen on 
December 3, 1942: 
"* * *   You a r e  aware of adverse public reac t ion  t o  the  
po l icy  of Farm Secur i ty  Administration designed t o  col- 
l e c t  WFA loans  i r respec t ive  of t he  consequences upon 
evacuees o r  subs t i t u t e  operators. You a r e  no doubt a l so  
aware t h a t  evacuees a r e  going t o  view such act ion very 
seriously.  We understand t h a t  Farm Secur i ty  Administra- 
t i o n  considers it mandatory t h a t  they follow  t h i s  pro- 
cedure i n  order t h a t  t h e i r  obl igat ions  t o  the  War Depart- 
ment be f u l l y  met. 
"The War Relocation Authority has given t h i s  matter 
ser ious  a t t en t ion ,  and an e f f o r t  t o  work out a program 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  both War Relocation Authority and Farm 
Secur i ty  Administration i s  being undertaken i n  Washington. 
War Relocation Authority accordingly requests t h a t  a l l  
ac t ion designed t o  l i qu ida t e  such loans be withheld pend- 
ing  the  outcome of t h e  conferences above mentioned. Will
you please ind ica te  t o  us what act ion you w i l l  take toward 
t h i s  end?" 
WRA's problems were fu r the r  complicated by the  d i f f i c u l t y  of get- 
t i n g  e s s e n t i a l  information concerning farms which were caught i n  t h e  
meshes of t he  loan policy. On November 30 Mr. Russell  Robinson, WRA 
chief of evacuee property (formerly a Farm Secur i ty  Administration man), 
ca l l ed  h i s  former a s s i s t an t ,  Mr. Eager of FSA, and asked him t o  prepare 
a l i s t  of a l l  persons receiving WFA loans from FSA, t he  date  of such 
loans,  amounts, and indicat ion of which, i n  the  judgment of FSA would be 
c o l l e c t i b l e  only through l e g a l  procedure. This o r a l  request  was fol-  
lowed by a formal request  i n  wri t ing t o M r . Ralph W. Hollenberg, 
a s s i s t a n t  regional  d i r ec to r  of FSA. In  a memo of December 3, 1942, 
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Mr. Robinson described t o  M r .  Fryer h i s  attempts t o  procure t h i s  infor-  
mation. 
"Each day I have contacted M r .  Eager t o  ascer ta in  t he  
progress of the  assignment. I learned t h i s  morning t h a t  
t he  mater ia l  i s  ready f o r  us, However, Mr. Eager has been 
ins t ruc ted  t o  channel it through t he  Regional Director ' s  
o f f i c e  of Farm Secur i ty  Administration and there appears 
t o  be reluctance on t he  par t  of t h a t  o f f i c e  t o  re lease  it 
d i r e c t l y  t o  us. I have accordingly jus t  been t o  the  
Regional Office of Farm Secur i ty  Administration and learned 
t h a t  M r .  Hewes i s  i n  Washington, M r .  Hollenberg i s  i n  
Denver, and M r .  Anglim i s  Acting Regional Director. I ex- 
plained t o  Mr.Anglim prec i se ly  what I had asked for ,  and 
indicated t h a t  t h i s  information was necessary t o  us i n  
order t h a t  we might a r r i ve  a t  a c o n c l u s i o n  with regard t o  
t h e  fu ture  disposi t ion and handling of our respons ib i l i ty  
i n  t he  matter. 
" M r .  Anglim, a f t e r  considerable discussion, s t a t ed  t h a t  
inasmuch a s  he was unfamiliar with the  en t i r e  problem, 
he f e l t  he could not do otherwise than adhere t o  the  fol- 
lowing procedure: He w i l l  t ransmit  the  information so  
gathered t o  Mr. Baldwin i n  Washington, by a i rmai l  today, 
with a l e t t e r  indicat ing the nature of our request and 
t h e  suggestion t h a t  i f  i n  the  judgment of Mr. Baldwin it 
should be transmitted t o  WRA, t h a t  M r .  Baldwin do so. He 
i s  sending an ex t ra  copy f o r  t h a t  purpose. He i s  a l so  
asking t o  be informed by Mr. Baldwin i f  it w i l l  be per- 
missible t o  transmit  a copy t o  the  Evacuee Property 
Division local ly .  
"Throughout  myconversation with M r .  Anglim and Miss Ruth 
Wilson (Mr. Hewes' sec re ta ry) ,  there  was a thread of 
thought revealed which indicates  t h a t  Farm Secur i ty  does 
not care  t o  re lease  anything concerning t he  handling of 
t h e  funds made avai lable  t o  them by the  War Department 
except upon t he  spec i f i c  d i rec t ion  of Colonel B e n d e t s e n . "  
M r .  Robinson s e t  f o r t h  h i s  f u r the r  opinion of t he  farm property 
s i t u a t i o n  i n  a memo bearing the  date  of December 4 ,  1942; t h i s ,  too, was 
addressed t o  h i s  regional  d i rec tor ,  Mr. Fryer. 
"The present approach of Farm Secur i ty  Administration, as 
announced by themselves, i s  t h a t  of a ' f i rm co l lec t ion  
po l icy ,   A l l  o ther  considerations a r e  subservient t o  
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co l lec t ing  every d o l l a r  loaned by them i n  t he  WFA program. 
It i s  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  me t o  comprehend how our announced 
po l icy  of ' m a x i m u m  u t i l i z a t i o n  of evacuee property i n  t he  
nat ional  i n t e r e s t s  and protection and preservation of t he  
i n t e r e s t s  and equ i ty  of t he  evacuees' can be adhered t o  
under t h e  present Farm Secur i ty  approach. I am convinced 
t h a t  t he  evacuees may, a t  the  termination of t he  war, have 
many j u s t  claims against  the  government unless we char t  our 
course i n  such a way a s  w i l l  insure  following our own 
announced policy. A s  a nat ion we a r e  s t r i v ing  t o  prove t o  
t h e  world t h a t  the  democratic processes a r e  t he  enduring 
ones. Any ac t ion  which savors of confiscation o r  de l i be r a t e  
waste of a c i t i z e n ' s  i n t e r e s t s  w i l l  not e n l i s t  t h e  whole- 
hearted support of t h e  pr inciples  we a r e  presumed t o  be 
upholding.  * * *  
"For some f i v e  years I have had a considerable pa r t  i n  
a s s i s t i n g  t o  determine po l ic ies ,  procedures, and t h e  t ra in-  
i ng  of people i n  a loaning  program. I am f u l l y  aware of t he  
complications which a r e  involved i n  such a program. It i s  
not c l ea r  t o  me how the  Evacuee Property Division can f u l f i l l  
i t s  functions without having con t ro l  of t h e  f i nanc i a l  as- 
s i s t ance  required t o  operate evacuee property. Because of 
developments which have taken place, I am s a t i s f i e d  t he  only 
way i n  which we can completely f u l f i l l  our obl igat ions  t o  
t h e  evacuees i s  t o  remove a l l  other i n t e r e s t s  f rom t he  pic- 
tu re .  Only i n  t h i s  way can t he  p r inc ip les  and po l ic ies  upon 
which we operate be assured of successful  administration." 
During h i s  November v i s i t  t o  San Francisco, t he  National Director 
of t he  War Relocation Authority had talked t o  Colonel Bendetsen and t o  
FSA representa t ives  on t h e  subject  of t he  co l lec t ion  policy, but  Colonel 
Bendetsen had been vague i n  his pronouncements and Mr. Hewes was adamant 
on h i s  "firm co l lec t ion  policy. " Upon h i s  re tu rn  t o  Washington Mr. Myer 
discussed t he  prob l em wi th  t h e  National Director of FSA and forwarded a 
request  f o r  c a r e fu l l y  thought out  answers t o  three  questions t o  t h e  
chief  of evacuee property i n  San Francisco. Mr. Robinson's memo of 
December 17, 1942, s e t s  f o r t h  c l ea r ly  WRA a t t i t u d e s  and in te rpre ta t ions  
of obl igat ions  l a i d  upon FSA i n  t h i s  matter. 
The f i r s t  question  was: What pol icy should be followed i n  serv- 
i c i n g  ex i s t i ng  WFA loans? In  replying, Mr. Robinson quoted Lieutenant 
General DeWitt 's  l e t t e r  of March 15, 1942, which ins t ructed f i r s t ,  i n  a 
l i s t  of four  considerations, t h a t  the  regional  d i r ec to r  of FSA should 
"administer a program which w i l l  insure  continuation of t h e  proper agri-  
c u l t u r a l  lands  * * * and which w i l l  insure  f a i r  and equitable arrange- 
ments between t h e  evacuees and t h e  operators of t h e i r  property." The 
t h i r d  consideration was t he  making, servicing and co l lec t ion  of loans. 
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A t  the  time when these  functions were assigned t o  F S A ,  M r .  Robin- 
son had been an o f f i c i a l  of t h a t  agency. On December 17, 1942, a s  t he  
War Relocation Authority's chief of evacuee property, M r .  Robinson 
wrote : 
"I r e c a l l  very d i s t i n c t l y ,  while I was i n  t h e  WFA program, 
ca l l i ng  t o  Mr. Hewes'' a t t en t i on  t he  f a c t  t h a t  i n  t h e  speed 
with which we were charged t o  execute t he  order, the re  were 
a p t  t o  be some unsound loans made and I f e l t  t h i s  should be 
made c l ea r  t o  WCCA I am sure t h i s  was taken  up with 
Colonel Bendetsen and t h a t  it was made c l ea r  t o  Mr. Hewes 
t h a t  the  most important th ing was the  ful f i l lment  of t h e  
order t o  insure  cont inui ty  of production and equitable 
dealings;  loan co l lec t ions  were secondary t o  t h i s ,  
"On Ju ly  6, 1942, Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief 
of S t a f f ,  C iv i l  Affairs  Division, Wartime Civi l  Control 
Administration, issued the  following ins t ruc t ions  t o  Farm 
Secur i ty  Adminis t ra t ion :
'1. Upon the  completion of evacuation of Areas  Nos, 1 
and 2, the  r e spons ib i l i t i e s  of the Farm Secur i ty  
Administration r e l a t i n g  t o  the  protection of evac- 
uees' property w i l l  be accepted by t he  WarReloca- 
t i o n  Authority, exclusive of cases wherein loans 
were made  t o  subs t i tu te  operators. 
'2. In  order t o  enable War Relocation Authority 
e f fect ivelyt o  service  individual  problems a r i s i ng  
out of t ransact ions  effected through you, a s  an 
agency of the  Wartime Civ i l  Control Administration, 
it may be necessary f o r  c e r t a in  data  per t inent  t o  
these  t ransact ions  now i n  your f i l e s  t o  be made 
avai lable  f o r  perusal  and copying by t h a t  Authority. 
It i s  desired t h a t  appropriate arrangements be made 
between you and WRA f o r  enabling t he  Authority t o  
have such access t o  such per t inent  records. 
' 3 .  In addit ion,  it i s  suggested t ha t  a representa t ive  
of your administrat ion fami l ia r  with the  program 
and who can devote su f f i c i en t  time t o  t he  task,  be 
assigned t o  a s s i s t  WRA i n  a l i a i son  capaci ty  u n t i l  
t h a t  Authority i s  able  t o  ca r ry  out f u l l y  t he  re- 
spons ib i l i t i e s  imposed upon i t  by reason of the  
t r ans f e r  above mentioned.' 
"The underscoring i s  my own. I f  t he  wording of t he  f i r s t  
paragraph i s  ca r e fu l l y  scrut in ized,  you w i l l  note t h a t  Farm 
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S e c u r i t y  Administration i s  not  completely r e l i eved  of a l l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  If I i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  co r rec t ly ,  Farm 
S e c u r i t y  Adminis t ra t ion  is  not  r e l i eved  from t h e  order  
contained i n  paragraph (1) of General DeWitt's l e t t e r  of 
March 15. In  my opinion, they  s t i l l  hold a continuing 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  see  t h a t  a l l  terms and condi t ions  under 
which t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  evacuee proper ty  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  
opera tors  was made a r e  l ived  up to .  I t h i n k  t h i s  i s  
e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  where a loan was made t o  t h e  s u b s t i t u t e  
opera to r  f o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  purpose of paying an evacuee 
f o r  h i s  l abor ,  o r  crops, o r  c h a t t e l s ,  o r  whatever e l s e  
h i s  e q u i t y  might have been. 
"In l i g h t  of the  above, it i s  my judgment t h a t  t h e  po l i cy  
which should be followed i n  se rv ic ing  e x i s t i n g  WFA loans  
should be one which l i v e s  up t o  t h e  orders  given t o  Farm 
S e c u r i t y  Administration and which, t o  t h e  b e s t  of my know- 
ledge,  have never been changed, except a s  indica ted  here- 
in .  I do not  be l i eve  t h a t  a ' f i r m  c o l l e c t i o n  policy '  i s  
t h e  on ly  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of Farm  S e c u r i t y  Administration. 
Addit ional  time and a d d i t i o n a l  money should be granted t o  
WFA borrowers who a r e  unable t o  pay t h e i r  loans out  i n  the  
o r i g i n a l  loan term, i f  t h e i r  outlook i s  good. In  many 
ins tances  s u b s t i t u t e  opera tors  undertook t o  purchase l a r g e  
q u a n t i t i e s  of farm equipment. In f a c t ,  I know of a number 
of  ins t ances  where t h e  amount a l located  t o  t h i s  purpose i n  
t h e  loan  was by f a r  t h e  g rea te r  percentage. It should be  
recognized t h a t  more than one year w i l l  be required t o  pay 
o f f  l a r g e  c a p i t a l  investments. 
"We a l s o  f e e l  t h a t  provision should be made t o  f inance  new 
borrowers a b l e  t o  take  over evacuee property. Many such 
loans  w i l l  exceed t h e  Farm Secur i ty  Administration's pres- 
e n t  l i m i t  of $2,500 per individual .  Such borrowers would 
not  n e c e s s a r i l y  q u a l i f y  f o r  loans  f r o m  commercial channels 
due t o  t h e i r  l imited  e q u i t y  and l a c k  of  resources.  Where 
evacuees leased t h e i r  farms t o  s u b s t i t u t e  opera tors  on a 
sha re  bas i s ,  t h e  evacuees should rece ive  t h e i r  share of 
crops produced under any circunstances,  and t h e  W F A  l i e n  
should extend only t o  t h e  opera to r ' s  share." 
The second quest ion  t o  be answered was: What i s  our [WRA 's ]  
conception of  t h e  po l i cy  of Farm Secur i ty  Administration toward t h e  ser-  
vicing of these  loans? To t h i s  quest ion Mr. Robinson r e p l i e d  a s  follows: 
more than one occasion I have attempted t o  have a con- 
f e r e n c e  with Mr. Hewes t o  d i scuss  t h e i r  po l i cy  regarding 
WFA loans  and i t s  e f f e c t  upon our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  
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evacuees. Each time I have been re fe r red  t o  Mr. Hollenberg 
with the  statement t h a t  t h i s  matter has been placed i n  h i s  
hands. I have held severa l  conversations with Mr .  Hollenberg. 
He has made i t  very c l ea r  t o  me t h a t  Farm Secur i ty  Administra- 
t i o n ' s  pol icy i s  now t o  co l l ec t  every do l l a r  possible under 
thei r  mortgages. He f rank ly  admits t h a t  t h i s  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  
i n j u s t i c e s  t o  evacuees; f o r  example, leases  were made by sub- 
s t i t u t e  operators wherein the  subs t i t u t e  operator agreed t o  
pay t o  t h e  evacuee f i f t y  percent of t h e  ne t  operating income. 
It i s  the  contention of Farm Secur i ty  t h a t  they hold a mort- 
gage on t he  e n t i r e  crop and therefore  must i n s i s t  upon the  
e n t i r e  ne t  income f i r s t  being used t o  repay t h e i r  mortgage 
i n  f u l l .  If there  i s  a deficiency ex i s t ing ,  the evacuee w i l l  
be e n t i t l e d  t o  nothing. 
"A second example i s  a case where t he  subs t i tu te  operator 
purchased the  farm equipment of an evacuee. This farm equip- 
ment was included i n  t he  crop and c h a t t e l  mortgage. If the  
subs t i t u t e  operetor does not have su f f i c i en t  ne t  income t o  
repay t h e  WFA loan i n  f u l l ,  i t  w i l l  be necessary f o r  Farrn 
Secur i ty  t o  foreclose on t h i s  farm equipment. They, i n  turn ,  
may then s e l l  it t o  the  highest  bidder. This may wel l  mean 
t h a t  the  equipment w i l l  go out of t h a t  loca l i ty .  A s  a  
consequence, equipment wi l l  not be avai lable  t o  operate 
t h i s  farm and t he  i n t e r e s t s  of t he  evacuee a r e  thrown i n t o  
jeopardy. 
"Mr. Hollenberg has j u s t i f i ed  t h i s  approach on t h e i r  p a r t  
by saying t h a t  he f e l t ,  unless h i s  organization did every- 
th ing  i n  t h e i r  power t o  co l l ec t  a l l  of t he  money due t o  t h e  
War Department or  t he  government, they would be remiss i n  
t h e i r  du t i e s  and subject  t o  severe cr i t ic ism.  Regarding 
t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  of extending the  period f o r  repayment, M r .  
Hollenberg has a l s o  informed me tha t  t h i s  w i l l  not  be done 
unless,  i n  t h e i r  judgment, the  chance of col lect ing a 
grea te r  proportion of the  loan i s  assured. Obviously, with 
t h e  labor  s i t ua t i on  f o r  the  1943 cropping season very  un- 
ce r t a in  and the  t ranspor ta t ion problem increasing i n  sever- 
i t y ,  the re  i s  l i t t l e  l ikelihood t h a t  an extension of a re- 
payment period can be viewed with much optimism. Here 
again, however, t h i s  approach i s  j u s t i f i ed  on the  premise 
t h a t  they  would be remiss i n  t h e i r  du t ies  i f  they f a i l ed  t o  
co l l ec t  the  amount now i n  s igh t ,  r a the r  than extending t he  
loan, and then succeeded i n  recovering a l e s s e r  amount. 
Recently M r .  Coverley, while ac t ing  a s  regional  d i rec tor  
[of WRA] telephoned Mr.  Hewes and discussed t h i s  matter of 
pol icy approach with him.  It i s  my understanding t h a t  M r .  
Hewes expressed himself i n  t h i s  way: that a l t hough he did 
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not l i k e  t he  program, i f  he were di rected by higher author- 
i t y  t o  proceed with a loaning program, and money was made 
ava i lab le  t o  him f o r  h i s  purpose, he would do so." 
The t h i rd  question was: Where a r e  these  two po l ic ies  i n  con f l i c t  
and what adjustment needs t o  be made t o  make them conform? The answer 
reads : 
"It i s  my be l i e f  t h a t  the  two po l ic ies  d i f f e r  a s  t o  the 
fundamental purpose of the  WFA program. It goes without 
saying t h a t  t he  taxpayers'  money must not be loaned with- 
out  ca re fu l  consideration of a l l  t h e  f ac to r s  t h a t  make f o r  
s ecu r i t y  i n  the  case of any loan made by p u b l i c  agencies. 
Also, the  loans made  must be watched, and every e f f o r t  
must be made t o  co l l ec t  a s  c lose  t o  one hundred per cent 
a s  possible. I believe it i s  very c l ea r  t h a t  the  nat ional  
i n t e r e s t s  require ,  and t h a t  i n  es tabl ishing t he  progrnm 
General DeWitt  ordered, t h a t  the re  be continuation of p r o p -  
e r  use of ag r i cu l t u r a l  lands vacated by evacuees and t h a t  
f a i r  and equi table  arrangements between the evacuees and 
subs t i t u t e  operators be made and car r ied  out. It i s  appar- 
ent  t h a t  a cold, r i g i d  co l lec t ion  pol icy w i l l  f requent ly  
run counter t o  t h i s .  In order t o  ad jus t  these  di f ferences  
it must be recognized t h a t  production of e s s e n t i a l  foods 
i s  more important than one hundred per cent recovery of 
t he  funds t h a t  were loaned through WFA. 
"In addit ion,  evacuees a r e  l i k e l y  t o  present and press 
claims against  the  government f o r  l o s se s  incurred by them 
due t o  f a i l u r e  on t h e  pa r t  of governmental agencies t o  l i v e  
up t o  t h e i r  r e spons ib i l i t i e s .  It i s  e n t i r e l y  possible t h a t  
any savings made i n  co l lec t ing  anywhere near one hundred 
per cent of the  loans made w i l l  be o f f s e t  by having t o  ex- 
amine, defend against ,  and perhaps make payment on such 
claims. The agency charged with servicing t h e  loans should 
be ab le  t o  handle all cases requiring adjustment, whether 
evacuee i n t e r e s t s  s t i l l  p r eva i l  or  not. 
"We f e e l  the re  should be a high degree of cooperation be- 
tween FSA and WRA ,  and a ready exchange of information be- 
tween t he  two agencies. Despite paragraphs (2) and (3) i n  
Colonel Bendetsen's d i r ec t i ve  of Ju ly  6, each time we have 
requested da ta  per t inent  t o  t ransact ions  now i n  t h e  f i l e s  
of FSA, we have had t o  appeal t o  WCCA t o  make it ava i lab le  
t o  us, o r  t he  matter i s  re fe r red  t o  Mr. Baldwin [in Wash- 
ington, D.C. f o r  decision. 
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"To summarize, I believe the  following s teps  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  
a so lu t ion  of the problem: 
"1. Agreement a s  t o  the  fundamental purpose of the  W F A  
program. 
"2. Recognition of the  f a c t  t h a t  the  WFA program cannot 
necessar i ly  be concluded twelve months from i ts  
inception. 
"3. Acceptance by Farm Secur i ty  Administration of i t s  
f u l l  share, l e g a l l y  and morally, of t h e  obligation 
imposed upon it. 
"4. A decision a s  t o  who w i l l  c a r ry  on refinancing 
where it i s  reasonable, taking i n t o  consideration 
t he  nat ional  i n t e r e s t s  and t h e  evacuees' i n t e r e s t s ,  
i n  addi t ion t o  the  c o l l e c t a b i l i t y  of a s  l a rge  a 
par t  a s  possible of the  outstanding loans. 
"5. A d e f i n i t e  understanding, by both agencies, as t o  
how such program will be executed. 
"6. Free and unimpeded interchange of information be- 
tween FSA and WRA. " 
These recommended s teps  were never accomplished. As the regional  
o f f i c e  of FSA car r ied  on i t s  functions i n  regard t o  evacuee farm proper- 
t y  under t he  d i rec t ion  of WCCA, or ,  t o  be more spec i f ic ,  Colonel Ben- 
detsen,  who was General DeWittts Ass is tan t  Chief of S t a f f ,  it i s  reason- 
ab le  t o  conclude t h a t  had Colonel Bendetsen f i rmly recommended a more 
e l a s t i c  co l lec t ion  pol icy t o  be employed i n  regard t o  the  WFA loans 
financed by the  Western Defense Command, then t he  regional  d i r ec to r  of 
FSA might have been l e s s  keenly aware of h i s  obl igat ion t o  wipe o f f  t h e  
debt t o  t h e  War Department a t  any and a l l  cos t s  t o  evacuees, operators 
and continued production of v i t a l l y  needed farm produce. 
Some Results of t he  Collection Policy of FSA 
The o f f i c i a l  FSA r e p o r t  of i t s  labors with evacuee f a r n  property 
under t he  d i rec t ion  of WCCA contains t he  statement: 
"Because of the  nature of Japanese farming, i n  many in- 
stances it was found most practicable t o  encourage the  
formation of corporations (connected with grower's and 
shippers'  organizations,  often)   t o  operate a group of 
farms, and t o  make loans of considerable s ize  to  such 
corporations."  11-b 
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In P lacer  County, a d i s t r i c t  of deciduous f r u i t  production with 
a f a i r l y  heavy concentration of Japanese orchardis ts ,  various packing 
houses and fruit-shipping organizations formed subsidiary corporations, 
enter ing i n t o  d i r e c t  l ease  agreements with the  individual  Japanese land 
owners and lessees .  The t y p i c a l  l ease  contained an agreeinent t h a t  t h e  
evacuee should receive 50 p e r c e n t  of the  net  proceeds from s a l e  of 
t h e  crops a f t e r  operating expenses had been deducted. The corporation 
acquired operating cap i t a l  by means of a WFA loan which was granted on 
t h e  ba s i s  of crop mortgages. It was customary f o r  a spec i f i c  corporation 
t o  handle a group of farms i n  a spec i f i c  l o c a l i t y ,  t he  farms of ten ly ing 
adjacent t o  each other.  Some parcels of land were superior t o  others  
and produced crops which net ted a subs tan t ia l  p ro f i t ,  whereas other  par- 
c e l s  of poorer land f a i l ed  t o  make costs.  Whereas the  corporations had 
l ea se s  with t he  individual  evacuee owners, the  FSA viewed the  e n t i r e  in- 
come from a l l  proper t ies  managed by a corporation a s  subject t o  the  crop 
mortgage and accordingly demanded t h a t  t he  f u l l  WFA loan be paid before 
any l e s s o r ' s  i n t e r e s t s  could be recognized. Thus an evacuee owner who 
had every r i g h t ,  according t o  the  terms of t he  l e a se  with t h e  corpora- 
t ion ,  t o  expect a subs tan t ia l  r e tu rn  from h i s  property, received nothing 
a t  a l l  u n t i l  d e f i c i t s  caused by poor crops on other persons' property 
had been made good. The s t o r y  of Northern Farms, Inc., offers a concrete 
example of could happen a s  a r e s u l t  of conf l i c t ing  views held by 
corporation and FSA. 
Northern Farms, Inc. 
A t  t he  time of t h e  evacuation i n  1942, the  PlNash-Decamp Company, 
an es tabl ished marketing corporation f o r  farm produce i n  Placer County, 
California,  s e t  up a dummy corporation designed t o  operate groups of 
evacuee farms. Like other  corporations formed t o  operate evacuee land, 
it had no a s s e t s  except l eases  obtained from evacuee owners and it de- 
pended upon a WFA loan negotiated with the  Farm Secur i ty  Administration  
f o r  operating costs.  
"The o f f i c e r s  i n  charge of t he  Wartime Farm Adjustment 
Program knew t h a t  the  corporations were designed f o r  the  
primary  purpose of insu la t ing  the  parent company, which 
was t he  marketing company, from any losses  t h a t  might be 
incurred a s  a r e s u l t  of t he  operation of t he  evacuated 
lands. Northern Farms, Inc.,was one of such dummy corpo- 
ra t ions .  Its o f f i ce r s  were the  same a s  the  o f f i c e r s  of 
i t s  parent company, the  Nash-Decamp Company, which i s  a 
company engaged i n  the marketing of farm products. No 
s a l a r i e s  were paid t o  the  o f f i c e r s  of the  Northern Farms, 
Inc.,and none of i t s  f i e l d  men were t o  be paid except out 
of ne t  p r o f i t s  and t h e i r  s a l a r i e s  were paid by Nash- 
Decamp Company. 
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"Northern Farms, Inc ., obtained l ea se s  t o  20. farms owned or 
leased and operated by American c i t i z ens  of Japanese ances- 
t r y  who were subsequently evacuated. After obtaining t he  
l e a se s  Northern Farms,Inc., submitted an appl icat ion t o  t he  
Wartime Farm Adjustment Program Unit of the  Farm Secur i ty  
Administration f o r  a loan t o  cover operation, management and 
t h e  supervision of the  evacuated farms. This appl icat ion 
was accompanied by a budget and by t he  l eases  obtained from 
t h e  evacuees. The leases  provided i n  re levant  par t  a s  
follows:  
'As r e n t a l  f o r  sa id  farm, too l s  and equipment, 
NORTHERN FARMS, INC., s h a l l  pay t o  the  undersigned 
f i f t y  p e r c e n t  (50%) of t he  annual ne t  operating 
p r o f i t ,  i f  any such be made by it i n  t he  farming of 
said farm. For the  purpose of t h i s  l ease ,  the  ne t  
operating p r o f i t  s h a l l  be considered t o  mean the  
proceeds f rom t he s a l e  of the  crops produced on 
sa id  farm during each crop year of the  term hereof 
a f t e r  deducting a l l  costs  and expenses incurred by 
NORTHERN FARMS, INC. in i t s  organization, operation 
and maintenance, and the amount of a l l  such organiza- 
t i on ,  general  administrat ive and overhead expense, 
s h a l l  be proportioned among a l l  l e s so r s  of NORTHERN 
FARMS, INC., on a planted acreage basis ,  it being con- 
templated t h a t  NORTHERN FARMSI N C . ,  w i l l  lease main- 
t a i n  and operate other farms in  a d d l t i o n  t o  t h a t  
covered by t h i s  lease.  Operating cos t s  and expense 
s h a l l  not include depreciat ion on said farm t o o l s  
and equipment, county taxes,  payment on outstanding 
r e a l  e s t a t e  obligations,  o r  payment on outstanding 
equipment obl igat ions , '  
"Northern Farms, Inc,,  a s  a r e s u l t  of i t s  loan application,  
obtained a loan of $98,077.38, Northern Farms, Inc., a s  
s ecu r i t y  f o r  t he  r e p a y m e n t  of t h i s  loan executed a c h a t t e l  
mortgage covering a l l  of t he  crops on a l l  of the  twenty 
farms. Northern Farms, Inc., fu r ther  executed an assign- 
ment of t h e  proceeds of the  s a l e  of these  mortgaged crops 
and t he  Nash-DecampCompany was no t i f i ed  of the  assignment 
and an acceptance of the  assignment was executed by M r .  
Decamp, President of Northorn Farms, Inc., and Vice Presi- 
dent of Nash-Decamp Company. The Nash-Decamp Company, how- 
ever, d id  not pay the  proceeds from the  s a l e  of the  crops 
t o  t h e  Farm Secur i ty  Administration but r a the r  paid them 
t o  Northern Farms, Inc. 
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"The f i nanc i a l  t ransact ions  and posi t ion of Northern Farms, 
Inc., i s  shown i n  these  two statements submitted t o  the Farm 
Secur i ty  Administration: 
Northern Farms, Inc. 
Berkely, Calif.  
OPERATIONS 
 RECEIPTS
 
Proceeds Government Loan                                                         98,077.38
Proceeds F ru i t  Sa les                                          70 ,247 .03  
Proceeds S t a t e  Gasoline 
Repaid on Government Loan            91,485.94
Growing & Harvesting Costs            74,831.97 
State Franchise Tax                                   25.00                       166,342.91       
 
                                    Balance Cash on Hand                                       2,017.19 
 
                                  FINANCIAL STATEMENT
 
 
ASSETS
 
Cash in Bank,  held in trust for Japanese Growers          2,017.19
Net Due from Growers                                             6,591.44
 
                                                                         8,608.63  
 
 LIABILITIES
 
Due to Japanese Growers (50% Credit Balances )          2,017.19 
Bills Payable to U.S. Government                               6,591.44 
 
                                                                         8,608.63  
" O n l y  f i v e  farms had a ne t  operating prof i t .  The $2,017.19 
cash on hand i s  50% of t he  ne t  p ro f i t  on these  f i v e  farms. 
"It i s  the  posi t ion of Northern  Farms, Inc., t h a t  it i s  not 
t h e  owner of these  funds but t h a t  it i s  merely holding them 
f o r  t he  c i t i z ens  of Japanese ancestry. That is  l ikewise t h e  
a t t i t u d e  of Mr. Russell  Robinson of t h e  War Relocation 
Authority.O t h e r then  t he  $2,017.19, Northern Farm, Inc. 
has no a s se t s  whatsoever. 
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"The Northern Farms, Inc.,has submitted t o  t h e  Farm 
Secur i ty  Administration a de ta i l ed  statement of i t s  dis-  
bursements. No objection has been made t o  t h e  manner of 
i t s  disbursement of t h e  proceeds of t h e  Government loan 
and the  proceeds of t he  crops. The Nash-Decamp Company has 
not submitted a statement but no one believes t h a t  the re  
has been any unlawful charges o r  disbursements made by t he  
Nash-Decamp Company. In view of t h i s  be l i e f ,  and i n  t h a t  
bel ief  I concur a s  a r e s u l t  of my interview with M r .  Decamp 
and M r .  Schnell,  I believe t h a t  an ac t ion  f o r  an accounting 
on t he  par t  of t h e  Nash-Decamp Company would be f r u i t l e s s .  
"Northern Farms, Inc. ,  will  not pay t h e  $2,017.19 t o  t he  
United S t a t e s  voluntari ly.  I f  an act ion i s  i n s t i t u t ed  fo r  
t h e  foreclosure of the  c rop  and c h a t t e l  mortgage executed 
by the  Northern Farms, Inc., i n  order t o  recover the un- 
disbursed proceeds of the crops, t ha t  is, the  $2,017.19, 
Northern Farms, Inc., w i l l  seek t o  interplead a s  defendants 
t h e  f i v e  evacuees t o  whom it a s s e r t s  it owes these  funds. 
The posi t ion of Northern Farms, Inc., i s  simply t h a t  it i s  
a stakeholder. Inasmuch a s  Northern Farms, Inc., has no 
o ther  a s s e t s  a def ic iency judgment would be uncollectible.  
"The Farm Secur i ty  Administration has asser ted a s  i t s  
posit ion,  'It i s  believed t h a t  the claim of t he  United 
S t a t e s  t o  these  funds i s  paramount t o  the  r i g h t  of t h e  
Japanese because of the  crop and c h a t t e l  mortgage recorded 
f o r  t h e  Government. The United S ta tes  was not a par ty  t o  
t h e  l eases  and t he  loan was made on t he  e n t i r e  acreage, 
without segregation according t o  individual  parcels. '  
"So f a r  a s  I can ascer ta in ,  under California law a l e s so r  
does not have a l i e n  upon growing crops and a c h a t t e l  mort- 
gage would o rd ina r i l y  p reva i l  over the  l e s so r  i n  act ion t o  
apply the  proceeds of t he  crops t o  repayment of the secured 
loan even though the r en t  had not been paid the  l e s so r  o r  
sublessor. I f  the  evacuees could be interpleaded, I do not 
believe t h a t  r u l e  would be applied here, however, because 
of the  r e l a t i o n  t h a t  exis ted between the  United S ta tes  and 
the  evacuated lessors .  The United S t a t e s  evicted t he  
l e s so r s  a s  a mi l i t a ry  measure. Before evacuation the  United 
S t a t e s  arranged with Northern Farms, Inc.,  t o  lend money se- 
cured by a mortgage on the  crops planted by t he  l essors  
about t o  be evacuated and required the  submission of the  
l e a se s  between the  evacuees and Northern Farms, Inc., before 
t he  loan was made. The United S t a t e s  thus knew t h a t  each 
l e s so r  was t o  be paid a s  ren t  50% of t h e  ne t  operating 
p r o f i t  of h i s  farm. These l eases  were par t  of a Government 
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caused, i n s t i t u t ed  and approved program. The United S t a t e s  
owed the  evacuated lessors ,  a l l  of them c i t i z ens  of t he  
United S ta tes ,  a duty  t o  protect  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e i r  
crops. The United S t a t e s  ce r t a in ly  would not be protecting 
t h e  i n t e r e s t  of the  lessors  i f  it a s s e r t s  a r i g h t  t o  t he  
p r o f i t s  of the  farms pr io r  t o  t h a t  of t he  l essors  and 
pa r t i cu l a r l y  i f ,  a s  here, it a s s e r t s  t h a t  t he  p r o f i t s  of 
these  f i v e  farms be applied t o  the  d e f i c i t s  suffered by t h e  
other  lessors .  I believe t he  United S t a t e s  would f a i l  i n  a 
court  of  equ i ty  i f  the  evacuees could be interpleaded."18 
In Ju ly  of 1943, FSA f i l e d  claim of t he  United Sta t e s  agains t  
Northern Farms, Inc., f o r  $7,493.10 plus i n t e r e s t .  The Attorney General, 
by l e t t e r  of July  26, 1943, sent  t he  case t o  t he  United S t a t e s  Attorney 
i n  San Francisco. This a t torney interviewed Nash-Decamp Company of f i -  
cers,  t h e  WRA Evacuee Property chief  and t he  WRA regional  attorney, two 
at torneys  of the  Department of Agriculture 's  Office of t he  So l ic i to r ,  
and a representa t ive  of the  regional  o f f i c e  of Farm Secur i ty  Administra- 
t ion.  After conducting t h i s  invest igat ion,  t he  United S t a t e s  Attorney 
reported t o  the  Attorney General i n  a l e t t e r  dated August 31, 1943. The 
major p a r t  of t h a t  repor t  i s  quoted above. 
From August 31, 1943,  until the  spring of 1946, t h e  present time 
of writ ing,  t h i s  case has been under discussion among t h e  Claims Divi- 
s i on  of the  Department of Jus t ice ,  the  Farm Secur i ty  Administration of 
t h e  Department of Agr i cu l t u r e ,  and the  War Relocation Authority. It i s  
a t  t h i s  time s t i l l  under discussion. 
Farm Management, Inc., of S u m n e r ,  Washington 
Farm Management, Inc. was a var ian t  among corporations s e t  up t o  
operate evacuee farms, i n  t h a t  it was not established within t h e  frame- 
work of a shippers' o r  growers' company. Ju s t  p r io r  t o  t h e  evacuation 
a group of f i v e  men formed the  corporation Known a s  Farm Management, Inc., 
f o r  the  purpose of taking over operation of 36 parcels of evacuee farm 
land t o t a l i n g  about 300 acres  and located i n  the  Puyallup and White 
River Valleys i n  Pierce  and King Counties. These farms had growing 
crops a t  the  t i m e  when the  corporation took over. Each of t he  indivi-  
dua l s  who formed the  corporation invested $100 i n  cash. The remainder 
of t h e  c a p i t a l  required f o r  operation of the  farm was procured through 
F S A  a s  a W F A loan, amounting t o  $60,500. The agency took a s  secur i ty  a 
mortgage on t he  crops and cha t te l s .  In accordance with the agreement 
between t he  corporation and the  evacuee owners, Farm Management, Inc., 
upon procuring t h e  loan, paid $19,794.65 t o  t he  owners f o r  t h e i r  farm 
equipment and $21,643.21 t o  t h e  owners a s  a sum representing one-half of 
ha l f  value of t he  growing crops; t he  o ther  hal f  of t h e  owners' share of 
50 per cent of crop value was t o  be paid a f t e r  t he  harvest.  
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In  a repor t  of November 9, 1942, to the regional  d i r e c t o r  of WRA 
i n  San Francisco, Victor L. Furth of WRA's Evacuee Property Division 
s t a t e s :  
"The FSA mortgage i s  due on December 15, 1942, but the re  is  
not  t he  s l i g h t e s t  p o s s i b i l i t y  of Farm Management, Inc ., being 
ab le  t o  pay i t s  obl igat ion t o  t he  evacuees and discharge the  
mortgage indebtedness by t he  due date. The evacuee's claim 
t o  t h e i r  r e n t a l  has been subordinated by Farm Management, 
Inc., to t h e  loan made by FSA and it appears t h a t  the  mort- 
gage cannot be paid i n  f u l l  even i f  a l l  a s s e t s  of the cor- 
poration were l iquidated i n  payment of the  mortgage. 
"Mr. GeraldDeGarmo of Sea t t l e ,  t h e  a t torney f o r  Farm 
Management, Inc. ,states t h a t  because of t he  be l ie f  t h a t  t he  
mortgage w i l l  have t o  be paid on December 15, one premature 
garnishment act ion has been i n s t i t u t e d  by an attorney-in- 
f a c t  representing th ree  evacuee landlords,  and other  such 
ac t ions  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  follow. It i s  h i s  opinion t h a t  i f  
assurance were given t h a t  an extension of t h e  mortgage could 
be granted, these  garnishments could be eliminated. Mr. 
DeGarmo has s t a t ed  t h a t  t he  corporation has su f f i c i en t  cash 
on hand t o  make a subs tan t ia l  payment t o  the evacuees a s  
well a s  t o  t he  Farm Secur i ty  Administration; however, i n  
o r d e r - t o  pay out  i n  f u l l  they  would have t o  have the  use of 
some of the  funds i n  order t o  ca r ry  on t h e i r  operations i n t o  
next season. Both Farm Management, Incorporated, and t he  
evacuee property supervisor i n  our Sea t t l e  f i e l d  o f f i c e  be- 
l i e v e  t ha t ,  given su f f i c i en t  time, t h i s  corporation could 
meet a l l  of i t s  obl igat ions  and, i f  allowed t o  continue 
operations,  would  supply a very subs tan t ia l  quant i ty  of food 
products v i t a l l y  needed i n  the  S e a t t l e  market. On the  other  
hand, i f  they  a r e  forced i n t o  e i t he r  voluntary or involun- 
t a r y  l iquidat ion,  t he  l a rge  number of evacuee-owned farms 
w i l l  be thrown out of production and i t  w i l l  be very d i f f i -  
c u l t  t o  secure other  operators as  wel l  qual i f ied  a s  t he  
corporation now farming these lands." 
When t h e  loan f e l l  due, FSA took from Farm Management, Inc., a l l  
proceeds on hand, leaving the  corporation no funds f o r  disbursement t o  
t h e  evacuee owners a s  the  balance due them on t he  p r ice  of the 1942 
crops. F S A  refused a loan t o  enable Farm Management, Inc., to operate 
t h e  36 farms i n  1943, but t he  corporation was ab le  t o  borrow $67,000 
from the  Regional Agricultural  Credit Corporation, t he  l a t t e r  taking a 
mortgage on t he  1943 crop a s  secur i ty .  After t h e  1943 crop was har- 
vested and disposed of,  Farrn Management, Inc ., had enough money on hand 
t o  l i qu ida t e  t h e  Regional Agricultural  Credit Corporation obl igat ion but 
had nothing a t  a l l  t o  apply on t he  debt t o  t h e  evacuee owners. 
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I n  e a r l y  1944, being unable t o  obtain f inancing through e i t h e r  
FSA o r  RACC o r  any pr iva te  channel, Farm Management, Inc., f i l e d  a peti-  
t i o n  in bankruptcy, and e a r l y  i n  the  summer of 1944 the  re fe ree  in bank- 
ruptcy ordered the  s a l e  of c h a t t e l s  of the  corporation, r e a l i z ing  about 
$12,000 therefrom. This sum was applied upon t h e  FSA loan balance, but 
$25,000 was s t i l l  owing t o  FSA a t  the time when t he  bankruptcy court 
discharged t h e  corporation i n  bankruptcy. 
Some of the  evacuee owners who had contracted f o r  the  s a l e  of 
t h e i r  crops t o  Farm Management, Inc., requested WRA t o  f i l e  c l a i m s  f o r  
them i n  t h e  bankruptcy court.  This was done. A repor t  of October 24, 
1945, from t he  northwestern area  o f f i c e  of WRA contains t he  f a c t s  of t he  
l a t e r  developments of t h i s  case, 
"A  t y p i c a l  i l l u s t r a t i o n  i s  W i l l i a m  Shimasaki. H i s  claim 
was i n  t he  amount of $2,000 and was substant ia ted by a 
b i l l  of s a l e  given by him t o  Farm Managament, Inc., cover- 
ing  t h e  growing berry  and vegetable crops t o  be harvested 
a t  t he  c lose  of t he  1942 season. The crops were purchased 
by t he  corporation f o r  $4,000, ha l f  of which was received 
i n  cash by Shimasaki from the  proceeds of the  W C C A [WFA] 
loan t o  t h e  corporation. On October 10, 1944, WRA f i l e d  
with 0. M. Pitzen,  re fe ree  i n  bankruptcy f o r  the  d i s t r i c t  
court of t h e  United S t a t e s  f o r  the  western d i s t r i c t  of 
Washington, Sh imsak i ' s  claim f o r  $2,000. Shor t ly  the reaf te r  a 
f i n a l  meeting of c r ed i t o r s  was held. Inasmuch a s  t he  l iqu i -  
dat ion of t he  cha t t e l s  of t h e  corporation amounted t o  only 
about $12,000, no claims other  than the  claim of WCCA [ F S A ]  
were allowed. The bankruptcy court awarded a l l  t h e  proceeds 
t o  t h e  government, and t h e  corporation was discharged i n  
bankruptcy a s  previously indicated. "19
The Nishimoto* Farm i n  San Joaquin County, California 
A t  t h e  time of t he  evacuation, Charles Nishimoto and h i s  s i s t e r  
Sally leased t h e i r  694-acre farm t o  a tenant f o r  a period of th ree  years, 
t h e  l e a se  ca l l i ng  f o r  a cash ren t  of $9,000 f o r  1942 and $10,000 f o r  
each of t h e  remaining two years. The tenant procured a WFA loan of 
$22,050  t h r o u g h  FSA. Of t h i s  sum, $16,000 was a l l o t t e d  t o  the  pur- 
chase of farm machinery and equipment while the  r eminde r  was obtained 
t o  cover t h e  cost  of growing and harvesting 300 acres  of tomatoes. As 
usual ,  FSA took a crop and c h a t t e l  mortgage a s  securi ty.  The tenant 
s t a t ed  t o  WRA o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  he knew t h a t  he  could not possibly repay 
 * The names a r e  f i c t i t i o u s ,  
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t he  Government loan i n  one year and had made t h a t  condit ion p la in  t o  t he  
FSA representative.  The l a t t e r  assured t h e  tenant a t  t h e  time when t h e  
mortgage was being arranged t h a t  r en t  due t h e  Nishimotos would be re- 
leased from the  crop r e tu rns  a t  each period when r en t  was due and pay- 
able,  and, according t o  t he  tenant,  t he  same representa t ive  promised 
t h a t  t h e  loan, although made f o r  a term of one year, would nevertheless 
be renewable from year t o  year i f  t h e  tenant  required t h i s  ass is tance 
during t h e  term of the  lease.  
In the  f a l l  of 1942 t h e  tenant cal led a t  the  San Francisco of- 
f i c e  of WRA t o  l a y  h i s  problems before the  Evacuee Property Division, 
Because of an acute  labor  shortage, he had not been able  t o  harvest  h i s  
e n t i r e  crop and so had not rea l i zed  the  r e tu rns  which he had anticipated.  
FSA had no t i f i ed  him t h a t  i n  view of t h e  impending defau l t  i n  t h e  pay- 
ment of h i s  loan, no re lease  f o r  the  payment of r en t  t o  t h e  evacuee 
owners could be approved. He had cal led a t  t h e  regional  o f f i c e  of F S A  
and was warned t h a t  i f  he did not pay t he  loan i n  fu l l  on t h e  maturi ty 
date,  the  c h a t t e l  mortgage would be foreclosed. 
Since t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of evacuee owners were involved in t h i s  mat- 
t e r ,  WRA conferred with FSA. The loan  was not due u n t i l  e a r l y  in 1943. 
The tenant,  i f  he were given assurance t h a t  he could continue t o  farm 
t h e  land in 1943, was prepared t o  plant  f a l l  crops which were badly 
needed i n  t he  market. However, i n  t h e  face  of FSA's announced determi- 
nat ion t o  se ize  and dispose of h i s  c h a t t e l s  t o  make up the  d e f i c i t  i n  
h i s  payment of the  loan before these  crops could be harvested, he had 
l i t t l e  incent ive  t o  go ahead with h i s  f a l l  planting. The evacuee prop- 
e r t y  d iv i s ion  representa t ive  from WRA, a f t e r  discussing t he  problem 
with FSA, reported a s  follows: 
"* * * The Farm Secur i ty  Administration s t a t e s  t h a t ,  under 
what they consider a sound col lect ion program, payment of 
t he  loan should be required t h i s  year because there  i s  
secu r i t y  avai lable  with which t o  pay it. They contend 
t h a t  i f  an add i t iona l  year were granted and next year ' s  
operations, because of labor  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o r  some o ther  
f ac to r ,  should prove unprofi table,  they would then have a 
smaller chance of being paid ou t  i n  f u l l  and would be sub- 
j e c t  t o  c r i t i c i sm  f o r  not having collected when there  was 
opportunity. " 20 
Farm Secur i ty  Administration proceeded t o  foreclose,  appropri- 
a t i n g  a l l  farm machinery and equipment on t h e  land. The Nishimotos, 
having relocated and s e t t l e d  down t o  farming i n  Michigan, decided t h a t  
they  would not r e tu rn  t o  California when and i f  t h e  exclusion orders 
were revoked. Real e s t a t e  agents and the  Bank of America began t o  show 
i n t e r e s t  i n  t he  Nishimoto land. An undated repor t  of t h e  summer of 1944 
from t h e  evacuee property supervisor of WRA's  Sacramento o f f i c e  t o  h i s  
chief  i n  San Francisco contains t h e  information: 
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"* * *  you mentioned. t h a t  *  *  *   a t  [ t h emanager f o r  the Re- 
clamation d i s t r i c t  i n  which t he  Nishimoto property i s  
loca ted]  ca l led on you a t  San Francisco, and s ta ted  t h a t  
it would be impossible f o r  t h e *  *  *   [ N i s h i m o t o s ]   t o  
ca r ry  on and pay f ixed charges a r e n t a l  of $10,000.00 
per year, and t h a t  it would probably be possible t o  s e l l  
t he  holdings f o r  approximately $125,000.00 You fu r the r  
inquired i f  t h i s  o f f i c e  had received any requests  from t h e  *  *  *   [ N i s h i m o t o s ] a s s i s t  them i n  any way with t h e i r  
property, located near Manteca. We informed you t h a t  we 
have had no such requests. 
"We discussed t h e  present market value of t h i s  property, 
and it was our opinion t h a t  t h i s  property was worth con- 
s iderab ly  more than the f igure  mentioned by * * * [the
manager of t h e  R e c l a m a t i o n d i s t r i c t ] .  It was ourim-
pression t h a t  the t o t a l  Federal land bank loan made on 
t h i s  property, was f o r  the  purpose of paying of f  t h e  
assessment on t he  Reclamation d i s t r i c t ,  and it was sug- 
gested t h a t  you have Mr. Furth contact the  Federal Land 
Bank f o r  a ve r i f i c a t i on  of t h i s ,  and a lso ,  i f  possible, 
obta in  t he  appraised value of t h i s  property when t he  land 
bank loan was made."
The Sacramento evacuee proper ty  o f f i c e  got  i n  touch with Mr. 
Nishimoto and was requested by him t o  place the  farm on t he  market. 
Accordingly, i n  December of 1944, the  property was l i s t e d  with several  
r e a l  e s t a t e  firms i n  San Francisco and i n  Stockton. Le t te r s  describing 
t h e  property were sent  t o  agents and i n t e r e s t ed  individuals.  Typical 
of these  i s  one t o  t h e  manager of t he  Bank  of America, Santa Maria, 
California:  
"* * * t h e  property i n  question cons i s t s  of pa r t s  of 
sect ions  26, 27, 34, and 35, T. 2 S.R. 6E., and i s  located 
e igh t  miles southwest of Manteca on t h e  Durham Ferry Road 
a t  a point  where t h e  San Joaquin River makes a long horse- 
shoe turn and t he  property l i e s  within t h i s  turn. 
"The gross acreage i s  694.27 acres. Of t h i s  amount approxi- 
mately 500 acres  l i e  within t h e  l ev i e s  of the  Reclamation 
d i s t r i c t  known a s  M c M u l l i n  Reclamation Distr ict  No. 2075, 
and approximately 195 acres  a r e  outside t he  l evy  without 
boundary l i ne s ,  going t o  the  center of t he  San Joaquin 
River. 
"The s o i l s  of t h i s  property a r e  Hanford sandy loam and 
Hanford f i n e  sandy loam. The sandy loam i s  adaptable t o  
seed crops, c a r ro t s ,  beans and potatoes. The Federal land 
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bank had a loan on t h i s  property f o r  approximtely  
$60,000.00. There i s  no bonded indebtedness. The p r o p -  
e r t y  has been leased f o r  the  pas t  several  years f o r  
$10,000.00 per year, cash r en t a l .  The only  improvements 
on t he  property a r e  a small  dwelling and severa l  t o o l  
sheds. There i s  no equipment t h a t  goes with t h e  property. 
"The owners a r e  * * * [ C h a r l e s  and S a l l y  N i s h i m o t o ] ,  who 
a r e  now located i n  Michigan, and have requested t h i s  o f f ice  
t o  he lp  them i n  t h e  d i spos i t ion  o r  s a l e  of t h i s  property, 
Undoubtedly you have prospects i n  view who w o u l d  be in- 
t e r e s t ed  i n  t h e  purchase of t h i s  property, which can be 
shown a t  any time. The f u l l  price of the  property  includ- 
ing t h e  commission of 5% and escrow and t i t l e  charges i s  
$135,000.00." 
On May 16, 1945, a l e t t e r  from the  Sacramento o f f i c e  of WRA t o  
Mr. Nishimoto reads : 
"As f o r  your ranch property, may we advise t h a t  up t o  t h e  
present time we have not received any encouraging poss ibi l i -  
t i e s  of disposing of i t  f o r  t h e  holding price. We f i rmly 
believe your asking pr ice  i s  i n  l i n e  compared t o  the way 
proper t ies  have been se l l ing .  We  have had any nunber of 
inqu i r ies ,  but  a f t e r  they have made an inves t iga t ion  they 
inform us t h a t  they  a r e  not  in te res ted  primarily on account 
of f lood hazards. 
"It i s  my personal opinion t h a t  someone i n  t h a t  area i s  
knocking t h e  place. It may be possible t o  dispose of it, 
a s  suggested i n  your l e t t e r ,  by subdividing it i n t o  
smaller t r a c t s ,  but before doing t h i s  it may be wel l  f o r  
you t o  make another v i s i t  t o  t he  area and t a l k  t h i s  pos- 
s i b i l i t y  over f i r s t  hand with * *  *  [themanager of t he  
Reclamation d i d i s t r i c t ] . "  
On June 28, 1945, t h e  Sacramento o f f i c e  wrote t o  M r .  Nishimoto: 
"This w i l l  a c k n o w l e d g e  your l e t t e r  of June 24 with refer-  
ence t o  t h e  s a l e  of your property  near Esparta [another  
small t o w n  c lose  t o  t h e  p r o p e r t y ] .  
"We immediately contacted * * *[the manager of the  Re- 
clamation d i s t r i c t ]  *  *  * on the  telphone and were ad- 
vised t h a t  he had a purchaser wi l l ing  t o  pay $100,000 
cash f o r  your ranch, and it was his, opinion t h a t  it 
would be impossible t o  obta in  any more a t  t h e  present 
time. 
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"In t h e  past  th ree  months we have had th ree  people who 
thought they might be in te res ted  in handling t h i s  prop- 
e r t y  but  a f t e r  invest igat ion they  a l l  were f e a r f u l  of 
t h e  flood hazard, and fo r  t h i s  reason would not c a r ry  on 
any fu r the r  negotiations. 
"I personally bel ieve t ha t  the  property i s  worth more 
than t h e  above o f fe r ,  but due t o  t he  Federal land bank's 
a t t i t ude ,  I do not wish t o  advise you one way o r  t he  
other,  I firmly believe t h a t  i f  you were here farming 
t h e  property a s  you did i n  the  past ,  the ranch would pay 
l a r g e  dividends on a $100,000 investment. 
"* * *  [ the  manager of t h e  Reclamation district] was of 
t h e  opinion t h a t  it would be possible t o  r ea l i z e  a few 
thousand do l l a r s  more i f  the  place was  t o  be subdivided. 
On the  other hand, t h e cost  of surveying and subdividing 
would near ly  o f f s e t  the extra  money and eventual ly  you 
would be l e f t  with only t h a t  pa r t  outside t h e  levee which 
would be very  d i f f i c u l t  t o  dispose of. 
"Knowing t h a t  t h i s  ranch has meant a very l a rge  invest- 
ment t o  you I ha te  t o  see you dispose of it a t  such a 
loss .  I f  it were possible f o r  you to  gather  up a crew of 
evacuees and had enough finances t o  purchase the  necessary 
equipment, I am pos i t ive  t h a t  you and your associa tes  
would  make enough money i n  t h e  next four o r  f i v e  years t o  
place your land bank loan i n  a current  position. 
"If y o u  decide t o  make the  s a l e  through Mr. Per r in ' s  sug- 
ges t ions ,  kindly advise t h i s  o f f i c e  i n  order t h a t  w e  may 
be informed of the  p r o p o s i t i o n . "  
The l a t e s t  o f f i c i a l  word on t h e  Nishimoto case reached Washington 
by te le type  from Sacramento, dated February 25, 1946. The Nishimotos 
had returned t o  Cal i fornia  i n  the  l a t t e r  ha l f  of 1945. They sold t h e i r  
ranch f o r  $100,000, a sum t h a t  netted them $30,000 above t h e i r  indebted- 
ness. With t h i s  c a p i t a l  they purchased a three-story building i n  Stock- 
ton,  i n  which they a r e  operating a h o t e l  and two shops. According t o  
t h e  r epo r t  M r .  Nishimoto professes t h a t  he i s  "sa t i s f i ed  with t he  e n t i r e  
deal." 
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REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING WRA'S HANDLING OF EVACUEE PROPERTY 
Having operated t h e  evacuee property program under a t en t a t i ve  
pol icy f o r  near ly  f i v e  months a f t e r  assuming t he  respons ib i l i ty ,  the  
Authority established a formal policy i n  January of 1943, spel l ing out  
i n  d e t a i l  regula t ions  and procedures i n  Administrative Ins t ruct ion 
No. 77, and s e t t i n g  up a system f o r  handling movable property i n  Ad- 
min is t ra t ive  Ins t ruc t ion  No. 78, both ins t ruc t ions  being issued on 
January 23. 
Executive Order No, 9102, which created the  War Relocat ion Author i ty  
authorized t he  Director t o  "provide f o r  the  needs" of evacuated 
persons " in  such manner a s  may be appropriate," and t o  a s s i s t  them i n  
t h e  "management and disposal  of t h e i r  property." The wording of t h e  
i n s t ruc t i ons  i n  regard t o  evacuee property r e f l e c t s  t he  thinking of mid-  
March, when agencies holding r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  safeguarding t he  in te r -  
e s t s  of evacuated persons thought i n  terms of d isposal  and l iqu ida t ion  
r a t h e r  than in terms of preservation. By t he  time when WRA assumed 
r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  evacuee property, t he  losses  sustained by t he  evacuees 
i n  consequence of has ty  l iqu ida t ion  of t h e i r  asse t s  were obvious enough 
t o  make the  Authority aware of i t s  obl igat ion t o  safeguard and preserve 
w h a t  was l e f t  i n  t h e  way of tangible assets .  
The object ive  of WRA i n  t h i s  matter was t o  make avai lable  every 
type of ass i s tance  which an evacuee required--and requested. The Au- 
t h o r i t y  d id  not  s o l i c i t  business but stood ready t o  serve. The kinds 
of se rv ice  avai lable  were publicized a t  the  centers,  and a s t ead i l y  in- 
creasing number of people turned t o  t he  Authority f o r  help with property 
problems. The general  pol icy statement contained i n  Administrative In- 
s t r u c t i o n  No, 77 read: 
"* * *  it i s  t o  be remembered t ha t  t h e  Authority operates 
only a s  an intermediary * * *  Therefore i n  no case s h a l l  
any representa t ive  of the Authority d i r ec t  what ac t ion  any 
evacuee s h a l l  take with reference t o  h i s  property problems, 
t he  du ty  of such representa t ive  being t o  furnish  such ad- 
v ice  and information a s  may be requested by the  evacuee, 
and t o  help the  evacuee t o  put i n t o  operation such decisions 
with reference t o  t he  lawful d isposi t ion of h i s  property a s  
a r e  arr ived a t  by t he  evacuee of h i s  own f r e e  w i l l .  In ad- 
d i t i o n  *  *  *   the  decis ions  thus reached by the  evacuee s h a l l  
not  a c tua l l y  be put i n t o  operation by any representative of 
t h e  Authority, but by a r e a l  e s t a t e  agent, a bank, an ac- 
countant, an attorney, o r  o ther  person i n  pr ivate  business 
o r  profession, of the  evacuee's own choosing, l i a i s o n  be- 
tween such person and the  evacuee being provided by the 
Authority a s  requested by the  evacuee. 
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"The o f f i ce  w i l l  make invest igat ions ,  r ep ly  t o  inqu i r ies ,  
a s s i s t  i n  handling problems of management, operation and 
d i spos i t ion  of r e a l  and personal property, a id  i n  set-  
t l i n g  claims held by evacuees, and a s s i s t  prospective 
purchasers, l e ssees ,  managers, agents, and others  i n  
contacting evacuees, 
"It s h a l l  be pa r t  of the  bas ic  pol icy of t h e  Evacuee 
Property Office t h a t  so f a r  a s  possible and except only  
a s  otherwise spec i f i c a l l y  s e t  f o r t h  i n  t h i s  Administrative 
Ins t ruct ion,  it s h a l l  serve not a s  subs t i t u t e  owner, di- 
rec to r ,  or  operator of the  property involved, but  i n  an 
invest igat ional ,  informational, and advisory capacity, and 
as an intermediary and negot ia tor  between t he  evacuee and 
other  persons o r  companies whom the  evacuee s h a l l  choose 
t o  a c t  f o r  him, represent him, operate h i s  property, o r  
l e a se  o r  purchase from him. 
" A s  a coro l la ry  of t h i s  bas ic  policy it follows t h a t  t he  
acceptance o r  r e j ec t i on  of t he  services  of a r e a l  e s t a t e  
agent, a bank, an attorney, etc. ,  and i n  f a c t  of t he  
se rv ices  of t he  Authority, s h a l l  be f o r  the evacuee him- 
s e l f  t o  determine i n  a l l  cases. Likewise t h e  evacuee s h a l l  
always make t he  decis ion a s  t o  acceptance o r  r e j ec t i on  of a 
given course of act ion (e.g., whether h i s  property should 
be leased or  sold ,  whether goods should be stored o r  dis- 
posed of,  whether a given pr ice  should be accepted o r  re-  
jected) with respect  t o  a l l  of h i s  property t o  which he has 
lawful r igh t .  In a l l  cases it s h a l l  be t h e  function of the  
o f f i c e  t o  ascer ta in  the  fac t s ,  and t o  make avai lable  as  
many p r a c t i c a l  a l t e rna t ives  as possible, i n  order t h a t  t h e  
evacuee may be aided i n  reaching an i n t e l l i g e n t  conclusion; 
but  t h e  advice of any representa t ive  of t he  o f f i c e  s h a l l  be 
given only  when spec i f i c a l l y  requested and then only upon 
making c l ea r  t o  t he  evacuee t h a t  t h e  advice i s  not a direc- 
t i o n  and t h a t  t he  evacuee i s  f r e e  t o  disregard it." 
WRA a t  no time served a s  a loan agency; a s  a short-lived war 
agency it was not prepared t o  cope with t he  problems of col lect ions  which 
might endure over a period beyond the  l i f e  of t he  agency. However, t h e  
Authority es tabl ished contacts which made it possible f o r  the  Nisei t o  
ge t  loans  on t h e  same bas i s  a s  o ther  c i t i zens .  
Freezing power was delegated t o  t h e  Director of WRA by the  Secre- 
t a r y  of t h e  Treasury but was never exercised by the  Director. While 
judicious exercise  of the  freezing power i n  t h e  period immediately before 
t he  evacuation took place might well  have prevented heavy losses ,  the  use 
of such power upon t he  property of United S t a t e s  citizens--even c i t i z ens  
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who were cur ren t ly  suspect because of t h e i r  r a c i a l  a f f i l i a t i o n  with t he  
enemy-was considered a dangerous proceeding. It was recognized t h a t  
t h e  use of such power t o  i n t e r f e r e  with any property owner's r i g h t  t o  
dispose of h i s  o w nproperty a s  he saw f i t  could wel l  throw a property- 
minded nat ion i n t o  a panic, because what had been done before could be 
done again; a government t h a t  used f reezing power t o  prevent a c i t i z en  
of Japanese ancest ry  from se l l i ng  h i s  property a t  a l o s s  would be estab- 
l i s h i n g  a precedent which might lead t o  Federal ac t ion  t o  prevent a 
c i t i z e n  of I r i s h  ancest ry  from s e l l i n g  h i s  property a t  a gain. 
L e g a l  Aid t o  Evacuees 
General government policy and p rac t i c a l  consideration of t he  ef- 
f e c t  upon public r e l a t i ons ,  t o  say  nothing of budgetary l imi ta t ions ,  
made it infeas ib le  f o r  WRA at torneys  t o  represent evacuee c l i e n t s  i n  
courts .  Government at torneys,  with t he  exception of those i n  the  Depart- 
ment of Jus t i ce  do not  appear i n  court ;  court l i t i g a t i o n  i s  handled by 
t h e  Department of Jus t ice .  Had it been decided t h a t  WRA should provide 
t h e  evacuees with f r e e  representa t ion i n  court ,  the  Authority would have 
had t o  persuade United S ta tes  a t torneys  t o  assume a heavy burden of 
cases--recognizing t he  f a c t  t h a t  f r e e  s e rv i ce  i nv i t e s  heavy demands-or 
accept a delegation of such r e spons ib i l i t i e s  f o r  i t s  own attorneys.  I n  
t h e  l a t t e r  and more probable event, i n  order t o  handle the  case load, 
WRA would have needed a prodigious s t a f f  of lawyers and unlimited t r a v e l  
funds. Assuming t h a t  these  suggested obstacles could have been overcome, 
t he r e  would have been a serious disrupt ion of public r e l a t i ons  had t he  
United S t a t e s  Governnent at torneys represented the  evacuees, f r e e  of 
charge, i n  l o c a l  cour ts  of the f a r  west ,  when l oca l ,  pr ivate  a t torneys  
might reasonably be expected t o  handle such cases. 
Thus it was determined ea r ly  t h a t  evacuees should have f r e e  l e g a l  
advice from WRA pro jec t  at torneys and t h a t  it should be a r e spons ib i l i t y  
of WRA t o  make avai lable  t o  the evacuees t h e  services of pr ivate  lawyers 
who would agree t o  represent  t he  evacuees f o r  a reasonable fee. 
A s  e a r l y  a s  May of 1942 t he  Spec ia l  B i l l  of Rights Committee of 
t h e  American Bar Association was displaying an i n t e r e s t  i n  problems con- 
nected with the  evacuation, and i n  a l e t t e r  of August 6, 1942, Mr. Ross 
L. Malone, Jr., of t he  committee, made spec i f i c  suggestions and recom- 
mendations t o  the  Director of WRA; among them, and based on t h e  assump-  
t i o n  t h a t  WRA acted a s  a receiver  of property f o r  t h e  evacuees, was t he  
suggestion t h a t  the  Government receiver  should bring court  proceedings t o  
s e t  as ide  un fa i r  s a l e s  f o r  those Japanese who were wi l l ing  and able  t o  
repay t h e  purchase p r ice  which they had received f o r  t h e i r  property. The 
S o l i c i t o r  of WRA rep l ied  by l e t t e r  of September 14,1942, explaining t h a t  
ne i ther  WRA  nor any other  Government agency was i n  a posi t ion t o  serve a s  
rece iver  and describing what services  WRA was prepared t o  provide. In 
t h e  course of t h e  l e t t e r  t he  S o l i c i t o r  advanced a plan which was t o  prove 
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of decided benefLt t o  evacuees whose problems required court  action: 
"Your l e t t e r  p r ec ip i t a t e s  a question concerning which I 
was planning t o  w r i t e  you i n  the near future.  In connec- 
t i o n  with t he  work of t he  Evacuee Property Division I have 
been planning t o  ask t he  American Bar Association and t he  
National Lawyers Guild t o  work with t he  War Relocation 
Authority i n  t he  organization of a panel of at torneys i n  
p r iva te  p rac t ice  i n  each r e l a t i v e l y  l a rge  c i t y  and town on 
the  West Coast t o  whom the  Evacuee Property Division may r e f e r  
cases a r i s i ng  out of the  work of t h a t  d ivis ion which require 
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  of p r iva te  s u i t  by evacuees, o r  which other- 
wise require  t h e  services of a pr ivate  at torney.  We a r e  
hopeful t h a t  the  public service nature of these  cases w i l l  
induce t h e  members of such panels t o  handle such referred 
cases on the  bas i s  of an agreed schedule of low but reason- 
ab le  fees.  I should be glad t o  ge t  your t en t a t i ve  react ion 
t o  t h i s  suggestion and hope t o  be able  t o  discuss  it with 
you fu r the r  when our plans a re  a l i t t l e  fu r ther  developed." 
Throughout t he  first ha l f  of the  calendar year of 1943, the  San 
Francisco f i e l d  o f f i c e  worked c lose ly  with the  California Bar Associa- 
t i o n  t o  es tab l i sh  an a t to rney  r e f e r r a l  system i n  California,  which would 
permit evacuees needing l e g a l  ass is tance from lawyers i n  pr ivate  prac- 
t i c e  t o  get  qual i f ied  at torneys a t  a reasonable fee. Le t te r s  were sent  
t o  a l a rge  number of lawyers  who had evidenced i n t e r e s t  i n  war work and 
problems a r i s i ng  from the  evacuation. Panels were composed of lawyers 
who were qua l i f i ed  i n  t he  d i f f e r en t  f i e l d s  of l i t i g a t i o n  t o  which evacuee 
problems had reference and who were wi l l ing t o  represent the  l e g a l  in- 
t e r e s t s  of the  evacuees under an agreed-upon fee  schedule which took in- 
t o  account t h e  impaired f i nanc i a l  s t a t u s  of most evacuees. Furthermore, 
a system f o r  ro t a t i on  of names on t he  panel was inaugurated so t h a t  the 
evacuees might exercise  the  p r iv i l ege  of personal se lect ion.  A t  no time 
was any evacuee discouraged from making h i s  own arrangements with any 
p r iva t e  a t torney he might know o r  care  t o  use, but  t he  r e f e r r a l  system 
was operative i n  California f o r  those evacuees who needed and cared t o  
use it. On August 5 ,  1943, formal regulations governing t he  operation 
of t h e  a t torney r e f e r r a l  system were issued by t he  Authority a s  Manual 
Release 50.4. 
These regulations provided f o r  the needs of any evacuee who was 
unable t o  pay f o r  the  services  of an a t torney i n  accordance with the  fee  
schedule, i f  it appeared t h a t  the  a t to rney  representing the  evacuee 
could not co l l ec t  t he  f ee  out of the  probable proceeds of t h e  case. In  
such an ins tance the  evacuee made an a f f i d a v i t  c l ea r ly  s e t t i n g  fo r th  h i s  
lack of a s s e t s  and the  f a c t s  which demonstrated h i s  i n a b i l i t y  t o  pay an 
at torney,  whereupon the  project  a t torney made recommendations i n  h i s  be- 
ha l f  t o  the  f r e e  l e g a l  c l i n i c  i n  o r  neares t  t o  the  area i n  which the  
services  were required. 
 
                                                   (73)  
The r e f e r r a l  system d id  not mater ia l ize  i n  Oregon o r  Washington, 
bu t  groups of qua l i f i ed  lawyers who were in te res ted  i n  a s s i s t i ng  evacuee 
owners a t  a moderate f ee  were located and i den t i f i ed  t o  the  evacuees by 
o f f i c i a l s  of the  evacuee proper ty  o f f i c e s  within  those s t a t e s .  WRA
at torneys  have been under ob l iga t ion  throughout t h e  program t o  cooper- 
a t e  with and provide e s sen t i a l  information t o  such a t torneys  a s  have 
represented t he  evacuees i n  court. 
Adaptations of Procedures f o r  Property Supervision t o  the  Various 
Phases of the  Relocation Program 
As has been t rue  of t h e  course of every other  f ea tu r e  of the WRA 
program, s o  i n  t he  case of evacuee property provisions, bas ic  regula- 
t i o n s  were established,  then r e shaped ,  l ibe ra l i zed ,  embellished-or 
sometimes curtailed-according t o  t he  recognized needs of the  evacuees 
and of t h e  over-al l  program a t  spec i f i c  periods. 
The basic  obl igat ions  of WRA i n  dealing with evacuee property 
were two in number: (1) t o  a s s i s t  t h e  evacuees t o  r e e s t a b l i s h  them- 
se lves  outs ide  t h e  prohibited area ,  f i r s t  i n  some one of t he  WRA centers  
and thence i n  normal l i f e  and work a t  some point outs ide  a center; and, 
(2) t o  give t he  evacuees all possible ass is tance i n  connection with t h e i r  
p roper t i es  and holdings in the  Pac i f ic  Coastal a rea  from which they  were 
excluded by mi l i t a ry  order. 
As time passed, changes occurring within the  agency o r  changes 
superimposed upon t he  agency by forces and f ac to r s  external  t o  it 
necess i ta ted a l t e r a t i ons ,  usua l ly  amplifications ,  of t he  services in- 
cluded i n  WRA's  evacuee property program. Major events which occurred 
within t h e  l ifet irne of t h e  Authority and which resul ted i n  a l t e r a t i o n s  
i n  procedures and regulat ions  governing t h e  evacuee property program 
were, i n  chronological order: 
1. The adoption by W R A  of a leave program under which 
any c i t i z e n  or a l i e n  of Japanese descent against  whom 
t h e  federa l  in te l l igence  agencies had no count could 
rees tab l i sh  himself i n  pr ivate  l i f e  outside t h e  
prohibited area; 
2. The reopening  of United S t a t e s  m i l i t a r y  service  t o  
t h e  Nisei; 
3. The segregation of those evacuees who s ta ted  t h a t  
t h e i r  fu tu re  i n t e r e s t s  l a y  with Japan ra ther  than with 
t h e  United Sta tes ;  
4. The revocation of t h e  mass exclusion orders by the  War 
Department together with the  Western Defense C o m m a n d ' s
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designation of individual  evacuees f o r  continued ex- 
clusion from the  m i l i t a r y  a r ea s  of t he  Pac i f ic  Coast; 
5. The termination of h o s t i l i t i e s  with Japan; 
6 .  The scheduled closing of the  re locat ion centers.  
The basic  leave regulations were e f fec t ive  October 1, 1942, but 
because leave clearance procedures were a t  f i r s t  time-consuming and cum- 
bersome, and a l so  because the Authority's public i n f o r m t i o n  campaign t o  
c l ea r  away myths and rumors and general uninformed prejudice i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  t he  Japanese American people had not ye t  produced perceptible r e su l t s ,  
t he  re loca t ion  of evacuees t o  private l i f e  was inconsiderable fo r  t he  
f i r s t  f i f t e e n  months o f  t h e  program-although the movement out of t h e  
centers  was gaining momentum by t he  c lose  of 1943. 
Un t i l  1944 adjustments of t he  evacuee property regulations t o  the  
re loca t ion  program were minor. That they were so i s  best  explained i n  
terms of the  kind of people who relocated during the  f i r s t  year of pro- 
g ress  toward the  Authority's objective of emptying the  centers. During 
t h e  f i r s t  year of the  established leave program, t he  v a s t majori ty of 
t h e  people who l e f t  the centers  t o  resume the  pr ivi leges  and responsi- 
b i l i t i e s  of American l i f e  were t he  young and unattached; they were a 
pioneer group upon whose success o r  f a i l u r e  i n  adjustment t o  the  complex 
l i v i n g  condit ions and pressures of wartime the  re loca t ion  of family 
groups and older people depended. 
During 1943 regulat ions  on t ranspor ta t ion of evacuee household a 
and personal property permitted one move a t  Government expense i n  addi-
t i o n  t o  t he  move f rom  pr ivate  t o  Government storage. That is, an evac- 
uee could ask t o  have h i s  goods picked up by t he  Government and placed 
f o r  safekeeping in a WRA warehouse; he could ask t o  have h i s  goods, o r  
p a r t  of them, sen t  t o  him a t  t he  center from t h e  warehouse. I f  t h a t  
request  had been made and h i s  goods delivered t o  him a t  t he  center,  he 
could not have t h i s  assortment of possessions moved f r e e  of charge t o  
h i s  re loca t ion  dest inat ion.  However, regula t ions  permitted him t o  have 
personal and household e f f e c t s  t o t a l i ng  not more than 500 pounds sent  t o  
h i s  re loca t ion  des t ina t ion  f r e e  of charge. Of course, i f  an evacuee had 
l e f t  h i s  household things and ex t ra  c lo th ing  in a WRA warehouse on t he  
West Coast f o r  the  duration of h i s  s t a y  i n  a re locat ion center, then he 
s t i l l  had t he  pr ivi lege of having the  whole l o t  shipped t o  h i s  new 
establishment f r e e  of charge when he relocated.  Since the  pioneers i n  
re loca t ion  were t h e  young and unattached, t h e  500-pound l im i t a t i on  
proved no pa r t i cu l a r  obstacle t o  t h e i r  r e se t t l emen t  even i f  they had 
exhausted t h e i r  one unlimited move pr ivi lege.  
By t h e  c lose  of t he  year several  fac to rs  made it feas ib le  f o r  
WRA t o  begin urging the  I s s e i  and family groups t o  leave the i so la ted  
and unnatural  world of t h e  centers ,  with t he  r e s u l t  t h a t  po l ic ies  and 
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procedures were a l t e red  i n  1944 t o  accommodate t h e  needs of t h e  older 
people with f a m i l y  r espons ib i l i t i e s .  
However, even though regulat ions  concerning the  moving of p r o p -  
e r t y  were f a i r l y  s tab le ,  t he  Evacuee Property Office, i n  common with a l l  
Divisions of WRA, experienced the  turbulence and t h e  pressures t o  which 
t h e  Authority was subjected throughout t he  year of 1943. 
West Coast r a c i s t  groups of long standing who had pressured f o r  
evacuation and had been vociferous i n  t h e i r  approval of t he  Western De- 
fense  Command's conduct i n  ordering and carrying out t he  evacuation of 
a l l  persons of Japanese ancest ry  from the  coas ta l  region were b i t t e r l y  
opposed t o  t he  re locat ion program and t o  t he  Government agency which had 
been charged with the  obl igat ion t o  re loca te  110,000 people i n  order ly  
fashion. No sooner had t he  r a c i s t s  learned t h a t  evacuees were being 
processed out of what the  former had hoped would be duration detent ion 
camps than the  outcry against  WRA began. Resolutions were forwarded t o  
Congress t o  prohibi t  the  re lease  of Japanese Americans, t o  urge legis la-  
t i o n  t h a t  would deprive t he  Nisei of t h e i r  c i t i zensh ip  and allow mass 
deportat ion of the  minority a t  the  end of t h e  war. On the  West Coast 
new super-patriotic pressure groups were born t o  crusade against  the  
r e tu rn  of t h e  exiled res iden ts  a t  any time. The Hearst p ress  and t he  
McClatchy p re s s  reported invention a s  f a c t  and ca r r ied  t he  banner f o r  
f o r  t h e  r a c i s t s  in t h i s  new upsurge of f ana t i c  prejudice. 
On January 28, 1943, the War D e p a r t m e n topened t he  armed forces  t o  
Nisei volunteers fo r  t h e  formation of a segregated combat team. The 
r e s to r a t i on  t o  t he  Nisei of t h e  p r iv i l ege  of o f fe r ing  t h e i r  l i v e s  i n  de- 
fense of t h e i r  country and so of demonstrating i n  unassailable fashion 
t h e i r  l oya l t y  enraged t he  r a c e b a i t e r s  s t i l l  fu r ther ,  e spec ia l ly  a s  
l i b e r a l  presses throughout t he  country applauded t h e  move. 
The year of 1943 was a year of invest igat ions ,  o f f i c i a l  and un- 
o f f i c i a l ,  beginning with t h e  Senate Mi l i t a ry  Affairs  Committee i n  
January and soon including the  Dies Subcommittee, t he  l a t t e r  having 
employed an inves t iga tor  given t o  re leas ing conclusions t o  t h e  press  be- 
f o r e  t h e r e  were any findings.  In January t he  McClatchy press i n  Cali- 
f o r n i a  l a u n c h e d  a campaign f o r  the  se izure  of Japanese-owned motor 
vehic les  and farm equipment which inspired a senator of the  S t a t e  
Legis la ture  who was chairman of the  l e g i s l a t u r e ' s  committee on un- 
American a c t i v i t i e s  t o  authorize an investigation of t he  stored- 
vehic le  s i t ua t i on  t h a t  eventually became a Dies-ian s o r t  of investiga- 
t i o n  of t h e  over-all a c t i v i t i e s  of WRA; whether invest igat ion of t h e  
t o t a l  program of a Federal agency i s  a legi t imate  function of a s t a t e  
l e g i s l a t u r e  committee was a question which apparently did not occur t o  
t h e  members of t he  Tenny committee. 
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The McClatchy Bee papers published i n  Sacramento and Fresno both 
ran  a long a r t i c l e  on January 28, 1943, i n  which it was charged t h a t  from 
"20,000 t o  25,000 Japanese-owned automobiles and trucks equipped with 
prewar grade t i r e s  i n  good condition a r e  believed t o  be stored fo r  t h e  
durat ion of t h e  war i n  public and pr iva te  garages"when "OPA invest i -  
gators  *  *  *   found two buildings i n  West Fresno owned by Nipponese" which 
"housed more than 100 cars  i n  excel lent  condition a l l  belonging t o  t h e  
Japanese, and t he  cars  a r e  not  f o r  s a l e  * * * . When t h e  war i s  over and 
t h e  coast  s t a t e s  Japanese a r e  permitted t o  resume t h e i r  former residencas, 
they  can s t a r t  motoring again on p r a c t i c a l l y  new rubber, while the  bal- 
ance of t he  s t a t e ' s  auto  owners w i l l  have t o  g e t  by on the  scrap rubber 
t i r e s  they  have been saving and wearing out  during t he  war * * *  t he  
t i r e s  a r e  use less  on the  stored automobiles, and t h a t  i s  the way the  
Japanese want them, u n t i l  the  war i s  over." T h e  following day t he  s to ry  
appeared i n  t he  Hearst papers of San Francisco and Los A n g e l e s  and a l so  
i n  t h e  San Francisco Chronicle. The San Joaquin Federal clubwomen re- 
quested t h e  W a r  Department by l e t t e r  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  Japanese-owned farm 
implementsto white farmers whocan use them now t o  w i n  the  war." 
[San Francisco Examiner, February 5 ,  1 9 4 3 . ]Congressman Gearhart of Fresno 
t o l d  t h e  press  t h a t  "federal  agencies should formulate plans t o  acquire 
thousands of motor vehicles and pieces of farm equipment stored by 
Japanese removed from California. " [Los  Angeles Times, February 2, 
1943]. In t he  Houseof Representatives t h e  same Congressman "criticized 
Rubber Czar William Je f f e r s  f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  u t i l i z e  an estimated 100,000 
serviceable t i r e s  on Japanese-owned automobiles and trucks now i n  stor-  
age," and "announced he i s  ca l l i ng  on Je f fe r s  t o  take immediate ac t ion  
looking t o  the  re lease  of t he  t i r e s .  " [Fresno Bee, Sacramento Bee, 
February 1, 1 9 4 3 ] .  
In Sa l inas  an incident  of t h a t  period revealed i t s e l f  a s  being 
t yp i ca l  of t h e  r e l a t i o n  between charges and t h e  f a c t s  i n  t h i s  whole u p  
heaval about i d l e ,  Japanese-owned farm equipment i n  t he  Coastal States.  
On January 26, 1943, Fred S. McCarger, Secretary  of t he  Sal inas  
Chamber of Commerce addressed Senator Downey of California a s  follows: 
"It i s  estimated t h a t  the re  a r e  500 pieces of Japanese- 
owned farm equipment stored. i n  t h i s  Valley. This machinery 
has been used t o  farm the  Salinas Valley and there  i s  no 
new machinery avai lable  t o  take i ts  place. Something 
should be done t o  re lease  it f o r  use i f  t h e  land i s  t o  g e t ,  
t h e  maxim, production f o r  t he  War Effort .  
"The Sa l inas  Chamber of Commerce, cooperating with the  
American Legion and the  Monterey County Farm Bureau re- 
spec t fu l l y  request  your a s s i s t a n c e . "  
A s  a r e s u l t  of  t h i s  l e t t e r  t he  WRA evacuee property supervisor 
f o r  the  area which included t he  Sal inas  Valley conducted a survey and 
made a repor t  t o  h i s  chief ,  dated February 9, 1943. 
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"This i s  a repor t  on a survey made i n  t h e  Salinas Valley. 
t o  loca te  t h e  reported 500 pieces of stored Japanese 
equipment. This repor t  on the  equipment came a s  a r e s u l t  
of a resolut ion passed by the King Ci ty  American Legion and 
a l s o  from a l e t t e r  sent  t o  Senator Sheridan Downey by 
Mr. Fred McCarger, Secretary  of t he  Sal inas  Chamber of 
Commerce. This l e t t e r  s a s  sent  on t h e  recommendation of 
a group which met a s  a r e s u l t  of receiving the  resolut ion 
from the  King City American Legion. This group was com- 
posed of Mr. McCarger , Frank Cornell, Fred Heart and others.  
"This survey took i n  the  towns of the  Sal inas  Valley, in- 
cluding Sal inas ,  Watsonville, Soledad and King City; a l s o  
t h e town of Ho l l i s t e r  and v i c in i t y ,  Gilroy and v i c i n i t y  
and San Jose and v ic in i ty .  
"My first contact  was with Mr. McCarger. I asked him who 
had d e f i n i t e  knowledge a s  t o  where t h i s  purported s to red  
machinery was. He s t a t ed  t h a t  he did not know of t he  
loca t ion  of it; t h a t  they had sent  t h e i r  l e t t e r  on t he  
ba s i s  of the  resolut ion submitted by t he  King City American 
Legion. Mr. McCarger suggested I contact M r .  Frank Cornell, 
of the  Cornell Tractor and Equipment Company, a s  Mr. Cornell 
seemed t o  have more d e f i n i t e  knowledge a s  t o  where it was 
stored.  This company has branch o f f i ce s  in Watsonville and 
Soledad. When I ta lked t o  Mr. Cornell, he s t a t ed  he d id  
not have a c t u a l  knowledge as t o  where any machinery was 
located,  but t h a t  a l ist  had been prepared by h i s  manager, 
M r .  Lee Johnson, of t he  Japanese with whom they had contact. 
This l i s t  included machinery t h a t  had been sold o r  turned 
over t o  other  operators on a loan o r  l ease  basis .  It ap- 
peared t h a t  a l l  had been e i t h e r  sold o r  leased,  but  t h a t  
the re  were a few cases i n  which t hey  were i n  doubt and be- 
l ieved t he  machinerywas s tored there.  This l i s t  was made 
ava i lab le  t o  us. Mr. Cornell took t he  a t t i t u d e  t h a t  t h i s  
equipment, which was not sold, was probably not i n  service,  
or, i f  it was, it was not used t o  i t s  f u l l e s t  extent .  He 
then went i n t o  a discussion on how he had heard from re- 
l i a b l e  repor t s ,  as he put it, t h a t  i n  Southern California 
the re  was qu i te  a l a rge  amount of stored machinery. In going over the  l i s t  wi th  Mr .  Johnson, he ch cked t he  names 
of those who, he believed, might have equipment stored, and
rom t h i s  l i s t  I found t h a t  a Mr. E. M. Juhler had one 
Ca te rp i l l a r  Tractor number 22, two John Deere l i s t e r s ;  an- 
o ther  farmer had a 10foot r i ng  r o l l e r  which was new, and 
one 6-foot K i l l i f e rchisel." 
In  f a c t ,  a thorough invest igat ion,  i n  t h e  course of which t h e  
property supervisor checked with 30 prominent men i n  t h e  valley-in ad- 
d i t i o n  t o  t h e  ones previously mentioned--among whom were bankers, farm- 
e r s ,  business men engaged i n  marketing produce or  s e l l i n g  o r  buying f a r m  
machinery, the  chairman of the  County War Board, and t h e  County Agricul- 
t u r a l  Supervisor, resul ted i n  t he  locat ion of not  500 pieces of i d l e  
farm equipment, but  f ive.  
The WRA representa t ive 's  repor t  concludes: 
"Before leaving Sal inas  I had an interview again with 
Mr. McCarger. He was e n t i r e l y  s a t i s f i e d  with t he  con- 
t a c t s  and s t a ted  t h a t  he thought t h a t  it was a complete 
and thorough survey. He then sent ,  i n  my presence a 
telegram t o  Senator Sheridan Downey which read a s  
follows : 
'War RelocationRepresentatives have cooperated 
with us and we have made  thorough survey of v a l l e y  
and f ind  very l i t t l e  Japanese owned farm machinery 
not being used and t h a t  not being used i s  i n  pro- 
cess  of negotiat ions t o  be used. Probably informa- 
t i o n  originated with people who a r e  anti-Japanese 
re turning t o  t h i s  t e r r i t o ry .  That fee l ing  growing 
i n  t h i s  d i s t r i c t .  W i l l  you no t i fy  other members 
of t he  Senate. 
Salinas Chamber of Commerce 
/a/ Fred McCarger.' 
"There were many other  contacts made on t h i s  t r i p ,  but no 
one could give me any information o r  had no knowledge of 
where any equipment had been stored." 22 
In t he  spring t h e  Federal Government i n i t i a t e d  act ion t o  permit 
t he  acquis i t ion  by eminent domain of i d l e  farm equipment. To be able  t o  
inform the  United S t a t e s  Department of Agriculture S t a t e  and County War 
Boards (which agencies administered t he  regulation) what evacuee-owned 
farm machinery existed and where it was, WRA's  Property Division compiled 
and forwarded t o  t h e  War Boards by t h e  end of June, 35 separate inven- 
t o r i e s .  
In Ju ly  an informal understanding was reached between the  Evacuee 
Property Off ice  and t he  California S t a t e  War Board regarding procedure 
f o r  requis i t ioning i d l e  farm machinery. The county  war boards, a f t e r  
t h a t  time, fu rn i shed  WRA with a copy of each l e t t e r  making a purchase 
o f f e r  t o  an evacuee owner of i d l e  equipment. The Evacuee Property Office 
then communicated with t he  evacuee, cautioning him t h a t  he had only 10  
days i n  which t o  reply  t o  t he  o f fe r  o r  have h i s  property requisi t ioned.  
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It was the  p rac t ice  of t he  S t a t e  War Board t o  withhold ac t ion  u n t i l  re- 
ceiving word f rom  t heEvacuee Property  Office. When WRA was able  t o  cer- 
t i f y  t h a t  an evacuee owner had been granted leave and was  negotiat ing a 
farm l ea se  o r  purchase elsewhere i n  the  United S ta tes ,  t he  State War 
Board granted an extension  of time i n  which t he  evacuee could apply fo r  
approval of t h e  war board i n  t he  county of h i s  relocation,  which would 
then recommend cancel la t ion of t he  requis i t ion.  A t  t h e  close of 1943, 
evacuee owned farm machinery had been requis i t ioned i n  only 38 in- 
stances. 23 
Property Problems Arising from the  Segregation Program 
In the  e a r l y  f a l l  of 1943 WRA car r ied  out a program t o  segregate 
those  evacuees who by word o r  act ion had indicated t h a t  t h e i r  l o y a l t i e s  
l a y  with Japan from those who considered themselves Americans. Tule Lake 
Relocation Center was cleared of most of t h a t  pa r t  of i t s  population 
which was re locatable  and converted i n t o  a segregation center. E v e r y  
e f f o r t  was made t o  persuade the  Tuleans of good record t o  re loca te  r a t h e r  
than t o  t r a n s f e r  t o  another re locat ion center. Those who relocated from 
Tule Lake a t  t h i s  t i m e  were granted f r e e  t ranspor ta t ion of a l l  t h e i r  
household goods and personal possessions, f r e e  of charge, regardless  of 
whether they  had had one movement of t h e i r  goods previously. In s p i t e  of 
t h i s  inducement, only a few hundred relocated from Tule a t  t h a t  time. 
However, t he  segregation movements taxed the  resources of the Evacuee 
Property Office t o  t h e  l i m i t .  
Between mid-September and mid-October of 1943, 33 t r a i n  t r i p s  
transported 14,825 persons, 6,250 of them from Tule Lake t o  other  centers  
and 8,575 t o  Tule Lake from other centers.  This t r ans f e r  of thousands of 
people required t r ans f e r  of t h e i r  household goods. At the  same time 
s t e a d i l y  increasing numbers of evacuees were re locat ing and needing t h e i r  
household goods and other equipment in t h e i r  new homes, which might be 
anywhere from the  California s t a t e  l i n e  t o  t he  At lant ic  coast ,  or from 
t h e  Canadian border t o  t he  Mexican border. During t h e  l a t t e r  hal f  of 
1943 alone, a t o t a l  of 1,531 requests f o r  storage and of 3,227 requests  
f o r  shipment were received f r o m  centers  and processed through t h e  San 
Francisco headquarters of t he  evacuee property f i e l d  offices-these fig- 
u res  representing the  needs of re locat ing people, not of those trans- 
f e r r i ng  f r o m  o r  t o  Tule Lake. 
During the  segregation movements, t h e  Transportation Section of 
Evacuee Property was made responsible f o r  t he  handling of a l l  matters 
r e l a t i n g  t o  segregation program f r e igh t  shipments; men were de ta i l ed  t o  
t h e  centers  f r o m  t h e  f i e l d  o f f i c e s  t o  a s s i s t  i n  t h e  handling of t he  per- 
sonal  property t o  be t ransferred.  The Tule Lake center completed i t s  
outbound shipment of f r e igh t  i n  September by forwarding 51 carloads of 
household goods and 10  carloads of excess baggage which could no t  be 
moved i n  t h e  baggage cars  t h a t  accompanied t he  passenger t r a in s .  By 
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t h e  end of November, 59 ca rs  of household goods had been received a t  t h e  
segregation center from the  re locat ion centers. In  a l l ,  more than 
4,700,000 pounds of f r e igh t  were moved a t  t h i s  time, i n  connection with 
t h e  segregation program. 
The year 1943 saw the  beginning of an exhaustive land ownership 
f i e l d  survey made by t he  evacuee proper ty  f i e l d  o f f ices  throughout t h e  
evacuated area. This survey was painstakingly thorough, and when it was 
completed, i n  1945, WRA f i e l d  men had searched t he  County Recorder's 
records in every county i n  t he  evacuated area, making a record of any 
property owned by persons whose name indicated Japanese origin.  A l l  
pa rce l s  of evacuee-owned land were thus iden t i f i ed ,  c l a s s i f i ed ,  cata- 
loged, and mapped. The survey was of immediate value t o  the  work of t he  
Evacuee Property Office, but it was real ized t h a t  i t s  major use might 
wel l  be t o  the  Government in connection with p o s t w a r  claims and damage' 
s u i t s .  The f igures  shown by the  survey a r e  s e t  f o r t h  below
: 
Number of Holdings within the  Evacuated A r e a ,  1943-1945 
No. of Counties Urban Rural 
STATE, with J. Holdings Holdings Holdings 
Cal i fornia                    39                      3 ,267               1 ,715  
Oregon 
Washington 3 382 201 
TOTALS 44 3,742 2,046 
On October 22, 1943, the  War Department issued i t s  f i r s t  press  
r e l ea se  on t he  performance of the  Japanese American 100th Infantry  Bat- 
t a l i o n  i n  ac t i on  i n  t he  I t a l i a n  campaign. From t h a t  time on, t h e  Nisei  
i n  United S t a t e s  Army uniform, f i gh t i ng  i n  Europe continued t o  mount up 
honors and casua l t i es ,  till they were t he  most decorated and c i t e d  un i t  
i n  the  armed forces ,  and probably one of t he  most publicized. Their 
performance had t h e  e f fec t ,  not instantaneously but gradually, of quiet- 
ing t he  voices of a l l  but t he  most rabid  of the  American r a c e b a i t e r s ,  
and of enlarging mater ia l ly  the  ranks of the  forces  of good w i l l  t h a t  
were determined t o  see  t h a t  the families  of Nisei f i g h t e r s  were accepted 
a s  f u l l  Americans. Furthermore t h e i r  performance persuaded t h e  War De- 
partment t o  r e s to r e  Select ive  Service t o  t he  Nisei, who a f t e r  March 31, 
1942, had been classed 4-C by the  Select ive  Service Boards. Restoration 
of t h e  p r iv i l ege  of being processed on individual  qua l i f i ca t ions  r a the r  
than on a r a c i a l  ba s i s  was made by t he  War Department on January 20, 1944. 
Improvement of public opinion concerning the  character of t he  
Japanese Americans and s t ead i l y  diminishing reserves of manpower f o r  the  
na t ion ' s  industry  favored t he  re locat ion program of WRA throughout t he  
year of 1944. During t h i s  year the  program was geared t o  encourage t he  
older  people and famil ies  t o  leave t he  centers  and resume independent 
l i f e  and work. From January 18  t o  20 an evacuee property conference was 
 
 
                                                                     (81)  
held i n  San Francisco. Representatives from Washington, at torneys and 
property o f f i c e r s  f rom  the  centers,  t ransportat ion and p r o p e r t y  super- 
v i sors  f r o m  the  area  o f f ices ,  and t h e  personnel of t h e  San F r a n c i s c o  
o f f i c e  discussed the  needs and problems of the period, and measures were 
agreed upon t o  improve property services t o  t he  evacuees. Exchange of 
v i s i t s  of property and t ranspor ta t ion o f f i c e r s  between the  West Coast of- 
f i c e s  and the  centers  was authorized; more thorough invest igat ion,  re- 
port ing and documenting of cases of fraud, vandalism, pi l ferage,  f i r e  
damage and ser ious  management lapses were urged upon property supervisors 
i n  t h e  evacuated area; t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  procedures were amended t o  permit 
the  cost  of packing and c ra t ing  evacuee property a t  the projects ,  and t he  
500-pound l im i t a t i on  on personal property shipments t o  points of reloca- 
t i o n  was eliminated, a s  of March 4, 1944. A t  t h e  same time a new provi- 
s ion allowed the  f r e e  t ranspor ta t ion of 5,000 pounds of f ix tu res ,  e q u i p  
ment, machinery or  too l s  necessary t o  business enterpr ise  whenever a 
family was  unable t o  procure such equipment i n  the  area of relocation.  
The closing of Jerome Relocation Center i n  Arkansas on June 30, 
1944, involving t he  movement of 5,707 people w i t h  t h e i r  household and 
personal possessions during the  month of June, necessi tated the  shipping 
of 43 f r e i g h t  c a r  loads of property t o  one or  another of th ree  d i s t a n t  
centers  which received the  g rea te r  par t  of t h e  Jerome population and 557 
truckloads t o  t he  nearby Rohwer Relocation Center, which accommodated 
2,514 of the  t r ans f e r  cases. 24 
On December 17, 1944, the  War Department announced the revocation 
of the  mass exclusion orders, e f fec t ive  January 2, 1945. The Western 
Defense Command subst i tu ted f o r  t he  mass exclusion orders a system by 
which it could designate ind iv idua l s  fo r  exclusion from the  coas ta l  area 
o r  f o r  continued detention by the  Department of Jus t ice .  W i t h  the  mass 
of t he  Japanese American minority f r e e  t o  re tu rn  t o  t he  West Coast, 
Director Dil lon S. Myer announced t h a t  a l l  re locat ion centers would c lose  
not e a r l i e r  than s i x  months, and not l a t e r  than one year, a f t e r  t he  
e f f ec t i ve  da te  of revocation. 
The r e tu rn  of the evacuees t o  t h e  West Coast and the  l iqu ida t ion  
of t he  Authority presented numerous problems t o  t he  Evacuee Property Of-  
f i c e  of WRA. Once the  ban was l i f t e d ,  there  was a marked f a l l i n g  away i n  
property sa les .  Few s a l e s  were consummated i n  1945 except those which 
had been determined before the  revocation announcement and those re- 
quested by evacuees who had decided t o  continue l i f e  away from the  Pacif- 
i c  Coast. In the  matter of leases ,  whether of agr icul tura l ,  commercial 
o r  residence  property, the  problem changed suddenly from a responsibil- 
i t y  t o  procure subs t i t u t e  operators t o  an obl igat ion t o  dislodge those
 subs t i t u t e  operators so t h a t  the  owners could take over.  A subs tan t ia l  
number of the  subs t i tu te  operators showed t h e  g rea tes t  d i s inc l ina t ion  t o  
be dislodged. Many h a s t i l y  drawn up leases  dat ing from the  spring of 
1942 contained the  clause  "for the  duration" --not even indicat ing t o  
what t h e  duration referred; others  car r ied t he  even more ambiguous word- 
ing "for the duration of h o s t i l i t i e s , "  and permitted t h e  tenant to  hold 
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out f o r  the  termination of h o s t i l i t i e s  with Japan. "Durationof the  war" 
offered an out because it could be in te rpre ted  t o  include t he  period fol-  
lowing t he  cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s  and prolonged u n t i l  t he  President 
should make o f f i c i a l  declara t ion t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  of nat ional  emergency no 
longer existed.  Any lease  which s e t  t he  termination da te  a t  the  termina- 
t i o n  of t he  exclusion of t h e  owner was a s  r a r e  a s  it was convenient. 
Increasing t he  na tura l  reluctance of people t o  move themselves 
and t h e i r  possessions were two fac tors ,  both predicated by t h e  war. The 
g r ea t  i n f l ux  of defense workers r e su l t i ng  from t h e  mushrooming war in- 
d u s t r i e s  on t h e  Pac i f ic  Coast had created an ex t raord inar i ly  severe 
I housing problem i n  a l l  the  c i t i e s  and most of t h e  l a rge r  towns of t he  
t h r ee  coas t a l  s t a t e s .  Defense workers had poured i n to  the  l i v ing  quar- 
t e r s  of former Japanese d i s t r i c t s  throughout t he  coas ta l  area; when t he  
evacuees began t o  stream back, they  found t he  tenants  determined t o  keep 
such she l t e r  a s  t hey  had and given t o  taking refuge i n  any t echn i ca l i t y  
which would allow them t o  s tave of f  t he  day of departure. In  r u r a l  
areas  t he  evacuation of t he  Japanese Americans had created a vacuum 
which had sucked i n  another group of dislocated people, the  refugees from 
t h e  Dust Bowl s t a t e s  who f o r  years had wandered the  "West Coast, an in- 
secure, unpopular migratory people. Farmers without land, a s  these  ref- 
ugees were up t o  t he  time of the  evacuation, they became i n  many in- 
s tances  t he  l o g i c a l  subs t i t u t e  operators of Japanese-owned farms. War- 
time p r o f i t s  from farm produce rose  s tead i ly .  People who had known the  
extreme of poverty and insecur i ty  were suddenly prosperous; t he  means of 
t h e i r  p rosper i ty  was t h e  land owned or  leased by the  excluded Japanese. 
It was understandable t h a t  many of these  subs t i t u t e  operators were loath 
t o  give up so p rof i t ab le  a venture simply because the  owner of the  land 
o r  l e a se s  was f r e e  t o  resume operations. 
Complex and time consuming a s  problems involving leaseholds, ad- 
hesive tenants,  ev ic t ions ,  and misunderstandings a r i s i n g  from informal 
o r a l  agreements were during the  f i n a l  period of WRA operations, t h e  
Evacuee Property Off ice ' s  heaviest  labor  was t h a t  of  c lear ing Government 
warehouses, both on the  West Coast and i n  t he  centers ,  of evacuee house- 
hold goods and equipment. 
Approximately 115,000  people were evacuated. On January 1, 1945, 
79,763 of them remained i n  t h e  centers;  roughly 35,000 had relocated t o  
points  outs ide  t he  exclusion area. Those who had relocated i n  a l l  prob- 
a b i l i t y  had goods stored i n  a coast  warehouse and other possessions 
s tored i n  center  warehouses. Once i n  t he  centers,  the  evacuees commonly 
requested t h a t  c e r t a in  items which would fit i n t o  t he  l imi ted space of a 
barrack apartment should be shipped t o  them. Sometimes, because of too  
grea t  a s i m i l a r i t y  i n  names ,  a family wanting nothing shipped would have 
a l l  t h e i r  household possessions unexpectedly deposited i n  t he  center. 
The head of t he  family might have been M r .  Saburu Yarnamoto, who i n  p r e -  
e v a c u a t i o n  days was a prosperous businessman with a t e n  room home. It 
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had happened t h a t  M r . Satoru Yamamoto, who had lived l e s s  amply in a three- 
room house before the  evacuation, had sent  i n  a request  t o  have a l l  h i s  
worldly goods sent  t o  the center f o r  h i s  family's comfort. The simplest 
th ing  f o r  Mr. Saburu Yamamoto t o  do was t o  have h i s  unwanted belongings 
s tored i n  a center warehouse. Later  he relocated t o  New York City, 
where he did wel l  t o  f ind a three-room apartment. He asked t o  have cer- 
t a i n items from h i s  household furnishings sent  t o  him i n  New York. The 
r eminde r  stayed i n  t he  center warehouse. The evacuees who had l ived  
continuously i n  the  centers  were most l i k e l y  t o  have selected items sent  
from the  West Coast t o  the  center. They of ten found t h a t  they had not 
room i n  t h e i r  quar ters  t o  accommodate t h e i r  possessions. The surplus 
was put i n  a center warehouse. Others made fu rn i t u r e ,  and i f  t he  ven- 
t u r e  were successful ,  tended t o  r e t i r e  older pieces t o  t he  warehouses 
t o  make room f o r  t he  new. The evacuees, l i k e  other  people, tended t o  
accumulate possessions. The following t ab l e  ind ica tes  the  gross weight 
i n  pounds of evacuee possessions of the  spring of 1945 t h a t  had t o  be 
moved out of the  centers  within the  year: 
Center In Project  Warehouses In Barracks Total  
Central  Utah                      200,000                       2,800,000                 3,000,000  
Colorado River                30,000                  4,000,000            4,030,000 
Gila River                     140,000                   3,000,000             3,140,000 
Granada                                175,000                       1,515,000                 1,690,000 
Heart Mountain                 450,000                       2,175,000               2,625,000  
Manzanar                            100,000                       1,887,000               1,987,000  
Minidoka                       1000,000                4,760,000           4,860,000  
Rohwer                                           50,000                             2,145,000                     2,195,000  
Tule Lake                             950,000                         4,350,000                  5,300,000  
TOTALS 2,195,000 26,632,000 2 8 , 8 2 7 , 0 0 0  2 5 ]  
A s  soon a s  t he  re turn of the  evacuees t o  t h e  West Coast was 
authorized, WRA reshaped procedures i n  evacuee property handling and 
supervision with two objectives:  t he  f i r s t  was t o  give a l l  possible as-  
s i s t ance  t o  the  evacuees, and the  second was t o  terminate t h e  property 
ass i s tance  program as soon a s  possible. A s  it happened, plans t o  ex- 
ped i te  t h e  l iqu ida t ion  program were frequently a l t e r ed  t o  m e e t  t h e  needs 
of t h e  evacuee population a s  these  needs manifested themselves through- 
out  t h e  year of 1945, when the dis located people were returning t o  t he  
Wes t  Coast and the  centers  were closing. 
A manual re lease  [ # 1 6 5 ]  of January 20, 1945, l i be r a l i z ed  proce- 
dures t o  include voluntary evacuees who needed ass is tance,  i f  they were 
t o  r e tu rn  t o  t h e i r  former homes, among those evacuees e l i g i b l e  t o  WRA 
help with property  problems. I n  t he  same re lease it was made c lea r  t h a t  
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those persons whom the  War Department designated a s  i n e l i g i b l e  f o r  re- 
t u r n  t o  t he  West Coast or  a s  i ne l i g ib l e  f o r  re locat ion elsewhere would 
receive f u l l  ass is tance from WRA with regard t o  t h e i r  property problems. 
A t  t h i s  time it was s ta ted t h a t  those who returned t o  t he  coas ta l  s t a t e s  
would be e l i g i b l e  f o r  W R A ' s  property management ass is tance f o r  a period 
not longer than 60 days a f t e r  t h e i r  re turn .  It was s ta ted  a lso ,  t h a t  a 
spec ia l  funct ion of the  Authority would be arranging contacts with l o c a l  
agencies, organizations and firms which would take over whereWRAl e f t  
o f f  i n  providing necessary services  t o  a d is located people. 
There were always people who relocated,  some t o  the  East  and many 
t o  t h e  West, who were unable t o  f ind l i v ing  quar ters  which would accom- 
modate t h e i r  fu rn i tu re  and other household goods. Many of these  people 
were not i n  a posi t ion t o  pay storage costs .  The Authority kept s t ress -  
ing t h e  f a c t  t h a t  no property could be retained i n  center warehouses 
l a t e r  than t h e  center l iqu ida t ion  da te  f o r  center property, and t h a t  the  
c los ing date  fo r  West Coast warehouses was February 28, 1946. On Novem- 
ber 27, 1945, a te le type  ins t ruc t ion  t o  a r ea  supervisors announced t h a t  
W R A  would no longer accept new requests f o r  storage of property. How- 
ever, many of the  re turning people were obliged t o  l i v e  i n  hos te l s  o r  
o ther  temporary housing f o r  considerable periods of time. February 1 
was o r ig ina l l y  s e t  a s  the  f i n a l  date  fo r  receiving appl icat ions  f o r  s h i p  
m e n t  of property i n  p r iva te  storage o r  use. The da te  was extended t o  
February 28, and by regulat ions  issued on February 4 ,  1946, it was per- 
mitted re locat ion supervisors on t h e  West Coast t o  make exceptions t o  
t h e  February 28 deadline f o r  bona f i d e  hardship cases involving persons 
l i v i n g  i n  t h e i r  areas.  S imi la r ly  the  deadline f o r  clearance of West 
Coast Government warehouses was extended from February 28 t o  March 15- 
though the  evacuee owner was obliged. t o  bear t he  cost  of c ra t ing  and 
shipping and t o  make h i s  own arrangements i f  he l e f t  h i s  property i n  t h e  
warehouse beyond t h e  February 28 l im i t .  A t  t h e  same time the  re loca t ion  
supervisors on t he  West Coast were given au tho r i t y  t o  extend t he  tirne a s  
f a r  a s  April 15  f o r  genuine hardship cases involving persons l i v i n g  i n  
t h e i r  areas. April  1 5  remained t he  deadline f o r  ge t t ing  property out ,  
but  on March 1, it was announced: 
"* * *  where an evacuee owner i s  s t i l l  res iding i n  temporary 
housing on t he  West Coast and a fu r ther  extension i s  nec- 
essa ry  t o  prevent hardship, t he  Area Supervisor m a y  o n  
request  s t o r e  the  property with a public warehouseman i n  
t h e  name of t he  evacuee and pay storage charges up t o  
June 30, 1946, not i fying t h e  evacuee of h i s  action,  and 
sending him t h e  warehouse r ece ip t  (which s h a l l  be a non- 
negotiable rece ip t )  by reg i s te red  mail. 26 
The same administrat ive no t ice  made provision f o r  t he  disposi- 
t i o n  of unclaimed property i n  WRA storage, t h a t  property "for which t he  
owner i s  unident i f ied  o r  cannot be located,  or  who has f a i l e d  o r  refused 
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shipment by February 28, 1946 (or  any extension approved by t he  Area 
Supervisor) ." Such property was t o  be moved from the  Government ware- 
house f l o o r  t o  a room su i tab le  fo r  conducting an auction, beginning 
March 15. Sa l e s  should take place not e a r l i e r  than April 15 and not 
l a t e r  than April  30. It was s t ipu la ted  t h a t  West Coast a rea  supervisors 
should continue t o  make every e f f o r t  t o  i d e n t i f y  and locate  t h e  owner of 
unclaimed property p r io r  t o  WRA disposi t ion,  and tha t :  
"Before any such property i s  offered f o r  s a l e ,  a s  s e t  
f o r t h  below, t he  Area Supervisor s h a l l  send a b r i e f  
descr ipt ion of the  property l o t s ,  t h e  respective places 
of storage and the  names and former addresses of t h e  
evacuees where known, t o  t h e  bi- l ingual  papers, namely, 
Rocky Shimpo ( D e n v e r ,  Colorado),  Utah Nippo ( S a l t  Lake 
City, U t a h ) ,  and Colorado Times ( D e n v e r ,  Colorado), and 
t o  t he  Pac i f ic  Ci t izen ( S a l tLake City, U t a h ) ,  with a 
request  t h a t  the  information be published. The news 
re lease  s h a l l  s t a t e  t he  place and time of s a l e  of all 
property uncalled-for and ind ica te  t h a t  the  proceeds will 
be deposited i n  the  U.S. Treasury where the  r i g h t f u l  
owners m a ymake claim f o r  it. 
On March 4, 1946, a schedule f o r  closing t he  remaining f i e l d  
o f f i c e s  of t h e  Authority was published, t he  West Coast d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e s  
scheduled f o r  l iqu ida t ion  between April 1 and May 4, and the three  a r e a  
off ices ,  located a t  Sea t t l e ,  San Francisco and Los Angeles, a s  of 
May 15. 
SOME OUTSTANDING INSTANCES OF PROPERTY LOSS AND DAMAGE 
Although it i s  a recognized f a c t  t h a t  few tenants l av i sh  such 
care  on property a s  would the  owner, the neglect  and dest ruct ion of 
evacuee property by subs t i t u t e  operators during the  period of the  
owners' exclusion from the  West Coast f a r  transcends the  ordinary care- 
l essness  of tenants. Too, the  f a c t  t ha t  prejudice against  the  J a p a n e s e  
American minority w a s so strong on t he  West Coast during a considerable 
pa r t  of t he  war period t h a t  t he  public conscience was highly insens i t ive  
t o  p i l f e r i n g  and vandalism committed against  the stored possessions or  
buildings of the  exi led people, encouraged the lawless t o  commit increas- 
ing ly  bold a c t s  a t  the  expense of t he  absent owners. The f u l l  extent  of 
damge and l o s s  has come t o  l i g h t  only with t h e  r e tu rn  of the  evacuees 
t o  t h e i r  former homes s ince  the  resc i ss ion  of t he  mi l i t a ry  exclusion 
orders which sent  t h e  evacuees i n t o  ex i le .  
That the  public conscience i s  awakening where the evacuees a r e  
concerned i s  evidenced by an e d i t o r i a l  t h a t  appeared i n  a Los Angeles 
newspaper i n  January of 1946; under the  caption "Resti tut ion f o r  
Evacuee Citizens, it read : 
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"Secretary of the  In t e r i o r  Harold Ickes has come out 
publ ic ly  with a declara t ion t h a t  American c i t i z e n s  of 
Japanese ancest ry  who were moved from t h e i r  West Coast 
homes by t he  mi l i t a ry  ' a re  e n t i t l e d  t o  and should receive 
compensation f o r  any damage i n f l i c t e d  on t h e i r  property 
in Cal i fornia  o r  elsewhere during t h e i r  absence.' He re- 
fe r red  only t o  stored goods o r  damaged, and homes o r  
o ther  buildings burned. This would be most inadequate 
j u s t i c e  t h a t  can never s a t i s f y  a sens i t ive  American con- 
science. From the  standpoint of t he  individuals,  goods 
may a s  wel l  have been burned or s to len  a s  t o  have been 
sold  ' f o r  anything you can get, ' a s  advised by t he  bank 
representa t ives  on evacuation boards. These people a r e  
e n t i t l e d  t o  r e s t i t u t i o n  f o r  l o s se s  i n  business and i n  
high earning power during the  war period. Their removal 
was t he  most un-American episode i n  American his tory .  
Those who th ink  it was necessary should be the  f i r s t  t o  
see t o  it t h a t  innocent c i t i z ens  should not bear the  
whole burden of 'war necessity. '"
The Story of  a Blocked Nat iona l  
M r .  Nomura* was a prosperous man u n t i l  t he  war. For many years he 
had l i ved  i n  Elk Grove, California,  with h i s  family. In 1941 he was 
manager of the S t a t e  Farming Company, Dos Palos-a small town near 
Fresno-manager and adviser  t o  both t h e  Berry Growers Association of Elk 
Grove and t h e  Sacramento Berry Exchange ,  and president of the  S t a t e  Ice  
Company, of Sacramento. He loaned money pr iva te ly  t o  finance some of 
these  companies. He had an i n t e r e s t  i n  t he  Garden City Investment Com- 
pany from which t h e  San Jose Brewery Company leased t h e  property on which 
it operated. In December of 1941 M r .  Nomura had sums of money outstand- 
ing which t o t a l ed  about $62,000, Since June of t h a t  year he had been 
operating under a blocked account. 
immediately a f t e r  December 7, 1941, according t o  Mr. Nomura's 
statement, Treasury Department representa t ives  entered h i s  home, taking 
a l l  records and account books from h i s  o f f i c e  and from h i s  safe,  none of 
which had been returned a s  of November 15, 1944 when the  p ro jec t  a t torney 
a t  t he  Central Utah Relocation Center wrote a repor t  on t h i s  case. The 
following s t o r y  i s  to ld  by M r .  Nomura. 
On January 13, 1942, four men from the  Treasury Department went t o  
t h e  Nomura home, showing no author izat ion except t h e i r  i den t i f i c a t i on  
cards f r o m  t h e  Treasury Department, and searched t h e  house. Mr. and Mrs. 
Nomura, not  knowing what, i f  any, t h e i r  r i g h t s  were, made no protes t .  
* Name f i c t i t i o u s .  
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Having completed t h e i r  search of t he  premises, th ree  of the  Treasury 
Department men l e f t ,  but  one stayed a s  guard u n t i l  he was re l ieved by 
another Treasury Department man. For about a week a twenty-four hour 
guard was maintained over t he  house, with s h i f t s  a t  8:00 P.M., 4:OO P.M. 
and midnight. During t h i s  period ne i ther  M r .  Nomura nor his wife was 
allowed t o  leave t h e  house f o r  any purpose o r  t o  use t h e  telephone- 
even t o  purchase food. When the  telephone rang, it was answered by the  
guard. The Nomuras ran  out  of food, except f o r  a s tock of r i c e  which 
they  had on hand, wi thin  a day o r  two of t he  establishment of the  guard. 
They asked t h e  guard t o  telephone the  grocery s t o r e  and order food, 
assur ing him t h a t  t he  grocer would furnish  food on c red i t .  The request  
was refused. Neighbors were not allowed t o  en te r  t h e  house o r  t o  leave 
any food f o r  t h e  Nomuras. The guards brought t h e i r  own lunches. 
After a week, t he  guard was withdrawn, but M r .  Nomura was warned 
aga ins t  attempting t o  use h i s  c r e d i t  i n  any way o r  t o  ca r ry  on any busi- 
ness. For th ree  more weeks t he  family l ived  on r i c e  except when a 
neighbor brought them a loaf  of bread. M r .  Nomura l o s t  24 pounds during 
t h i s  period. F ina l ly  when t h e  r i c e  was about t o  give out, he went t o  a 
United S t a t e s  Commissioner whom he knew. She made arrangements so t h a t  
he could withdraw $100 monthly from h i s  blocked account a t  t he  Capi ta l  
National Bank i n  Sacramento. He withdrew h i s  f i r s t  $100 on February 14, 
1942, terminating a month of hunger. 
During t h a t  period Mr. Nomura was twice taken t o  t he  court  house 
by representa t ives  of t h e  Federal Bureau of Investigation. Each time he 
was questioned and then released.  After  t h e  guard was withdrawn, M r .  
Nomura was summoned every two o r  th ree  days t o  t he  Sumitomo Bank Build- 
ing, where he was questioned by from two t o  seven people, sometimes f o r  
severa l  hours. He was to ld  t o  be ava i lab le  f o r  such questioning a t  a l l  
times. Consequently he f e l t  v i r t u a l l y  a prisoner and dared not go about 
h i s  business operations. 
"A neighbor of h i s  was * * * * t hemanager oftheB u t t e Farm Land 
Company. He to ld  Nomura t h a t  he was no longer being subjected 
t o  questioning ,  e tc . ,  because he had arranged with * * * [two
men]  both of whom were connected with t he  Treasury Department, 
t o  pay them $500.00 per month f o r  handling h i s  business. 
Nomura a l s o  learned t h a t  t he  Highland Land Company was pay- 
i ng  $250.00 per month t o  the same men f o r  the  same services.  
The neighbor took Nomura t o  t he  Sumitomo Bank Building i n  t h e  
e a r l y  par t  of April, 1942, t o  t he  o f f i c e  of t he  Highland Land 
Company where Nomura met  * * * [the[ the  two men]. Nomura knew 
both men because they  were two of t he  men who were question- 
ing him from t i m e  t o  time. Nomura then suggested t h a t  he 
would be in teres ted i n  having them run h i s  business a s  they 
were operating other  businesses, and t h a t  perhaps he could 
pay 25% of t he  monies he would co l lec t .   *  *  *  [A] said  t h a t
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perhaps 25% was t oo  much, but t h a t  20% would be right. It 
was then agreed t h a t  *  *  *  [ B ] was t o  ge t  20% of a l l  t h e  
m o n i e s  col lected and when it came t o  making out some wr i t t en  
memo of the  arrangement, * * * [A] said t h a t  he would get  a 
form of Power of Attorney t h a t  had been used i n  other s imilar  
cases .  He l e f t  the  o f f i c e  and about ten  minutes l a t e r  he 
came back with a form which he gave Nomura and which was l a t e r  
typed up and signed by Nomura. It appoin ted  *  *  *  [B]  agent 
and a t to rney  in f a c t  f o r  Nomura but provided no compensation 
t o  *  *  *   [ B ] .   In a separate l e t t e r ,  dated April  10, ad- 
dressed t o  *  *  *   [ B ] ,  Nomura agreed a s  follows: ' In  con- 
s i de r a t i on  of t he  f ac t t h a t you a r e  w i l l i n g  and able  t o  a c t  
a s  my attorney-in-fact t o  a s s i s t  me t o  conserve my a s se t s  f o r  
t h e  duration of the  war. I hereby agree t h a t  you a r e  t o  be 
compensated f o r  so  doing on a ba s i s  of (20%) twenty percent 
of t he  cash recovered on the  t o t a l  as se t s  so being conserved.' 
Nomura holds a l e t t e r ,  dated April 16, signed by * * *  [B],
a s  'U.S. Treasury Representative, Foreign Funds Control '  
which, of course, ind ica tes  t h a t  on t h a t  da te  ( s i x  days a f t e r  
the  * * * [Nomura-B]  agreement) * * *  [B] was s t i l l  connec t ed
with t he  Treasury Department.  
"* * * [B] himself never col lected any money. A l l  t h e  money 
was col lected by N o m u r a .  Nevertheless, it was a l l  deposited 
i n  t h e  Capi ta l  National Bank of Sacramento under an account 
e n t i t l e d  *  *  *  K .  Nomura by * * * [B], a t t o rney  i n  f a c t ,  ' 
and * * * [B]  drew checks t o  h i s  own order t o  pay himself an 
amount equal  t o  20% of a l l  col lect ions .  The check book shows 
t h r ee  s tubs  numbered and dated as follows: No. D 1  i n  t he  sum 
of $1201.47, May 5, 1942,  * * * [B] '20% of co l lec t ions  t o  
d a t e  a s  per agreement' ; No. D2 i n  t h e  sum of $462.71 ,  May 11, 
1942, * * *  [B] '20% of co l lec t ions  t o  da te  a s  per agreement' ; 
No. D3  in the  sum of $356.09, Ju ly  16, 1942, * * *  [B] 20% 
of co l lec t ions ,  expenses and mileage'. Nomura a l s o  has the  
cancelled checks t o  show t h e  payments made by *  * *  [B]  t o  
himself. 
"* * * [B]  f i l e d  a repor t  t o  t he  Treasury Department  (TFER 1)   
f o r  t h e  period from Apr i l  14  t o  August 12, 1942, showing col- 
l e c t i ons  and disbursements. The repor t  r e f e r s  a t  two o r  
t h r ee  points  t o  the  f a c t  t h a t  *  *  *   [ B ]  and Nomura had an 
agreement by which * * *  [B]  was t o  have 20% of a l l  collec- 
t i o n s  and it shows co l lec t ion  f i r s t  paid t o  *  *  *  [ B ]   i n  
 
accordance with t h a t  agreement. This would seem t o  ind ica te  
t h a t  t he  Treasury Department knew about t h e  *  *  *   [ B ]  arranga- 
ment and made no exception t o  it. I s  it possible t h a t  t h e  
Treasury Department permits i t s  employees  t o  make such arrange- 
ments with persons whose accounts a re  blocked, etc.? A t  any 
rate, * * *  [B] certainly made no attempt a t  t he  time of 
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making t h i s  report  t o  cover up the facts .  Also, i n  a p p l y i n g  
f o r  a l icense under form TFER 1 on April 10, 1942, * * *  [B]
f i l e d  a copy of h i s  power of attorney and of the agreement 
t o  pay him 20% of a l l  collection, The application was re- 
viewed on April 11, 1942, by * * *  [A] a s  examiner."  27 
. 
In August of 1942, when Mr. Nomura was in residence a t  the Tule 
Lake Relocation Center, he was v i s i t ed  by Mr. B, who gave him a release 
and discharge of power of attorney, saying t h a t  M r .  Nomura no longer 
needed such services. However two weeks l a t e r  Mr. B. returned t o  Tule 
Lake with C,  Liquidator of the Sumitomo Bank.  M r .  B assured M r .  Nomura 
t h a t  M r .  C was a very "reliable"  man and t h a t  other Japanese companies 
were employing him t o  handle t h e i r  businesses. M r .  B t o ld  M r .  Nomura 
t h a t  he would do well t o  give Mr. C power of attorney. Fearful of offend- 
ing o f f i c i a l s  of the United Sta tes  Government, Mr, Nomura did a s  he was 
told. 
"Two items in connection with * * *  [C's]  handling deserve 
mention: * * *  [He]  soldNomura's automobile e i ther  t o  him- 
se l f  or to * * *  [B].
 
Before the sale ,  he had the car  re- 
paired a t  Nomura's expense (about $70.00) then sold the 
car  fo r  $750.00 and then took 20% of tha t  sum or  $155.00 
as  h i s  c o m m i s s i o n  (0ct. 16, 1942). 
"On February 2, 1943, * * *  [C]   drew $407.42 which sum r e p -  
resented a  'collection' from the Garden City Investment 
Company. This was merely the t ransfer  of the sum of about 
$2,000 from the Garden City account t o  Nomura's account. 
* * *  [C]  had already collected a fee of 15% of a larger  
sum including the $2,000 item when he sold the 
building f o r  the Garden City Investment Company." 27 
A report  of l a t e r  date,  November 15, 1944, from the project at- 
torney of Central Utah Relocation Center, where M r .  Nomura was l iv ing  
a t  t ha t  time, carried fur ther  d e t a i l s  of the Garden City Investment 
Company sale. 
"  * * * Here the power of attorney was dated August 22, 1942, 
to * * *  [C]  and the commission specified 15%. Property 
l e f t  i n  h i s  care was appraised a t  $12,000 i n  November 1942. 
On November 14, 1942, * * *  [C]  reported the place destroyed 
by f i r e ,  not i n  writing but by telephone. He thereupon sold 
the  property fo r  $3,000, including a l l  machinery, t o  an un- 
known through Escrow 137744 San Jose Abstract Company. The 
buyer then promptly resold t o  Angelo Tersini, 220 Ryland St., 
6. i s  sorry but thought San Jose, f o r  $8500. M r .  *  * *  [C] 
he had a r igh t  t o  use h i s  best  judgment." 28 
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On August 11, 1945, t h e  Director  of WRA addressed t h e  Director  of  
t h e  Foreign Funds Control Division of t h e  Treasury Department, by l e t t e r ,  
enclosing t h e  two r e p o r t s  on t h e  Nomura case prepared by t h e  p ro jec t  at-  
to rney ' s  o f f i c e  a t  Central  Utah, and asking f o r  an inves t igat ion.  The 
Director  mentioned t h a t  he had informed t h e  Alien Property Custodian of  
t h e  statements i n  the  repor ts .  On September 18, 1945, t h e  Acting Direc- 
t o r  of Foreign Funds Control r ep l i ed  t o  t h e  Director  of WRA a s  follows: 
"Reference i s  made t o  your l e t t e r  of August 11, 1945, 
enclosing two r e p o r t s  which make c e r t a i n  charges respect- 
i n g  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of former Treasury Repersentatives,  
"We very  much apprecia te  your sending t h i s  information 
t o  us,  We f ind ,  however, t h a t  a number of the  charges 
contained i n  t h e  repor t s  a r e  unfounded. 
"Shortly a f t e r  *  *  *   [ B ' s ]  res igna t ion  i n  April 1942, 
from h i s  pos i t ion  a s  Treasury Representative, we under- 
took an extensive inves t iga t ion  which, among other  
th ings ,  es tabl ished t o  our s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  n e i t h e r  he 
nor h i s  c o l l e a g u e ,  *  *  *   [ A ] ,  had s o l i c i t e d  t h e  busi- 
ness  with * * *  [K. Nomura] and o the r  Japanese nat ionals ,  
and t h a t  both had acted i n  good f a i t h ,  although i n  a 
manner not  i n  accord with Treasury policy. We took 
immediate remedial s t e p s  t o  discontinue * * *  [B's]   ac- 
t i v i t i e s  i n  behalf of t h e  Japanese, permit t ing him t o  
receive  c e r t a i n  compensation f o r  services  a l ready  
performed , 
"During  the investigation, it may be noted, Nomura stated 
i n  a signed statement t h a t  he had approached * * *  [B] 
v o l u n t a r i l y  and t h a t  *  *  *   [ B ]   had i n  no way used h i s  
pos i t ion  a s  Treasury Representative i n  obtaining Nomura's 
power-of-attorney, It might a l s o  be mentioned t h a t  p r i o r  
t o  *  *  *   [ B ' s ]  enter ing i n t o  agreements with Japanese 
na t iona l s ,  he and a number of o ther  Treasury employees 
had been advised t h a t  t h e i r  employment by t h e  Department 
would soon be termintated." 
The Case of M r .  Hideo Mori* 
This case i s  bes t  described i n  Mr. Mori's own words, from a l e t t e r  
which he wrote t o  t h e  Director  of WRA on November 2, 1945, from P a r l i e r ,  
California--in t h e  San Joaquin Valley. 
Name f i c t i t i o u s  
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"1 wrote t o  the  Project  Director of the  Gila River 
Relocation Center and was referred t o  you f o r  fur ther  
ac t ion  and information. 
"I am an a l i e n  and own a ranch, purchased p r io r  t o  the  
passage of the Alien Land Law [i.e., p r io r  t o  1 9 1 3 ]  in 
Winters, California-Yolo-Solano Co. Because I was 
forewarned of the  public sentiment there,  I temporarily 
relocated here, and from here made t r i p s  t o  Winters t o  
personally determine the  prevail ing conditions there,  
"During my years i n  camp, I rented the ranch t o  l o c a l  
Spaniards. They milked it for  a l l  it was worth, never 
bothering t o  keep up nor improve it, knowing t h a t  during 
the  term of t h e i r  l ease  no one would come t o  inspect 
t h e i r  work. Though the e n t i r e  ranch was supramarginal 
during the years of the  war, ce r ta in  portions t h a t  were 
poorer than others were t o t a l l y  abandoned. The r e s u l t  
i s  t h a t  t he  productivity of the ranch i s  now but a 
f r ac t ion  of i ts  f u l l  potent ia l ,  thereby making it a 
poor prospect f o r  s a l e  o r  lease. 
When I was evacuated, I was to ld  t o  leave a l l  equipment 
necessary t o  the  operation of the  ranch on the  ranch o r  
stand possible charges of sabotage, so I had l e f t  them. 
Now, what remains a r e  only those t h a t  a re  old and useless;  
a l l  the  other pieces t h a t  I had a c c u m u l a t e d  during my 
t h i r t y  years of farming a r e  gone. Even such things a s  
water faucets have been stolen,  a s  well  a s  household 
equipment and personal property which I had stored i n  a 
c loset ,  the  door of which I had locked. Were I t o  r e tu rn  
t o  again operate my ranch, I would require a greater 
i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  than I could possibly command a t  my 
disposal. 
"Besides the negligence i n  t he  care of the  ranch, there  i s  
a l s o  the  negligence i n  t he  care of the buildings. Not on ly  
a r e  there  broken windows and broken doors and broken cabi- 
nets,  but a lso there  are  n a i l s  and boards nailed randomly 
on the  walls. And around the  buildings grass has grown so 
thickly t h a t  a f i r e  a half mile away could eas i ly  reach and 
destroy the buildings. 
"I have been informed by various WRA o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  I must 
stand the losses  myself: t h a t  the  WRA i s  powerless i n  
t h i s  issue; t h a t  i f  I chose t o  I could bring a law s u i t  
against  those who rented my ranch, the  success of such a s u i t  
being admittedly very poor though the evidence be substantial .  
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"We were evacuated a s  a w a r t i m e  measure. And as  a r e su l t  
of t h i s  evacuation we suffered losses from negligence 
t h a t  borders on sabotage and looting such a s  can be 
associated with ransacking hordes of an invading  army. 
Is it not only f a i r  tha t  r e s t i t u t ion  fo r  such losses in- 
curred a s  a r e su l t  of t h i s  evacuation-proper r e s t i t u t ion  
t o  put us back on the economic s t a tus  from which we were 
forced--be t reated by a measure a s  forceful  as  our 
evacuation? 
On November 9, 1945, the following l e t t e r  prepared fo r  the Direc- 
t o r ' s  signature went t o  _Mr. Mori: 
"This i s  i n  reply t o  your l e t t e r  of November 2, 1945, 
concerning the damage done t o  your ranch i n  Winters, 
California, during your absence. 
"I was deeply disturbed t o  learn of t h i s  damage, and of 
the consequent d i f f i c u l t i e s  t o  be encountered by you in 
restor ing the ranch t o  i ts  former l eve l  of productivity. 
"The War Relocation Authority does not have the authority, 
however, t o  make r e s t i tu t ion  for  losses tha t  may have been 
incurred by individuals a s  a r e su l t  of the evacuation, nor 
does any other Federal agency have such authority. Spe- 
c i a l  leg is la t ion  would be required t o  give responsibi l i ty  
and funds for  t h i s  purpose t o  an agency, and t o  our know- 
ledge no such leg is la t ion  is being considered by the 
Congress. You may, of course, bring s u i t  against your 
former tenants, and a competent attorney there would be i n  
the  best position t o  advise you i n  regard t o  the advisa- 
b i l i t y  of in s t i tu t ing  such l ega l  action." 
Evacuee Farms i n  the Florin Area 
The Florin area--near Sacramento i n  the lower Sacramento Valley 
of California-was reclaimed from waste land or i n  some instances hay 
land t o  use i n  vineyard and berry culture largely  through the labor and 
skill of Japanese immigrants i n  the ear ly days of t h i s  century. A t  the 
outbreak of World War II, t h i s  area was s t i l l  populated principally by 
Japanese American farmers, most of whom owned the i r  land. In  general 
the  individual farms varied from 15 t o  50 acres, the s ize of the farm 
depending somewhat upon the s ize of the farmer's family, as  the neces- 
s a r y  l a b o r  was in most instances performed by members of the family. 
From the average farmer's point of view, the Florin d i s t r i c t  i s  
not a t t r ac t ive  country. The s o i l  i s  shallow, varying from 12 inches-- 
o r  even less-to 48 inches i n  depth, with hardpan or  dense clay subsoil 
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l aye r s  underneath. I r r i g a t i o n  has been e s s e n t i a l  t o  production of all 
crops produced by the  Japanese, and t he  average cos t  per acre  of i r r i ga -  
t i o n  f o r  grapes has run $6 per ac re  fo r  t h e  e l e c t r i c  power t o  u t i l i z e  
t h e  deep wel ls  which a r e  e s sen t i a l  t o  a l l  farms i n  t h i s  d i s t r i c t .  In  
d r y  years the  cost  runs above t h a t  f igure .  Because of t he  shallowness 
of t h e  s o i l  and t h e  need of frequent i r r i ga t i on ,  i n  s p i t e  of t o i l  and 
ingenuity of t he  farmers, the yie ld  of Tokay grapes t o  t h e  acre i n  t he  
F lor in  a rea  i s  about three  tons, an average f a r  below t h a t  of more fa- 
vored areas,  f o r  ins tance Lodi, i n  t h e  same general section of the  val- 
ley .  Up t o  t he  time of t h e  evacuation, t he  Japanese American farmer, by 
working  very hard and u t i l i z i n g  family labor,  could hope t o  have above 
cos t s  of production and s t r ippings ,  approximately $32 per ac re  a t  t h e  
end of the  harvest. Out of t h i s  sum he had t o  pay taxes,  i n t e r e s t  on a 
mortgage perhaps, and repa i r  or replace  equipment. In order t o  g e t  
along, these  farmers augmented t h a t  basic income from vineyards by grow- 
i ng  o ther  crops simultaneously. They discovered t h a t  strawberries 
planted between t he  rows of grapes did well  and subs t an t i a l l y  supple- 
mented t h e  income from the  grapes. Many of the  farmers grew ce r t a in  
t ruck  crops, too. They learned t h a t  a modest p r o f i t  could be made from 
t h i s  uninvi t ing land--if enough work and skill were lavished upon it. 
The evacuation occurred a t  t h e  height of t h e  strawberry season. 
Unless the  owners harvested a l l  or most of t h e i r  crops, they  l o s t  t h e i r  
only  chance of ge t t ing  immediate cash. When exclusion orders were 
posted f o r  t h a t  area  and the heads of families reported t o  t h e  control  
s t a t i o n  f o r  processing, they were t o ld  t h a t  they  should u t i l i z e  the  week 
t h a t  remained before t h e  enforced departure t o  gather up t h e i r  personal 
and household goods and s t o r e  them i n  some cen t r a l  place o r ,  i f  none 
should be available,  i n  a Government warehouse. I f  t h e  strawberries 
were t o  be harvested, the re  was no time t o  f i l l  out forms itemizing the  
possessions and t o  c r a t e  and handle them. Therefore, a f t e r  working up 
t o  t he  l a s t  possible minute, t he  farmers boxed up what t hey  could of 
t h e i r  furnishings and equipment and stored the  l o t  i n  a room of t he  
farmhouse, o r  perhaps i n  a shed or  garage on t he  farm, turned the key 
i n  t he  lock, and went t o  the  railway s t a t i on  f o r  entrainment, hoping 
f o r  t h e  best .  For weeks, i n  most cases, these  farms were t o  a l l  appear- 
ances aband oned . 
Not many of the  Japanese American farmers had been able  t o  f ind 
operators  wi l l ing t o  take over t h e i r  land. A few made  deals  with 
neighboring farmers of other races  t o  continue production, with a con- 
t r a c t  s t i pu l a t i ng  the  owner's share of the  s e l l i n g  pr ice  of t h e  crop. 
Others t r u s t f u l l y  made verbal  agreements with tenants  whereby the tenant 
continued production and gave a designated share t o  t he  owner--providing 
t h a t  t h e  tenant considered an o r a l  agreement binding. The untenanted 
farms became f o r  a time the  r e spons ib i l i t y  of t h e  Farm Security Admin- 
istration. In January of 1943 t he  WRA evacuee proper ty  supervisor f o r  
t h e  Sacramento distr ict-he had been working a t  t h e  time of t h e  
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evacuation with t h e  Wartime Farms Adjustment Program within FSA-re- 
ported a s  follows: 
" A t  t he  time of evacuation t he  Farm Secur i ty  Administra- 
t i o n  attempted t o  secure substitute operators f o r  t he  
ranches and met with l i t t l e  success. It was almost im- 
possible  t o  secure operators t o  farm these  ranches i n  
t h e  way t h a t  t he  Japanese had done. Consequently the  
strawberry acreage dropped from approximately 1600 acres  
t o  probably l e s s  than 200 acres. However, i n  t he  case 
of Tokay grapes, a l l  farms which d id  not have individual  
operators were taken over by t h e  various operation cor- 
porations, which corporations were formed by the  var ious  
f r u i t  shipping companies located i n  t h i s  area. There was 
only about a one-half normal crop t h i s  year and labor  was 
very d i f f i c u l t  t o  obtain. This method of operation could 
not continue without Government financing and most of 
them show a d e f i c i t  on t h e i r  books fo r  t h e  past  year 's  
operation.
"From a recent  survey by t he  Evacuee Property Division, 
it appears a t  the  time t h i s  repor t  i s  being wr i t t en  t h a t  
the re  w i l l  be very close t o  f i f t y  or  more of these  ranches 
without operators. The other ones have been, or  a re  i n  
t he  process of being, sold o r  leased t o  Caucasian operators." 29 
Grape production was dwindling, too, though not so conspicuously 
as the  strawberry industry.  The repor t  j u s t  quoted contained t he  infor- 
mation t h a t  a check-up made by t he  Sacramento County Agriculture Commis- 
sion--at t he  c lose  of 1942-showed t h a t  about  20 percent of t h e  vineyards in  
the  Flor in  a rea  had been pulled out since t he  evacuation. Mention was 
made of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  one of the  l a rge  f r u i t  shipping companies had 
pulled out 180 acres  of t h e i r  6 1 0 - a c r e  vineyard and planted t he  land 
with Ladino clover fo r  pasture. 
The type of farming, the  peculiar  skills and heavy t o i l  required 
t o  wring even a l i t t l e  p r o f i t  from the  land, the  general  confusion and 
bewilderment of t he  evacuees, and the  animosity with which many West 
Coast res iden ts  regarded the  Japanese Americans were a l l  f a c to r s  mili- 
t a t i n g  against  the  preservation of these  farms i n  the  absence of the  
owners .   To quote from another repor t  o f  t he  WRA evacuee property super- 
v i sor  : 
" I t  might be wel l  t o  note here t h a t  i n  several  areas ,  and t h e  
F lor in  area i n  par t i cu la r ,  the  t r a i n  i n  which the  evacuees 
were leaving had not l e f t  before people from various p a r t s  
of t h e  country began t o  p i l f e r  t h e i r  homes and ranches, 
breaking windows, f i l l i n g  wells with debris ,  and committing 
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other  a c t s  of vandalism. The County Sher i f f  was unable t o  do anything about t h i s  *  *  *  . "  3O 
The corporations formed t o  take over groups of farms t h a t  a t  the  
time of evacuation had no other  operation planned developed sho r t l y  
a f t e r  the  owners had been moved i n t o  assembly centers.  The farms oper- 
a ted  by these  corporations l a y  close together, and thus were isola ted,  
only  an occasional Caucasian-owned o r  -leased piece of property in te r -  
rupt ing a so l i d  block of Japanese-owned farms. Ultimately 125 farms in 
t h i s  area  were taken over by t he  corporations. Having no tenants  i n  
residence, being i so la ted ,  a n d  being deserted when t h e  working day was 
ended, such farms and the  buildings upon them offered i d e a l  opportunit ies 
t o  vandals and thieves  t o  commit nuisance undetected. A t  t he  request  of 
the  WRA evacuee property supervisor t he  corporations agreed t o  h i r e  a 
night  watchman t o  pa t ro l  t he  area. This p rac t ice  continued u n t i l  t he  
l a s t  harvests  were i n  i n  t he  f a l l  of 1942, and during t h a t  period there  
were no fu r the r  a c t s  of depredation. However, by January of 1943, t h e  
property o f f i c e r  reported: 
"The corporations a r e  now through w i t h t h e i r  pas t  season's 
operations and a r e  cancell ing t h e i r  leases.  This vandalism 
i s  reappearing and w i l l  probably become more acute than 
before. This w i l l  be a d i f f i c u l t  s i t ua t i on  t o  handle now 
with no one on the  ranches and these  farms a r e  ra ther  iso- 
l a t e d  from close  neighbors who might be able  t o  s top any- 
one from causing waste and damage to  evacuee property. 
"The present p r o b l e m  t o  decide what i s  t o  be done t o  
handle the  f i f t y  or  more Japanese owned farms i n  Flor in  
which a r e  facing p a r t i a l  abandonment." 29 
Most of t he  farms were kept i n  p a r t i a l  operation throughout t h e  
remaining par t  of t h e  exclusion period. A s  time went on the  lumber, 
house f i x t u r e s  and plumbing p a r t s  became increas ingly  hard t o  obtain,  
t h e  s p i r i t  which had governed t h e  e a r l i e r  depredations, t he  a t t i t u d e  of 
des t ruc t ion  f o r  des t ruc t ion ' s  sake, changed. Night ra iders ,  who had 
descended upon abandoned farm houses t o  smash boxes of stored dishes  and 
t o  break up stored furni ture ,  now went w i t h a view t o  appropriating any- 
th ing which t h e i r  own establishments might lack. Evacuee possessions of 
e a s i l y  movable nature had long s ince  been wrecked o r  s to len,  but  doors 
could be removed and carried away f o r  use i n  t h e  marauders' own houses, 
window frames were u t i l i z ed ,  sinks were appropriated, t o i l e t s  were up- 
rooted and carr ied away, and bui l t - in  shelves were taken apar t  and the  
boards taken away. 
In March of 1945, when t he  o r ig ina l  owners were beginning t o  re- 
t u r n  t o  t h e i r  farms i n  t h i s  d i s t r i c t ,  the  WRA Historian v i s i t e d  Flor in  
and inspected many of t he  evacuee farms. The charred ru ins  of t h e  Fumi 
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Mukai Fujimoro ranch house and barn, destroyed in a mysterious night f i r e  
i n  t h e  owner's absence, were ugly testimony of t he  h o s t i l i t y  of c e r t a in  
elements t o  t h e  Government-authorized r e tu rn  of the  ex i les .  The f i r e  
occurred j u s t  a f t e r  t h e  Takeoka brothers had returned t o  t h e i r  property 
across  the  road from the  Fujimoro place. Viewing the  remains of t h e i r  
former neighbor's farm buildings, the  Takeoka brothers decided t h a t  
Flor in  was unfriendly and t h a t  they had b e t t e r  leave. A s  they were 
dr iving away, completely discouraged by t h i s  incident,  they  were in ter-  
cepted by t h e  WRA evacuee property supervisor; he talked t o  them f o r  
some time, pointing out t h a t  these   cowardly  acts  were a desperate a t -  
tempt t o  f r i gh t en  away t h e  f i r s t  evacuees t o  re turn ,  and t h a t  courage t o  
face these  pioneering hazards u n t i l  more of t h e  evacuee farmers returned 
would be worth the  e f fo r t .  The Takeokas by proving t h a t  they could re- 
main would encourage others  t o  jo in  them, and when  half  a dozen adjoin- 
ing farms were occupied by t h e i r  owners, night  t e r r o r i s t s  would h e s i t a t e  
t o  a t t ack ,  whereas they could be bold when only one inhabited farm i n  an 
i so la ted  d i s t r i c t  l a y  before them. The Takeokas turned around and re- 
sumed cont ro l  of t h e i r  property. 
Frank Umida returned t o  h i s  farm t o  find t h a t  a l l  doors and w i n -  
dows were missing from h i s  house and t h a t  an enterpr is ing r a ide r  had 
t h r i f t i l y  taken up t h e  floorboards and made of f  with them. Mr. Umida 
moved i n  with r e l a t i ve s ,  who had been for tunate  enough t o  have a tenant 
t o  look a f t e r  t h e i r  home during t h e i r  absence, u n t i l  he could construct  
temporary quar ters  f o r  h i s  family, ingeniously put t ing up a u n i t  of war- 
time housing under t he  roof of an old barn. 
Invariably t h e  returning farmers reported t h a t  t h e i r  land had 
suffered from neglect  of vines, l ack  of knowledge of peculiar  trimming 
and t r a i n i n g  of t he  Tokays if these  grapes were t o  produce i n  shallow 
s o i l  and be sheltered from the sun, and t he  unwillingness of subs t i t u t e  
operators t o  perform the  tedious labor  necessary t o  strawberry produc- 
tion. Whereas t he r e  had been 1,600  acres of strawberries in t h e  d i s t r i c t  
a t  t h e  time of evacuation, the re  remained  30 acres  i n  t h e  spring of 1945. 
Farm equipment and machinery had been worn down badly by ca re less  hand- 
l i n g  and a l so  by t he  heavy use t o  which it was put in a day when farm 
machinery was a t  a premium. The men who had returned were resourceful  
farmers and were f igur ing out ways t o  overcome t h e  damge t o  t h e i r  
hab i tua l  crops. They sa id  t h a t  by ro t a t i on  of other crops, by experi- 
ment ing ,  by working a l i t t l e  harder, they could ge t  along-it was good 
t o  be home again, even i f  they had t o  s t a r t  out once again a s  they had. 
years ago when they had taken over unimproved o r  hay land and made it 
productive. 
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damaged things. Nothing was untouched. Sewing machines 
were ruined, furni ture  broken, mirrors smashed t o  smith- 
ereens, broken glass  from breakable a r t ic les ,  household 
goods scattered helter-skelter, trunks broken beyond re- 
pair ,  albums, pictures precious only t o  the respective 
owners, thrown t o  the four winds. Standing among t h i s  
debris of disreverent damage--my heart  was f u l l  of unwept 
t e a r s  and compassion fo r  the  people who t rus t ingly  stored 
t h e i r  valuables and treasured household belongings. These 
things were a l l  careful ly  packed and separated and divided 
in to  two categories * * * necessi t ies  of l i f e  * * * and 
keepsakes. While surveying the irremediable damage, I 
noticed tha t  th ings  of in t r ins i c  worth were what the 
plunderers were searching for  and any things tha t  could be 
converted in to  immediate cash were taken and the residue 
abandoned regardless of value and preciousness, Elec t r ic  
irons, sewing machines, refr igerators ,  washing machines, 
radios, Persian rugs, typewriters, were systematically 
filched-not one box went by unscathed * * *. 
"Through days and nights of endless separating, dividing, 
segregating merchandise t o  the r i g h t f u l  owners, my only 
thought was how was I t o  face these unhappy people again 
and report  t h e i r  losses  tha t  money could never buy again. 
Things t h a t  we did gather up careful ly  were not so much 
of monetary value but f o r  sentimental reasons dear t o  the 
owners' hear ts  only. T h e  other things--Those t h a t  had 
been stolen--were things needed t o  carry on i n  the future 
the necessi t ies  of l i f e .  * * *" 
Vandalism i n  Guadalupe, California: Today's Fish Market 
In the spring of 1944 the  Transportation Section of the Evacuee 
Property Division of WRA, acting on a request from an evacuee t h a t  cer- 
t a i n  personal property of h i s  should be shipped t o  him, sent a repre- 
sentative t o  a building known a s  "Today's Fish Market," i n  Guadalupe, 
where several evacuees had stored t h e i r  personal property. The WRA man 
discovered t h a t  the place had been ransacked, and he immediately re- 
ported the  matter t o  the Evacuee Property Division. WRA made an in- 
vestigation on April 17, 1944. The second f loor  of t h i s  building had 
contained a large amount of personal property. A l l  trunks and boxes 
had been broken in to  and ransacked; clothing, furniture,  household goods 
and spl intered crates  were strewn about. The investigation took place 
i n  the presence of Deputy Sheriffs Bidwell and Oxford of Guadalupe, and 
pictures were taken. A t  the she r i f f ' s  of f ice  i n  Guadalupe, t h e  WRA in- 
vest igators  found a report  dated February 20, 1943, which s tated tha t  
Fred Shaffer had reported t o  the  she r i f f ' s  office tha t  the building had 
been broken into. The report  did not indicate t h a t  the sher i f f ' s  off ice 
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had made any attempt, in the 14 -month period between the date of the  re- 
port  and t h e  WRA discovery of the  s i tua t ion ,  t o  communicate e i t he r  with 
the  owner of t he  building or  with any governmental agency with a view 
t o  ending such ac t s  of depredation, 
Di f f icu l t ies  of Peter Tsuchiyama* i n  h i s  Dealings with 
Caucasian Operators on h i s  Poultry Farm a t  Downey, California 
A t  the  time of evacuation Peter  Tsuchiyama, of Downey, California, 
leased h i s  poultry ranch t o  J. Early in 1943 Mr. J informed Mr. 
Tsuchiyama t h a t  he could no longer operate the  ranch with prof i t  and 
recommended a new lease  t o  K and L. Mr. Tsuchiyama agreed. A t  t he  time 
of the  change i n  lease ,  and, according t o  Mr. J ' s  statement, Mr.  J with 
Mr .  Tsuchiyama's knowledge,removed two brooders from the  Tsuchiyama 
property fo r  use on h i s  own property, There followed a somewhat heated 
correspondence between M r .  J and Mr. Tsuchiyama about the  brooders and 
ce r t a in  other matters, u n t i l  Mr. J ' s  attorney, Mr. M, wrote t o  Mr. 
Tsuchiyama, ins t ruc t ing  the  l a t t e r  t o  address a l l  future  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
t o  M. 
A t  some period in 1943 a windstorm blew the  tarpaper from three 
of t he  l a rge r  buildings on the Tsuchiyama property. The payment of the 
c o s t  of t h i s  roofing repa i r  job became an i ssue  between tenants and 
owner. WRA served as arbitrator-in the  absence of any provision i n  
the  lease  t o  cover a wind storm loss-recommending t h a t  the owner and 
the  lessee  s p l i t  the  cost  of the repa i r  work. 
By November 19, 1943, the ren t  was f i ve  months i n  arrears.  On 
January 8, 1944, the residence on the  poultry farm burned t o  the  ground, 
and with it the  household goods of M r .  Tsuchiyama. There was no insur- 
ance, and the cause of the  f i r e  remained a mystery. 
On April 17, 1944, a man t o  be known as  N telephoned the W R A  
property off ice  i n  Los Angeles tha t  he would henceforward operate the 
chicken farm alone, a s  s u b l e s s e e  t o  L, who was leaving. He a l so  in- 
formed WRA t h a t  he was taking over operation of the poultry farm because 
of a b i l l  f o r  chicken feed which M r .  L was e i ther  unwilling or  unable 
t o  pay. Mr. N was in the  feed business. 
In a l e t t e r  of May 6, 1944, Mr. Tsuchiyama informed WRA tha t  he 
would henceforward handle t h i s  matter himself. Rent continued delin- 
quent, a s  it had been since Mr. J moved o f f  the premises with the  
brooders. By October 26, 1944, the  delinquent rent amounted t o  $900. 
While there  was evidence t h a t  a par t  of t h i s  sum had been spent. on re- 
pairs ,  Mr. L s teadfas t ly  ignored Tsuchiyama's request fo r  an accounting. 
* Fic t i t i ous  name 
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On November 27, 1944, Mr. N reported t h e f t  and vandalism a t  the chicken 
farm. On December 4, 1944, Mr. L announced t h a t  he was f i l i n g  s u i t  
against  N and would turn over any amount collected by way of judgment 
against  the delinquent account. The s u i t  was f i l e d  on December 27, 1944, 
and apparently forgotten. 
January 5, 1945, L's attorney, 0, telephoned the Los Angeles of- 
f i c e  of WRA t h a t ,  i n  view of the l i f t i n g  of the  ban against  the  evacuees, 
L would cancel the  lease  and was so informing Tsuchiyama by mail. A t  
t h i s  time the lessees  owed M r .  Tsuchiyama well  over $1000 i n  ren t  and 
there was a considerable quant i ty  of equipment missing, No accounting 
had ever been rendered Mr. Tsuchiyama. 
Ear ly  i n  March of 1945 a newcomer i n  the tangle telephoned WRA, 
ident i fying himself a s  a minister, and said t ha t  a t  the  request of M r .  
Tsuchiyama he was going t o  attempt t o  s e t t l e  amicably the  differences 
between the various lessees  and Tsuchiyama. The attempt fa i led.  Mr. 
Tsuchiyama thereupon employed attorneys t o  f i l e  s u i t ,  31 
The f i n a l  word available on t h i s  confused matter came i n  a l e t t e r  
from the  Los Angeles a rea  supervisor of W R A ,  dated November 21, 1945: 
''There seems t o  be a l e g a l  question a s  t o  whether 'or not 
Messrs. L and K sublet from Mr. J or  whether they 
entered in to  an e n t i r e l y  new lease,  J contends t h a t  he 
acted a s  an agent. He executed an assignnent of h i s  lease. 
Tsuchiyama contends, through h i s  present attorney, t h a t  he 
accepted the assignnent fo r  r en t a l  payments only and t h a t  
J was not released from any of the  other provisions. 
"It i s  our understanding t h a t  M r ,  K i s  s t i l l  about and i s  
f u l l y involved. It i s  a l so  our understanding t h a t  when 
the  attorneys * * * took l e g a l  act ion on Tsuchiyama's
behalf they enjoined a l l  par t ies ,  namely, J, K, L  and N. 
Furthermore they had the four defendants together a t  the  
same time f o r  a conference but were unable t o  work out a 
sa t i s fac tory  amicable settlement. A t  t h i s  date only two 
of the  defendants have answered the complaint and the date  
of the t r i a l  has not been set .  It is the opinion of the  
attorneys t h a t  a l l  four defendants a r e  f inanc ia l ly  
responsible. " 33 
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The Case of Nobu Miyamoto* of Sea t t l e  
P r io r  t o  the  evacuation, M r .  Miyamoto was a prosperous green- 
house and nursery operator, conducting h i s  business on h i s  own land i n  
Sea t t le .  The nursery was operated i n  a plant  comprising about 15,000 
square f e e t  under glass. I n  addit ion t o  the  nursery the land had a 
l a rge  house and a small house and various small outbuildings and sheds, 
Mr. Miyamoto dea l t  i n  cut flowers, potted and bedding plants,  green- 
house cucumbers and tomatoes. Before entraining f o r  the  Puyallup As- 
sembly Center, the  Miyamotos stored a l l  t h e i r  more valuable personal 
property i n  t he  small house and locked the  building securely. They l e f t  
the  en t i r e  property i n  the  custody of an old f r iend and family adviser, 
an attorney, This attorney, an aged man of good will but poor health,  
was unfortunately not capable of giving su f f i c i en t  a t ten t ion  t o  the  
Miyamoto property. In f ac t  he made neither regular  nor i r regular  
inspections. 
In the  spring of 1945, a f t e r  t he  resciss ion of the  exclusion 
orders, t h e  Miyamotos returned t o  t h e i r  old home. 
"* * * they found t h a t  t h i s  [the small] house had been
 completely emptied of the goods they had l e f t  there  and 
t h a t  it had been rented t o  an i t i ne ran t  war worker for  
some time. Many of the items of furn i ture  l e f t  i n  the  
house were a l so  found t o  be missing. The greenhouse 
property i t s e l f  was i n  such s t a t e  t ha t  it could not be 
operated due t o  broken glass, s tolen motors, s to len  and 
broken pumps, missing pipes, missing par t s  and missing 
too l s  which a re  necessary for  the operation of such an 
enterprise.  It was only a f t e r  Mr. Miyamoto had secured 
new l e g a l  representation t h a t  the  tenant was evicted 
from the  small house, thus giving him [Mr. Miyamoto] a 
place i n  which t o  l i ve ,  but r e s t i t u t i o n  of missing 
property s t i l l  remains t o  be accomplished. The t o t a l  
value of t h i s  property i s  s e t  by Mr. Miyamoto a t  an 
estimated $10,000. Detailed l is ts  of missing items i n  
our f i l e s  mention such a r t i c l e s  a s  carpenter tools $125, 
plumber too ls  $275, flower shop materials $350, while 
one trunk alone contained the f i n e s t  of Japanese f ab r i c s  
valued a t  over $1500 a s  well  a s  a diamond r ing  valued 
a t  $1500," 34 
M r .  Miyamoto had l e f t  ins t ruct ions  with t h e  attorney t h a t  under 
no circumstances was the small house t o  be entered or molested i n  any 
way. 
* Fic t i t i ous  name 
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The Case of Kenneth Kitasako* 
Mr .  Kitasako, a master craftsman, arranged with a Mr.  P f o r  t h e  
storage of h i s  personal property-including a s e t  of t oo l s  valued a t  
$1,000--in a room on the  t h i r d  f l oo r  of t h e  Pioneer Building in Seat t le .  
In September of 1943 Mr. P reported t o  t h e  WRA of f i ce  t h a t  t he  room i n  
which M r .  Kitasako's  possessions had been s tored had been broken into.  
The WRA representa t ive  v i s i t e d  t he  room, made a repor t  and reboxed t h e  
remaining property. M r .  P died,  and the  management of t h e  building  was 
assumed by a M r .  Q. M r .  Q disappeared from t h e  c i t y ,  and t he  management 
passed t o  a th i rd  man. 
When Mr. Kitasako was preparing t o  r e tu rn  t o  Sea t t l e ,  he  request- 
ed WRA t o  inves t iga te  t he  contents of t h e  property stored i n  t he  Pioneer 
Buildinq, and it was discovered t h a t  the  room had again been entered and 
r i f l e d .  Household items had been taken from trunks and boxes and thrown 
about t h e  room, and t he  thousand-dollar t o o l  s e t  was missing. The 
building manager reported t h a t  t he  p i l f e r i ng  had been reported t o  t h e  
po l ice  but  t h a t  no ac t ion  had been taken. He informed the  WRA repre- 
s en t a t i ve  t h a t  a l i v ing  room s e t  and a dining room s e t  of furni ture ,  
s tored by Mr. Kitasako i n  two other  rooms of t h e  building, were a l s o  
missing. It was reported t h a t  M r .  Q, t he  second i n  t h i s  s e r i e s  of 
building managers had absconded with $1,500 or  $2,000 belonging t o  a 
partnership composed of himself and another man. 
Arson on Vashon Island: The Case of the Miyoshi Brothers 
The Miyoshi family of Vashon Island,  Washington, were evacuated 
t o  Minidoka Relocation Center in Idaho.  They owned a well-insured home 
on Vashon Island, and i n  it they  had s to red  fu rn i tu re ,  clothing, and 
ag r i cu l t u r a l  equipment belonging t o  themselves and a l so  personal p r o p -  
e r t y  and ag r i cu l t u r a l  equipment belonging t o  four other  i s land evacuee 
famil ies .  Not long a f t e r  t h e  owners had been evacuated, the  insurance 
company cancelled t h e  insurance policy. Presumably because t he  property 
was not occupied, other insurance companies refused t o  grant coverage. 
From t h e  re loca t ion  center  Masaru and Glenn Miyoshi, t he  brothers who 
had t i t l e  t o  t h e  Vashon property, went i n t o  t he  Army and both were sent  
t o  t he  European thea t re ,  Masaru sustaining serious wounds i n  Italy.  
On February 1, 1945, before daylight ,  t he  Miyoshihouse on Vashon 
Island was burned t o  the  ground with complete l o s s  of a l l  property 
s tored therein .  It was es tabl ished before long t h a t  t he  f i r e  was of 
incendiary or igin .  The Seat t le  Times of February 28, 1945, carried t h e  
following item: 
F i c t i t i o u s  name  
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"A mysterious s e r i e s  of house f i r e s  on Vashon Island 
during the  past  two months was solved today when th ree  
Vashon youths admitted t o  Deputy Sheri f f  Louis Benard 
t h a t  t hey  s e t  f i r e  t o  several  vacant houses on the  
i s land  ' j u s t  f o r  the  t h r i l l . '  The youths, 16, 17 and 
22 years old, were a r res ted  yesterday and f r e e l y  
admitted t h e i r  pa r t  t o  Benard. "  
The 22-year-old pleaded g u i l t y  i n  the  superior court  of King 
County and was sentenced t o  pay a f ine  of $1,000. The other  two boys, 
a s  minors, were placed under t he  ju r i sd ic t ion  of t he  King County juvenile 
court. The boys and t h e i r  parents entered i n t o  wr i t t en  agreement t o  
make r e s t i t u t i o n  t o  the  Miyoshi brothers i n  t he  amount o f  $1,000 from 
each offender. The court  gave the  th ree  cu lp r i t s  the  opportunity of 
going i n t o  the  Merchant Marine and making payments out  of t h e i r  earnings. 
The 22-year-old boy acted upon the  suggestion, and a s  of November of 
1945, the  area  supervisor reported t h a t  a l l  offenders were up t o  date  on 
t h e i r  payments.34
The Case of Thomas Ishimoto* of S e a t t l e  
M r .  Ishimoto,  a t  the  time of evacuation, leased h i s  furnished 
residence i n  Sea t t l e  t o  Mr.  and Mrs, R, Mr. Ishimoto reserved one room 
of t h e  dwelling f o r  storage purposes, placing i n  the  room about $2,000 
worth of personal property including fu rn i tu re .  He locked t h i s  room and 
departed f o r  the  assembly center. Upon h i s  property there  was a l so  a 
greenhouse, which a Mr. S took over from Mr. Ishimoto a t  the  time of 
evacuation and continued t o  operate. 
In 1943, some time p r io r  t o  July  1, Mr.  Ishimoto's brother,  a s  a 
so ld i e r  i n  t he  United S ta tes  Army, was permitted t o  enter  the  evacuated 
area. He v i s i t e d  and inspected h i s  brother ' s  property i n  Sea t t l e ,  dis-  
covering t h a t  t h e  room reserved by h i s  brother f o r  storage of personal 
possessions had been broken i n to  and everything removed therefrom. The 
greenhouse operator informed the  owner's brother t h a t  M r .  R had been 
moving t he  missing a r t i c l e s  and much of the  fu rn i t u r e  from the  leased 
p a r t  of t h e  house away from the  premises. Mr .  S had questioned R about 
h i s  a c t i v i t i e s ,  but  R informed him t h a t  he was shipping the  property t o  
Mr. Ishimoto a t  t h e  Minidoka Relocation Center. However, M r .  Ishimoto 
had not made any request  t o  have h i s  property shipped t o  him, and no 
property ever reached him a t  t he  project .  By the  time t h a t  t h i s  discov- 
e r y  was made by Mr. Ishimoto's brother, R had disappeared. 
* F i c t i t i o u s  name 
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WRA f i l e s  show t h a t  R, a t  the  time of rent ing the  Ishimoto house, 
was an inspector a t  Boeing Aircraf t  Company. In September 1944 he was 
employed a s  a patrolman i n  t he  navy yard a t  Terminal Island,  California.  
I n  t h e  spring of 1945 when t he  ass i s tance  of the WRA of f i ce  was requested 
by Mr. Ishimoto, WRA reported the  disappearance of M r .  I s h i m o t o ' s  p r o p -  
e r t y  t o  t he  King County s h e r i f f ' s  o f f ice .  That o f f ice ,  however, has 
professed an i n a b i l i t y  t o  loca te  R. 
The Mismanagement of Mrs. Yano's Property  i n  S e a t t l e  
The Yanos leased and operated a s  a rooming house a building i n  
Sea t t l e .  A l l  t h e  fu rn i tu re  and furnishings i n  the  house were the  prop- 
e r t y  of the  Yanos. A t  the  time of e v a c u a t i o n  they l e f t  t h e i r  a f f a i r s  i n  
the hands of an agent, M r .  T, who shor t ly  acquired an operator f o r  them. 
On August 11, 1942, t h e  Yanos entered i n t o  a wr i t t en  agreement with t h i s  
man, Mr. U, who contracted t o  manage t h e  rooming house, no period of 
time being s e t  f o r  termination of the agreement, and t o  make a w r i t t e n  
f i nanc i a l  repor t  t o  the  Yanos before the  tenth  of each month of h i s  
managership. This repor t  was t o  show the  t o t a l  income from the  rooming 
house, l is t  t he  names of a l l  tenants ,  include a statement of any poss ib le  
delinquency in ren t  payment, and show an itemized account of any expend- 
i t u r e s  incurred, r e ce ip t s  and statements o r  invoices t o  be attached. It 
was s t ipu la ted  t h a t  a l l  money taken i n  from the  business was t o  be sub- 
mitted by U t o  t he  Yanos with the  report .  The Yanos, a f t e r  audit ing t he  
repor t  and paying any unpaid b i l l s ,  were t o  remit t o  U one-half the  net  
p r o f i t s  a s  compensation fo r  h i s  management and operation of the rooming 
house. 
In June of 1943 U submitted h i s  f i r s t  and l a s t  report ,  which 
covered the  months of February, March, April,  May and June of t h a t  year. 
With t he  repor t  he sent  the  Yanos about $80, which he said was the  
amount of p r o f i t  due the Yanos f o r  t he  5-month p e r i o d .  In t h i s  re-  
por t  he s t a t ed  t h a t  it had cost  him $20 t o  have water pumped out of t he  
basement and $30 t o  r e p a i r  a broken window. Mrs. Yano s ta ted t h a t  t he  
basement was equipped with a mechanical device which a u t o m t i c a l l y  
pumped water out  and t h a t  she did not believe t h e t  U made any such ex- 
penditure. In October of 1945 t h e  WRA representa t ive  v i s i t ed  the  prem- 
i s e s  and found t h a t  t he  same window reported a s  mended a t  a cos t  of $30 
was unmended. This v i s i t  was made  a t  the  request  of M r s .  Yano, who had 
returned t o  Sea t t l e .  It was discovered t h a t  a room reserved fo r  storage 
of Yano personal property had been r i f l e d  and much of the  goods removed. 
The more important missingitems were a sewing machine and a motor used 
t o  operate a large ,  commercial type of r e f r i ge r a to r ,  valuad by Mrs. Yano 
a t  $400. 
* F i c t i t i o u s  name 
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Great de te r io ra t ion  of t h e  property had taken place under U ' s  
management. The WRA i nves t iga tor  found  Mr. U i n  bed, apparently suffer- 
ing from a severe hangover and i n  unpleasant mood. M r .  U s t a t ed  t h a t  he 
had more important th ings  t o  do than prepare statements f o r  t he  Yanos 
but, on being assured t h a t  unless an accounting was submitted t o  Mrs, 
Yano very shor t ly ,  Mrs. Yano was prepared t o  procure an accounting 
through j ud i c i a l  proceedings, he promised t o  produce one. He s t a t e d  on 
t h i s  occasion t h a t  he was employed by  t h e  S e a t t l e  Trans i t  Company, 
The house had been sold e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  f a l l  t o  a woman who wanted 
t o  t ake  possession by November 27, and it was important t ha t  Mrs. Yano 
should s e l l  what remained of her  f u rn i t u r e  and have it out i n  time f o r  
t h e  new owner t o  move in.  Mrs. Yano hoped a l so  t o  ge t  some l e g a l  act ion 
t o  recover her vanished possessions and her  share of proceeds from the  
rooming house before M r .  U disappeared, 
A repor t  from t h e  area a t to rney  t o  t h e  So l i c i t o r ,  dated Novem- 
ber 2, 1945, contained the  information t h a t  t o  da te  U had been "unable 
t o  make any s o r t  of a s a t i s f ac to ry  accounting." Mrs. Yano i n  company 
with Mr. T, t he  f r i end  who had arranged f o r  U t o  operate the  rooming 
house, had consulted an attorney. A check  with t h e  Sea t t l e  Transi t  
Company revealed t he  fac t  t h a t  U had l e f t  i t s  employment on August 17, 
1944. In  view of t h e  amount of time U spent around t he  rooming house, 
it seemed improbable t h a t  he could be employed anywhere. Mrs. Yano and 
Mr .  T had discovered one of the  roomers who had seen U remove t he  ex- 
pensive motor from Mrs. Yano's commercial s i z e  re f r igera to r .    WRA strong- 
l y  advised criminal  prosecution, f o r  it seemed probable t h a t  even though 
U was without funds, criminal  act ion might r e t r i e v e  some of t h e  missing 
property.
The WRA area a t to rney  made an appointment f o r  Mrs. Yano and Mr. T 
with t he  prosecutor ' s  o f f i c e  with the  deputy prosecutor. The l a t t e r  
passed t h e  two on t o  t he  she r i f f ' s  o f f ice  t o  repor t  the  case. The 
s h e r i f f ' s  o f f i c e  refused t o  invest igate ,  saying it was a matter f o r  the 
c i t y  r a the r  than f o r  the  county t o  handle, and sending Mrs. Yano on t o  
t h e  c i t y  police department. After  hearing her s t o ry  the  pol ice  captain 
t o ld  her t h a t  there  was no bas i s  f o r  prosecution, but t h a t  she might 
take c i v i l  ac t ion  i n  the  case. Mrs. Yano mentioned t h a t  the re  was a 
witness t o  t he  t h e f t  of the  motor, but unfortunately it developed t h a t  
t h e  witness was so aged and feeble as t o  be unable t o  appear i n  court. 
Mrs. Yano returned from her many  interviews t o  repor t  t o  WRA. 
The WRA area a t to rney  cal led the  deputy prosecutor who sa id  t h a t  he had 
hoped t h a t  t he  police department would inves t iga te  the  case but t h a t  he 
could not force  such an invest igat ion.  The WRA at torney then cal led the  
pol ice  captain,  who a f t e r  m u c h  argument r e luc t an t l y  agreed t o  make an 
invest igat ion.  The deputy prosecutor prornised t o  prosecute i f  t he  
police invest igat ion produced suff ic ient ,  evidence. 
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With t h e  ass is tance of t h e  evacuee property off ice ,  Mrs. Yano 
sold her  remaining fu rn i t u r e  and had her  appl icat ion t o  t he  r en t  divi-  
s ion of OPA f o r  t h e  removal of her property by t he  purchaser approved, 
so  t h a t  the  fu rn i tu re  could be removed i n  time f o r  the  new owner of t h e  
house t o  take possession on the  date se t .  
The l a s t  word on t h e  Yano case came i n  e a r l y  December i n  a repor t  
to t he  S o l i c i t o r  from t h e  S e a t t l e  area  attorney: 
"I talked t h i s  week with [a] detect ive  * * *  of the  S e a t t l e  
Po l i ce  Depar tmen t  who merely informed me t h a t  the pawn shop 
d e t a i l  i s  continuing i t s  search f o r  items of property miss- 
ing from t h e  Yano rooming house. * * *   [ U ]   now admits t h a t  
he cannot produce su f f i c i en t  records t o  give an accounting 
of h i s  managership of t h e  rooming house. I have talked 
again t h i s  week with Mrs. Yano about f i l i n g  a c i v i l  s u i t  
agains t  him. Her at torney,   * * * has advised agalnst  
f i l i n g  such a s u i t  because it i s  obvious t h a t  *  *  *   [ U ]  has no 
property against  which a judgment could be levled.  Further- 
more, he has no job and therefore  no wages which could be 
garnisheed. Mrs. Yano herse l f  f e e l s  t h a t  a c i v i l  ac t ion 
would be t o  no avai l .  I am sor ry  t o  repor t  t h a t  any s a t i s -  
fac to ry  sett lement appears now t o  be impossible."  
CON CLUS I O N  
According t o  an e s t i m a t e  made by M r .  Russell  Robinson, WRA Chief 
of Evacuee Property, i n  1942, t h e  evacuated people l e f t  behind them 
about $200,000,000 worth of r ea l ,  personal and commercial property. It 
i s  known that l o s se s  have mounted t o  many mill ions of dol lars .  It i s  
known t h a t  many evacuees who had leaseholds upon farms have l o s t  them 
by t r ans f e r  t o  operators of other races during the years of exclusion. 
It was estimated by Adon P o l i  and Warren M. Engstrend, of t he  Bureau of 
Agricultural  Economics, U.S. Department of Agriculture, i n  the  f a l l  of 
1945 t h a t  whereas "farm ownership by Japanese amounted t o  about 30 per- 
cent of t h e i r  t o t a l  prewar farm operations, ownership t r ans f e r s  t o  non- 
evacuees during and a f t e r  evacuation has probably reduced these  f a r m  
ownership i n t e r e s t s  t o  l e s s  than a four th  of the  t o t a l  prewar Japanese 
land holdings, including leaseholds. This w i l l  amount t o  roughly 
60,000 acres  o r  l e s s  than 0.002 of a l l  of the  land in a l l  farms i n  the  
3 States .  "35 
The cases  which have been c i t ed  a r e  t yp i ca l  of t h e  kind of losses  
t h a t  t h e  evacuees a s  a whole suffered. Many l o s t  t h e i r  chance of  in- 
come and secur i ty  i n  t h e i r  old age through i n a b i l i t y  t o  keep up payments  
on insurance po l ic ies .  Others have l o s t  property through i n a b i l i t y  t o  
pay taxes. Individual losses  vary i n  amount from a few hundred t o  many 
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housand do l l a r s .  A t  t h e  time of t h i s  wri t ing,  l a t e  April of 1946, 
t h e r e  i s  no Federal law under which claims of people su f fe r ing  property 
l o s s  and damage because of a Government-ordered evacuation could be paid 
by the  Government. However, a b i l l  t o  provide f o r  t h i s  lack has been 
approved by t h e  Bureau of the  Budget and i s  being forwarded t o  the  
Congress. 
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The Higashi* Property and i t s  Legionnaire Custodian 
Woodrow W. Higashi, up t o  t he  time of evacuation, operated a drug 
s t o r e  i n  Los Angeles. He was unable t o  dispose of h i s  movable property 
before he was obliged t o  en te r  the  Santa Anita Assembly Center in the  
l a t e  spr ing of 1942. A Caucasian acquaintance, who was a man of some 
prominence i n  t he  neighborhood, cal led on Mr. Higashi a t  the center and 
offered t o  a s s i s t  t h e  evacuee in s e l l i n g  ce r t a in  property. This man was 
a disabled World War I veteran drawing a Government pension. He sa id  
t h a t  he could dispose of M r .  Higashi's drug s to r e  equipment f o r  $350, 
h i s  neon s ign  fo r  $75, h i s  1935 Oldsmobile coupe f o r  $100 and offered t o  
t ake  ca re  of M r .  Higashi 's household fu rn i t u r e  and goods. Mr .  Higashi 
g r a t e f u l l y  accepted t h i s  o f f e r  of assistance.  
A few weeks l a t e r ,  the  veteran, whom we w i l l  c a l l  Mr.  E, v i s i t ed  
Santa Anita again, informing Mr. Higashi t h a t  a l l  h i s  apartment furni-  
t u r e  and furnishings had been stolen.  Mr. E sa id  t h a t  he believed t h a t  
he knew who had s to len  the  things,  but without power of a t to rney  t o  ac t  
i n  M r .  Higashi 's name, he was powerless t o  ac t .  M r .  Higashi granted him 
the  power of at torney.  M r .  E went away, and f o r  some weeks Mr. Higashi 
waited f o r  some word of h i s  property. The evacuee was increas ingly  un- 
easy, espec ia l ly  a s  he had received no port ion of t he  proceeds of the  
s a l e  of equipment which E admitted having made. So M r .  Higashi wrote t o  
M r .  E and requested an accounting. Neither then nor a t  any time s ince  
has M r .  Higashi received an accounting o r  any proceeds. 
From the  assembly center Mr. Higashi was sen t  t o  t he  Granacla 
Relocation Center i n  Colorado. There he consulted the  project  at torney,  
who advised him t o  place the  case i n  t h e  hands of an at torney.  Again 
Mr. Higashi waited, and again nothing happened. On October 27, 1943, 
t he  case was turned over t o  the  WRA at torney i n  t h e  San Francisco of- 
f i c e .  WRA property o f f i c e r s  conducted a thorough invest igat ion of the  
a c t i v i t i e s  of M r .  E, who about t h i s  time was made commander of an Amer- 
ican Legion post f o r  the  year 1944. The invest igat ion revealed t h a t  
Mr. E had no a s se t s  which would be reached by attachment, t h a t  he was 
d e f i n i t e l y  g u i l t y  of misappropriation and misrepresentation--not only 
with regard t o  Mr. Higashi but a l s o  with regard t o  other  evacuees. The 
f a c t s  assembled were presented t o  t h e  Los Angeles d i s t r i c t  at torney's  
o f f ice ,  but  t h a t  o f f i c e  s ta ted t h a t  it was not in te res ted  i n  f i l i n g  
charges against  Mr. E. 31 
Pilfering of the  Nichiren Buddhist Church i n  Los Angeles 
The Nichiren Buddhist Church, located a t  2806 East  F i r s t  S t ree t ,  
Los Angeles, was used as a storehouse f o r  t h e  household  and personal 
* Name f i c t i t i o u s  
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goods of  its evacuated members. The parsonage next door was rented t o  a 
woman who was duly appointed a s  custodian of t h i s  church, with power of 
at torney.  The appointment was made i n  a name t o  which she was not 
l e g a l l y  en t i t l ed ,  t he  surname being derived from a man with whom she was 
then l iving.  
On June 22, 1943, t h e  Los Angeles police informed t h e  WRA o f f i c e  
t h a t  they had, on June 21 a t  12:45 a. m., discovered a man who can be 
ca l led  F i n  t h e  Nichiren church and another man, G i n  a t ruck  j u s t  out- 
s i d e  t he  s i de  entrance t o  the  church, and t h a t  they had proceeded t o  
a r r e s t  both men. Mrs. H, t h e  o f f i c i a l  custodian of the  churdh, pleaded 
f o r  F ,  declaring t h a t  he had a r i g h t  t o  be i n  t h e  church, regardless  of 
the  hour, because he was ac t ing  a s  her  "caretaker." According t o  t he  
po l ice  repor t ,  nothing had been removed from t h e  church on t h a t  night,  
and t h e  two men were subsequently released. 
Less than three  weeks a f t e r  t h i s  episode, the  WRA property o f f i c e  
was informed by t h e  pol ice  t h a t  they had been called on Ju ly  6, by Mrs. 
H, who asked them t o  a r r e s t  F, whom she a t  t h i s  time accused of s tea l ing  
her  radio .  The evacuee property officers  immediately v i s i t ed  t h e  
Nichiren church and found t he  s ide  door broken open. Inside the  church 
everything was i n  a s t a t e  of chaos: trunks had been broken open and 
t h e i r  contents scat tered;  most of t he  c r a t e s  had been broken into;  a l l  
r e f r i ge r a to r s ,  stoves, washing machines, sewing machines and radios had 
disappeared. Information was teletyped t o  a l l  t he  relocation centers  t o  
res iden ts  who had stored t h e i r  possessions i n  t h i s  church; photographs 
of t he  wreckage were taken, and an inquiry  was made throughout t he  
neighborhood. In t he  course of t h i s  invest igat ion it was learned t h a t  
M r s .  H, who was ac tua l ly  Mrs .  I, had moved out  about July  8  Neighbors
reported t h a t  whereas she moved i n  with l i t t l e  o r  nothing i n  t he  way of 
fu rn i tu re ,  she took two truckloads away with her. The evacuee property 
o f f i c e r  on t he  case managed t o  loca te  t he  woman's husband, M r .  I, in 
another sec t ion  of t he  c i t y ,  but Mr. I had no idea of where Mrs. I might 
be. 
The property o f f i c e r  recommended t o  Rev. J. Ishihara, absentee 
p r i e s t  of t h i s  church, t h a t  a pa t ro l  service  be ins ta l l ed .  This was 
done, and mi l i t a ry  permission was sought and granted f o r  the p r i e s t  and 
th ree  o ther  evacuees of the  group affected t o  r e tu rn  under escor t  t o  
attempt t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  l i t t l e  remaining property t h a t  was worth 
salvaging. 31 
The following i s  a statement submitted by Mrs. Cecil Itano, who 
was a menber of t h i s  group which returned with a WRA i n t e rna l  secur i ty  
o f f i c e r  t o  Los Angeles t o  i den t i fy  goods i n  the  church: 
"On October 11, 1943, we went to  view the  Nichiren church. The 
catastrophe before my eyes was a hopeless mass of de l ibera te  
destruction. Everything was a conglomeration  of unrecoverable 
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